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Communication networks are part of the critical infrastructure upon which society and the 
economy depends; therefore it is crucial for communication networks to survive failures and 
physical attacks to provide critical services. Survivability techniques are deployed to ensure the 
functionality of communication networks in the face of failures. The basic approach for 
designing survivable networks is that given a survivability technique (e.g., link protection, or 
path protection) the network is designed to survive a set of predefined failures (e.g., all single-
link failures) with minimum cost. However, a hidden assumption in this design approach is that 
the sufficient monetary funds are available to protect all predefined failures, which might not be 
the case in practice as network operators may have a limited budget for improving network 
survivability. To overcome this limitation, this dissertation proposed a new approach for 
designing survivable networks, namely; risk-based survivable network design, which integrates 
risk analysis techniques into an incremental network design procedure with budget constraints.  
In the risk-based design approach, the basic design problem considered is that given a 
working network and a fixed budget, how best to allocate the budget for deploying a 
survivability technique in different parts of the network based on the risk. The term risk 
measures two related quantities: the likelihood of failure or attack, and the amount of damage 
caused by the failure or attack. Various designs with different risk-based design objectives are 
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considered, for example, minimizing the expected damage, minimizing the maximum damage, 
and minimizing a measure of the variability of damage that could occur in the network.  
In this dissertation, a design methodology for the proposed risk-based survivable network 
design approach is presented. The design problems are formulated as Integer Programming (InP) 
models; and in order to scale the solution of models, some greedy heuristic solution algorithms 
are developed. Numerical results and analysis illustrating different risk-based designs are 
presented.  
 
 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE............................................................................................................................... XVII 
1.0 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 SURVIVABILITY TECHNIQUES ................................................................... 1 
1.1.1 Link-based and Path-based Schemes .......................................................... 2 
1.1.2 Protection and Restoration Schemes........................................................... 3 
1.1.3 Dedicated-backup and Shared-backup Protection Schemes .................... 4 
1.2 BASIC APPROACH FOR SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN ................ 5 
1.3 RISK APPROACH FOR SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN................... 6 
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT................................................................................. 8 
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS ............................................................................................. 8 
1.6 ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 9 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW.......................................................................................... 11 
2.1 MINIMUM-COST SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN........................... 11 
2.2 AVAILABILITY-BASED SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN............... 13 
2.3 OTHER NETWORK DESIGN APPROACHES............................................ 15 
3.0 RISK-BASED SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN ........................................... 17 
3.1 RISK-BASED DESIGN PROCEDURE .......................................................... 18 
3.2 RISK ASSESSMENT ........................................................................................ 20 
 vii 
3.3 RISK-BASED INVESTMENT STRATEGY.................................................. 29 
3.4 MINIMUM-RISK SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN ............................ 30 
3.4.1 Integer Programming (InP) Approach ..................................................... 30 
3.4.1.1 Node-Link InP Formulations............................................................. 32 
3.4.1.2 Link-Path InP Formulations ............................................................. 37 
3.4.2 Heuristic Approach..................................................................................... 43 
3.5 MINIMUM-RISK SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN FOR 
NETWORKS WITH MULTIPLE CLASSES OF TRAFFIC........................................ 46 
3.6 INCREMENTAL MINIMUM-RISK DESIGH WITH DUAL 
PROTECTION ................................................................................................................... 56 
3.7 NUMERICAL RESULTS................................................................................. 63 
3.7.1 Minimum-risk curves ................................................................................. 65 
3.7.2 Cost-benefit analysis ................................................................................... 71 
3.7.3 Comparison of heuristic and InP approaches .......................................... 75 
3.7.4 Minimum-risk survivable network design for networks with multiple 
classes of traffic .......................................................................................................... 79 
3.7.5 Sequence of incremental minimum-risk designs...................................... 89 
3.7.6 Incremental minimum-risk design with dual protection ........................ 92 
3.8 CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................ 94 
4.0 ALTERNATIVE RISK-BASED SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGNS........... 97 
4.1 MIN-MAX DAMAGE SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN ................... 100 
4.2 MIN-MAX RISK SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN............................ 105 
4.3 MINIMUM-RMS DAMAGE SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN........ 109 
 viii 
4.4 NUMERICAL RESULTS............................................................................... 113 
4.4.1 Min-max damage survivable network design......................................... 114 
4.4.2 Min-max risk survivable network design ............................................... 117 
4.4.3 Comparisons of different risk-based survivable network designs ....... 120 
4.4.4 Comparisons of different risk-based survivable network designs for 
networks with multiple classes of traffic................................................................ 130 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................. 135 
5.0 CONTRIBUTIONS AND SUMMARY.................................................................. 137 
APPENDIX A       UNAVAILABILITY CALCULATION OF CABLE LINK.................. 140 
APPENDIX B       PROOF OF EXISTENCE OF OPTIMAL BUDGET VALUE............. 141 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................... 145 
 ix 
 LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1 Notation used in Section 3.2 ......................................................................................... 20 
Table 3.2 Notation used in node-link InP formulations................................................................ 32 
Table 3.3 Notation used in link-path InP formulations................................................................. 37 
Table 3.4 Notation used in minimum-risk design formulations for networks with multiple classes      
of traffic ............................................................................................................................... 47 
Table 3.5 Notation used in incremental minimum-risk design with dual protection                
formulations ......................................................................................................................... 57 
Table 3.6 Investment strategy results indicating which links or lighpaths (LPs) being protected 
for some specific budget values........................................................................................... 66 
Table 3.7 The number of pre-computed backup routes used in link-path InP models ................. 75 
Table 3.8 Average error of heuristics for link protection and path protection on Network 2 ...... 76 
Table 3.9 Average error of heuristics for link protection and path protection on Network 3 ...... 77 
Table 3.10 Risk and budget comparisons between minimum-risk design and minimum-cost 
design for Network 2 with link protection and varied CC values........................................ 85 
Table 3.11 Risk and budget comparisons between minimum-risk design and minimum-cost 
design for Network 2 with path protection and varied CC values....................................... 85 
Table 3.12 Risk and budget comparisons between minimum-risk design and minimum-cost 
design for Network 3 with link protection and varied CC values........................................ 86 
 x 
Table 3.13 Risk and budget comparisons between minimum-risk design and minimum-cost 
design for Network 3 with path protection and varied CC values....................................... 86 
Table 3.14 Risk results from three different incremental minimum-risk investment alternatives 
for link protection on Network 2, and a given capital expenditure of 40 units ................... 91 
Table 3.15 Risk results from three different incremental minimum-risk investment alternatives 
for link protection on Network 3, and a given capital expenditure of 50 units ................... 91 
Table 4.1 Notation used in Chapter 4 ........................................................................................... 98 
Table 4.2 A list of all network states in Network 2 which have the two highest damage levels 114 
Table 4.3 Results from min-max damage link protection design on Network 2 for a given budget 
of 30 units .......................................................................................................................... 116 
Table 4.4 Results from min-max damage path protection design on Network 2 for a given budget 
of 20 units .......................................................................................................................... 117 
Table 4.5 A list of ten network states in Network 2 with the highest risk levels in decreasing 
order ................................................................................................................................... 117 
Table 4.6 Results from the min-max risk link protection design on Network 2 for a given budget 
of 30 units .......................................................................................................................... 119 
Table 4.7 Results from the min-max risk path protection design on Network 2 for a given budget 
of 20 units .......................................................................................................................... 119 
Table 4.8 Comparison of different risk-based link protection designs on Network 2 for a budget 
of 15 units .......................................................................................................................... 121 
Table 4.9 Comparison of different risk-based link protection designs on Network 2 for a budget 
of 30 units .......................................................................................................................... 121 
 xi 
Table 4.10 Comparison of different risk-based link protection designs on Network 2 for a budget 
of 45 units .......................................................................................................................... 122 
Table 4.11 Comparison of different risk-based path protection designs on Network 2 for a budget 
of 10 units .......................................................................................................................... 122 
Table 4.12 Comparison of different risk-based path protection designs on Network 2 for a budget 
of 20 units .......................................................................................................................... 123 
Table 4.13 Comparison of different risk-based path protection designs on Network 2 for a budget 
of 30 units .......................................................................................................................... 123 
Table 4.14 Comparison of different risk-based link protection designs on Network 2 with 
multiple classes of traffic for a budget of 54 units............................................................. 132 
Table 4.15 Comparison of different risk-based path protection designs on Network 2 with 
multiple classes of traffic for a budget of 40 units............................................................. 133 
 xii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 Classification of survivability techniques ..................................................................... 2 
Figure 1.2 (a) link-based scheme and (b) path-based scheme ........................................................ 2 
Figure 1.3 Shared-backup protection: spare capacity sharing between BP1 and BP2 on link 4-5. 4 
Figure 3.1 Risk-based survivable network design procedure ....................................................... 19 
Figure 3.2 Network 1 (|N| = 5, |L| = 7) and working route matrix P............................................. 26 
Figure 3.3 Fault tree model for a WDM network in Figure 3.2 with link protection on             
links 1 and 4. ........................................................................................................................ 26 
Figure 3.4 Matrix STATE and vector stateprob ............................................................................ 28 
Figure 3.5 Flow chart of the greedy heuristic algorithm with greatest risk reduction.................. 44 
Figure 3.6 Flow chart of the greedy heuristic algorithm with greatest risk reduction/cost ratio.. 45 
Figure 3.7 Flow chart of the iterative greedy heuristic algorithm ................................................ 46 
Figure 3.8 Network 2 (|N| = 10, |L| = 22) with cable length (km) and Cable Cut (CC) metric (km) 
within parentheses................................................................................................................ 64 
Figure 3.9 Network 3 (|N| = 13, |L| = 23) with cable length (km) and Cable Cut (CC) metric (km) 
within parentheses................................................................................................................ 64 
Figure 3.10 Minimum-risk curves (risk vs budget) for link protection and path protection on 
Network 1............................................................................................................................. 65 
 xiii 
Figure 3.11 Minimum-risk curves (risk vs budget) for link protection and path protection on 
Network 2 with (a) a fixed Cable Cut (CC) value of 450 km, and (b) varied Cable Cut (CC) 
values as indicated in Figure 3.8.......................................................................................... 68 
Figure 3.12 Minimum-risk curves (risk vs budget) for link protection and path protection on 
Network 3 with (a) a fixed Cable Cut (CC) value of 450 km, and (b) varied Cable Cut (CC) 
values as indicated in Figure 3.9.......................................................................................... 68 
Figure 3.13 Minimum-risk curves (normalized risk vs budget) for link protection and path 
protection on Network 2 with (a) a fixed Cable Cut (CC) value of 450 km, and (b) varied 
Cable Cut (CC) values as indicated in Figure 3.8................................................................ 70 
Figure 3.14 Minimum-risk curves (normalized risk vs budget) for link protection and path 
protection on Network 3 with (a) a fixed Cable Cut (CC) value of 450 km, and (b) varied 
Cable Cut (CC) values as indicated in Figure 3.9................................................................ 70 
Figure 3.15 Benefit Plot (benefit vs budget) for (a) link protection, and (b) path protection on 
Network 3 with varied CC values (assuming a risk reduction of 40 Mbps = 1 monetary 
unit) ...................................................................................................................................... 72 
Figure 3.16 Benefit plot (benefit vs budget) for link protection on Network 3 with varied CC 
values assuming (a) a risk reduction 30 Mbps = 1 monetary unit, and (b) a risk reduction of 
50 Mbps = 1 monetary unit.................................................................................................. 73 
Figure 3.17 Benefit plot (benefit vs budget) for (a)  link protection and (b) path protection on 
Network 2 with a fixed CC value of 450 km (assuming a risk reduction of 40 Mbps = 1 
monetary unit)...................................................................................................................... 74 
 xiv 
Figure 3.18 Benefit plot (benefit vs budget) for (a) link protection and (b) path protection on 
Network 2 with varied CC values (assuming a risk reduction of 40 Mbps = 1 monetary 
unit) ...................................................................................................................................... 74 
Figure 3.19 Benefit plot (benefit vs budget) for (a) link protection and (b) path protection on 
Network 3 with a fixed CC value of 450 km (assuming a risk reduction of  40 Mbps = 1 
monetary unit)...................................................................................................................... 75 
Figure 3.20  Computational times of InP approach and Heuristic 3 for (a) link protection, and (b) 
path protection on Network 2 with a fixed CC value of 450 km......................................... 78 
Figure 3.21  Computational times of InP approach and Heuristic 3 for (a) link protection, and (b) 
path protection on Network 3 with a fixed CC value of 450 km......................................... 79 
Figure 3.22  Minimum-risk curves (risk vs budget) for Network 2 with multiple classes of 
traffics and (a) fixed CC values of 450 km, and (b) varied CC values................................ 80 
Figure 3.23  Minimum-risk curves (risk vs budget) for Network 3 with multiple classes of 
traffics and (a) fixed CC value of 450 km, (b) varied CC values ........................................ 81 
Figure 3.24  Risk curves (a percentage of the initial total risk level) for different classes of traffic 
in Network 2 with varied CC values and (a) link protection, and (b) path protection......... 82 
Figure 3.25  Risk curves (a percentage of the initial total risk level) for different classes of traffic 
in Network 3 with varied CC values and (a) link protection, and (b) path protection......... 82 
Figure 3.26  Risk curves (a percentage of the initial risk level of each traffic class) in Network 2 
with varied CC values and (a) link protection, and (b) path protection............................... 83 
Figure 3.27  Risk curves (percentage of the initial risk level of each traffic class) in Network 3 
with varied CC values and (a) link protection, and (b) path protection............................... 83 
 xv 
Figure 3.28  Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of connection availability across all 
connections in each traffic class for (a) no protection, (b) link protection with a budget of 
28 units, and (c) path protection with a budget of 28 units, on Network 2 with varied CC 
values. .................................................................................................................................. 88 
Figure 3.29  Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of connection availability across all traffic 
connections in each traffic class for (a) no protection, (b) link protection with a budget of 
48 units, and (c) path protection with a budget of 48 units, on Network 3 with varied CC 
values. .................................................................................................................................. 89 
Figure 3.30  Minimum-risk curves (risk vs budget) for deploying the second backup paths in (a) 
Network 2, and (b) Network 3 with varied CC values ........................................................ 94 
Figure 4.1 Two probability distributions of damage illustrating a difference between the 
minimum-RMS damage design and the minimum-risk design ......................................... 111 
Figure 4.2 Flow chart of the iterative greedy heuristic algorithm for solving the minimum-RMS 
damage design problem ..................................................................................................... 112 
Figure 4.3 Probability distribution of damage in Network 2 with no protection deployed ........ 129 
Figure 4.4 Probability distribution of damage in Network 2 with link protection using (a) 
minimum-risk design, (b) min-max damage design, (c) min-max risk design, and (d) 
minimum-RMS damage design for a budget of 30 units................................................... 129 
Figure 4.5 Probability distribution of damage in Network 2 with path protection using (a) 
minimum-risk design, (b) min-max damage design, (c) min-max risk design, and (d) 
minimum-RMS damage design for a budget of 20 units................................................... 130 
Figure 4.6 Probability distribution of damage in Network 2 with multiple classes of traffic with 
no protection ...................................................................................................................... 133 
 xvi 
Figure 4.7 Probability distribution of damage in Network 2 supporting multiple classes of traffic 
with link protection using (a) minimum-risk design, (b) min-max damage design, (c) min-
max risk design, and (d) minimum-RMS damage design for a budget of 54 units ........... 134 
Figure 4.8 Probability distribution of damage in Network 2 supporting multiple classes of traffic 
with path protection using (a) minimum-risk design, (b) min-max damage design, (c) min-
max risk design, and (d) minimum-RMS damage design for a budget of 40 units ........... 135 
Figure B.1 Minimum-risk curves (Risk vs Budget) for link protection and path protection on 
Network 3 and optimal budget values obtained from analytical approach........................ 143 
 xvii 
PREFACE 
Firstly and most importantly, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Dr. 
David Tipper. Without his guidance, encouragement, support, and understanding during my 
entire PhD study, this dissertation would not be possible. His profound comments have guided 
the direction of my research to stay on the right track until this work is finished. I am also very 
thankful for his financial supports through numerous research fundings, including the grants 
from National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institute of Standards (NIST), and Bechtel 
Bettis. 
I would also like to thank the members of my dissertation committee: Dr. Deep Medhi at 
the University of Missouri at Kansas, Dr. Bjorn Jager at the Molde University in Norway, Dr. 
Richard Thompson, and Dr. Prashant Krishnanmurthy at the Telecommunications Program, 
University of Pittsburgh, for their expertise and valuable comments to help improve my research. 
I am also obliged to the Telecommunications Program at the University of Pittsburgh for 
a financial support through a number of graduate student assistantship during my entire PhD 
study.  
I also owe thanks to many colleagues at the Telecommunications Program who have 
helped me during my study at Pitt, particularly Mr. Tae-Hoon Kim, who has been my office mate 
over the last few years. I would also like to thank all Thai students in the city of Pittsburgh for 
their friendship during the time that I am far away from home. 
 xviii 
Lastly, I would like to thank all of my family members, my father Mr. Nirach 
Vajanapoom, my mother Mrs. Ratanasri Vajanapoom, and my only sister Ms. Panpilai 
Vajanapoom. Their unlimited love, support, and understanding are the biggest factor for my 
success today. In particular, I would also like to dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my 
beloved father who passed away while I was pursuing the PhD degree. Now, his will for me to 
obtain the highest education is completed.  
 
 
 
 1 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Communication networks are part of the critical infrastructure upon which society and the 
economy depend. Therefore, it is crucial for the networks to survive failures and physical 
attacks, and continue to provide critical services. Survivability techniques are deployed to ensure 
the functionality of communication networks in the face of failures and physical attacks. A 
number of survivability techniques have appeared in the literature [1-45] for various network 
technologies, such as Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS), ATM, SONET, and Wavelength 
Division Multiplexing (WDM) optical networks. 
1.1 SURVIVABILITY TECHNIQUES 
A common approach for survivability techniques deployed in communication networks is based 
on the use of backup paths to carry the affected traffic in the event of network failures.  
Survivability techniques can be classified into different schemes as presented in Figure 1.1 [1, 4-
6]. The classification includes link-based or path-based schemes, protection or restoration 
schemes, and dedicated-backup or shared-backup protection schemes. The differences among 
these survivability schemes include their capacity efficiency, and level of resiliency to multiple 
failures. The classification is explained as follows. 
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Protection
Path 
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Figure 1.1 Classification of survivability techniques 
1.1.1 Link-based and Path-based Schemes 
Survivability techniques can be classified into a link-based scheme or a path-based scheme based 
on the scope of the protected entity (i.e., a link or a path). In the link-based scheme, the backup 
path (BP) is provided between the two end nodes of the protected link to carry the affected traffic 
from the protected link in the event of its failure. On the other hand, in the path-based scheme the 
backup path is provided end-to-end between source and destination nodes of the connection to 
carry the traffic between two end nodes when the working path (WP) fails. The link-based and 
the path-based schemes are illustrated in Figure 1.2 (a) and (b), respectively. 
 
   
  
WP
BP
s dFail
   
  
 
BP
s d
 
Fail 
(a)  (b)
WP
 
Figure 1.2 (a) link-based scheme and (b) path-based scheme  
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Typically, the path-based scheme is more spare capacity efficient than the link-based 
scheme due to its higher flexibility in choosing the backup routes [1, 4, 6-9, 14, 25]. However, 
the path-based scheme is more susceptible to multiple-link failures because it usually has a 
longer backup path, and its protected path is also longer than a protected link. 
1.1.2 Protection and Restoration Schemes 
The survivability techniques can also be classified as a protection or a restoration scheme, 
depending on when the routes of backup paths are determined. In the protection scheme, the 
backup routes are predetermined in advance before a failure occurs. To survive any single-link 
failure, each predetermined backup path must be link-disjoint from its corresponding working 
path. In contrast, in the restoration scheme the backup routes are computed in real time upon 
failure notification. The backup paths can utilize any available spare capacity that is left over in 
the network following the failure. Once the route is computed, the backup path is then 
established. 
The restoration approach is more spare capacity efficient [1, 4, 7], and more flexible to 
react to different failure scenarios than the protection technique. This is due to its ability to 
dynamically find backup paths after a failure occurs (i.e., a failure location is known prior to 
computing the backup routes), and its ability to utilize any available spare capacity in the 
network, as compared to the predetermined backup routes and pre-assigned spare capacity in the 
protection scheme. 
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1.1.3 Dedicated-backup and Shared-backup Protection Schemes 
Protection schemes can be further classified as dedicated-backup protection or shared-backup 
protection, depending on whether spare capacity sharing among backup paths is allowed or not. 
In dedicated protection, spare capacity allocated along a backup path is dedicated to that backup 
path only and cannot be used for failure recovery of any other protected links or paths. Whereas 
in shared-backup protection, backup paths can share spare capacity on a common backup link 
given that their corresponding protected links or protected paths are not expected to fail at the 
same time. Spare capacity sharing among backup paths also implies that the backup paths in the 
shared-backup protection can only be established after a failure. 
Figure 1.3 illustrates spare capacity sharing. Since working path 1 (WP1) and working 
path 2 (WP2) are link and node-disjoint, they are not expected to fail at the same time under a 
single-link and single-node failure assumption; therefore their backup paths (BP1 and BP2) can 
share spare capacity on a common link 4-5. Through spare capacity sharing, the amount of spare 
capacity required on link 4-5 is equal to the maximum value of the spare capacity required by 
BP1 and BP2, where as in the dedicated-backup protection the amount of spare capacity required 
on link 4-5 is equal to the sum of spare capacity required by BP1 and BP2. 
 
WP1
WP2
BP1
BP2
2
4 5
7 8 96
31
 
Figure 1.3 Shared-backup protection: spare capacity sharing between BP1 and BP2 on link 4-5 
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Through spare capacity sharing, the shared-backup protection scheme is more capacity 
efficient than the dedicated-backup protection scheme [1, 4, 6-7, 16-17, 25]. However, the 
shared-backup protection is more vulnerable to multiple-link failures in which predetermined 
backup paths are competing for shared spare capacity which is not sufficiently allocated in the 
network under a multiple-link failure event [16].  
1.2 BASIC APPROACH FOR SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN 
The basic approach for designing survivable networks in the literature is that for a given network 
technology and a given survivability technique (e.g., link protection, shared backup path 
protection, path restoration, etc.), a network is designed to survive a set of predefined failures, 
(e.g., all single-link failures), with minimum cost. This basic design approach involves 
determining an allocation of spare capacity in the network and an assignment of backup routes to 
minimize the cost. A number of optimization formulations and heuristic algorithms have been 
proposed for solving minimum-cost survivable network design problems for different network 
technologies and different survivability techniques [1, 2, 6-25].  However, a limitation of this 
minimum-cost design approach comes from a hidden assumption that the sufficient monetary 
funds are available to protect all predefined failures. In practice, many network operators have a 
very limited budget for improving network survivability, (e.g., a quarterly capital expenditure 
budget). This is especially true in access networks and edge service providers (e.g., Tier 3 ISPs). 
Typically, they have to build out the survivable network in pieces in an incremental manner 
based on a chronological sequence of budgets. In addition, another limitation of the minimum-
cost design is that this design approach treats all failures equally without considering the 
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variability in failure impacts and likelihood. Therefore, these require a new design approach 
which takes budget limitations and the variability in impacts and likelihood of failures directly 
into consideration; and this is one of the motivations of this dissertation. 
1.3 RISK APPROACH FOR SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN 
Due to the limitations of basic survivable network design approach described in Section 1.2, in 
this dissertation we propose a new approach for designing survivable networks based on 
integrating risk analysis techniques into an incremental network design procedure with budget 
constraints.  Risk analysis is widely used in engineering, and economics [52-54].  In engineering 
fields, the term risk accounts not only for a probability of failure but also for a degree of damage 
resulting from the failure. The risk of a failure is commonly evaluated as the product of the 
failure probability and the magnitude of damage caused by the failure [52]. In communication 
networks, potential failures, such as fiber cuts and equipment failures (e.g., router, cross connect, 
line card, etc.) cause a risk to the network. Different parts of the network are associated with 
different risk levels. This is due to a variation in an unavailability level of various network 
components. For example, the rate of cable cuts per km of cable in the United States shows an 
order of magnitude variation based on the geographic location and population density. The Mean 
Time To Repair (MTTR) network components also varies across different parts of the network 
based on the failure location. In addition, failures in some parts of the network cause a higher 
magnitude of damage than the others. For example, failure of an optical fiber carrying critical 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) traffic for the electrical power grid can result 
in more societal damage than a fiber carrying web or entertainment traffic. Moreover, different 
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parts of the network require different costs for deploying a survivability technique. For example, 
some network links may have longer backup paths than the others depending on the network 
topology, thus requiring a higher spare capacity cost. Observing that the risk level and the 
survivability cost vary across the network infrastructure, therefore for a given budget, network 
operators need to carefully determine a budget allocation for deploying network survivability in 
different parts of the network. This is the design problem we consider in the risk-based 
survivable network design approach proposed here. 
 At any capital expenditure investment point, the basic design problem considered is given 
a working network and a fixed budget, how best to spend the money for deploying a 
survivability technique in different parts of the network based on the risk. Many different design 
objectives can be considered in the risk-based design approach, for example minimizing the 
expected damage value, minimizing the variability of damage, or minimizing the maximum 
damage that could occur in the network. 
The components of the risk-based design approach are a risk assessment and a risk-based 
investment strategy. The risk assessment is a process of quantifying the risk associated with 
failures in the network. The assessment is achieved by using probability techniques and 
understanding of failure relationships in the network. The risk-based investment strategy is used 
to determine the best budget allocation for deploying a survivability technique in different parts 
of the network based on the risk criteria. 
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1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In responding to a need for an approach for incrementally designing survivable networks with 
budget constraints, a risk-based survivable network design technique is proposed in this 
dissertation. The basic design problem considered in the risk-based design approach is: 
Given a working network and a fixed budget, how best to allocate the budget for 
deploying a survivability technique in different parts of the network based on the risk? 
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS  
The contributions of this dissertation are twofold. First, this dissertation proposes a new design 
approach which is suited to an incremental design of survivable networks with budget constraints 
and variability in the damage and likelihood of failures, namely; risk-based survivable network 
design. Then, based on the proposed risk-based design approach, this dissertation presents 
solution methods, numerical results, and analysis for different risk-based design formulations. 
Four risk-based designs are considered in the dissertation: minimum-risk design, min-max 
damage design, min-max risk design, and minimum-RMS damage design. These design 
problems are considered for the first time in literature. The Integer Programming (InP) 
formulations for each design problem with link protection and path protection are presented. 
However, the minimum-RMS damage design is solved by the proposed greedy heuristic 
algorithm due to its nonlinearity. 
Based on the numerical results, various aspects of the risk-based design approach are 
disclosed. First, the results exhibit a convexity in the risk curve, and secondly provide 
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comparison of path protection and link protection based on the risk. The dissertation also 
presents a cost-benefit analysis which demonstrates whether the cost for providing network 
survivability is justified by the reduction in risk level, and determines the optimal budget value 
which maximizes the benefit of an investment in network protection. The dissertation also 
provides a proof that if the risk curve is convex, there always exists an optimal budget value. 
The dissertation shows one advantage of the risk-based design approach over the 
conventional minimum-cost design approach in that it allows a tradeoff between the survivability 
cost and the network risk level. In addition, the dissertation shows the ability of the risk-based 
design approach to provide differential classes of availability or protection to different traffic 
classes. 
Lastly, the dissertation presents the advantages and disadvantages of the four risk-based 
designs considered based on various measures including the expected damage, the maximum 
damage, the variability of damage, and the probability distribution of damage. 
1.6 ORGANIZATION    
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a literature review 
on different approaches for survivable network design, along with discussion of their limitations, 
and comparisons with the proposed risk-based survivable network design approach. Chapter 3 
presents the methodology for risk-based survivable network design. The basic risk-based 
survivable network design approach, namely the minimum-risk survivable network design, is 
presented in the chapter. Chapter 4 presents and compares various risk-based survivable network 
design objectives. The min-max damage survivable network design, the min-max risk survivable 
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network design, and the minimum-root mean square (RMS) damage survivable network design 
are discussed in this chapter. Lastly, Chapter 5 gives a summary and contributions of this 
dissertation along with future research directions. 
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents a literature review on survivable network design. Different survivable 
network design approaches are discussed, and compared to the proposed risk-based survivable 
network design.  A review of other related literature is also presented. 
2.1 MINIMUM-COST SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN 
A large amount of literature on survivable network design has appeared in recent years. The 
basic design approach in the literature is that for a given survivability technique, the network is 
designed to survive a set of predefined failures (e.g., all single-link failures, or all single-node 
failures) with minimum cost. This minimum-cost design involves determining an allocation of 
spare capacity in the network and an assignment of backup routes to minimize the cost. The 
works in [8, 9] provide Integer Linear Programming (ILP) formulations to determine the 
minimum-cost capacity allocation and route assignment for a network using link restoration and 
path restoration to survive all single-link failures. The formulations can be used for minimizing 
the amount of spare capacity only, or jointly optimizing both working and spare capacity. In [10, 
11], the minimum-capacity ILP formulation for a link-restorable network is extended to include 
dual-link SRLG failures, where SRLG is a group of links that are susceptible to simultaneous 
failures. The work also shows the effect of the design for dual-link failures on the spare capacity 
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requirement. Whereas, the minimum-cost link restoration design in [12] also takes the hop limit 
of backup routes into consideration. In [13], a minimum-capacity design to protect against node 
failures using path restoration is considered. In addition, some algorithms have been proposed 
for solving the minimum-capacity link restoration and path restoration design problems, such as 
in [9, 12, 14]. 
For networks with Shared-Backup Path Protection (SBPP), the basic minimum-capacity 
ILP formulations are provided in [15-18]. The formulation is extended for single-node failures in 
[19], single-duct failures in [24], arbitrary failures in [15], and two-layer networks in [20]. A 
greedy-based heuristic technique, called Successive Survivable Routing (SSR), to provide good 
near optimal solutions is proposed in [15]. A simulated annealing heuristic is presented in [21].  
For networks with shared-backup link protection, the minimum-cost ILP formulations are 
presented in [6, 22-23]; and some algorithms are proposed in [22-23]. 
For a dedicated-backup protection scheme, an ILP formulation to jointly minimize both 
spare and working capacity is presented in [6, 24]. Alternatively, working and backup routes can 
be determined by using Bhandari’s algorithm [26], which finds a pair of link-disjoint working 
and backup paths between a source and a destination node with minimum cost.    
In all of the above minimum-cost survivable network designs, a common assumption is 
that the sufficient monetary funds are available to protect all predefined failures. This is 
fundamentally different from our proposed risk-based survivable network design approach in 
which the monetary funds are limited, and the network must be designed for a given budget 
based on the risk consideration. 
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2.2 AVAILABILITY-BASED SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN 
Apart from the capacity cost aspect, a number of studies in literature also consider the failure 
probability of network components, or an availability aspect of survivable networks.  
An availability evaluation of connections in a network with different types of 
survivability techniques has been considered in the literature. For connections with dedicated 
protection, a connection availability calculation is similar to an availability calculation of series 
and parallel systems; and precise closed-form models are available. However, availability 
evaluations in networks with restoration or shared-backup protection are much more complex, 
due to spare capacity sharing in both schemes, and flexibility in choosing backup routes in the 
restoration scheme (i.e., a backup path is not restricted to a predefined route). Therefore, precise 
closed-form models for connection availability are not available; and a number of approximating 
models have been proposed in literature (e.g., [27] for link restoration, [28] for path restoration, 
and [16, 29-30] for Shared-Backup Path Protection (SBPP)). Comparative studies on connection 
availability for different survivability techniques are also presented in [16, 29-30]. Furthermore, 
the works in [31-34] present a tradeoff between the minimum cost for providing network 
survivability and the level of connection availability that can be achieved for different 
survivability techniques; in order to measure a relationship between the two quantities, a metric 
called availability gain is proposed in [31, 34] as a ratio between an increase in availability and 
an increase in backup capacity compared to the unprotected case. In contrast to these works, our 
work shows a tradeoff in terms of the cost of network survivability and the level of risk 
reduction. A cost-benefit analysis is considered in our work to show whether the cost for 
providing network protection is justified by an amount of risk reduction. In addition, in the above 
literature, an availability evaluation is performed after the networks were designed (e.g., using 
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the minimum-cost design). This is different from our risk-based design approach in which the 
failure probability and the availability evaluation are incorporated into the design procedure. 
Network design problems which incorporate availability into their design objectives are 
also considered in some literature. The works in [36, 37] study the maximum-availability 
network design problems. The design approach in [36] consists of two phases. The first phase 
determines the routes for each connection with maximum availability using a dedicated path 
protection with no cost constraint. In the second phase, the design is aimed at minimizing the 
network cost while keeping the availability level the same, or decreased by a prefixed margin 
factor. The work in [37] determines maximum-availability routes with no cost constraint for each 
unprotected or dedicated path protection connection using a modified Dijkstra’s algorithm.  This 
work is similar to our risk-based design approach in which a failure probability or an availability 
is considered as a part of design objective; however the difference is that the risk based design 
approach considers not only the failure probability, but also the amount of damage resulting from 
the failure. Also, the risk based design takes into a consideration a budget constraint which 
imposes a limit on the amount of spare capacity in the network. 
In [38-41], an availability-constrained provisioning problem is studied.  This problem is 
to determine the minimum-cost routes for each connection while satisfying the minimum 
requirement of connection availability by, if necessary, applying a dedicated path protection. 
This study is similar to our work in which protection is applied only to some connections. 
However, the difference is that in these studies, cost is an objective function to be minimized, 
and connection availability is a constraint, whereas in the risk-based design problem the design 
objective is to minimize the risk function, subject to a budget constraint. Also, the risk-based 
approach considers the damage of various failure cases in the provisioning of spare resources. 
 15 
The work in [35] provides an analysis of the survivability cost and the availability that 
can be achieved for different partially fault-tolerant network configurations. This is similar to our 
work in that networks are partially protected (i.e., only some network links are protected); 
however the difference is that in this work, a determination of which network parts to be 
protected is subjectively given to the analysis without considering a budget constraint; whereas 
in the risk-based design approach an investment strategy is used to determine which parts of the 
network to be protected for a given budget and risk-based objective. 
2.3 OTHER NETWORK DESIGN APPROACHES 
In the risk-based design approach, networks are designed based on a given budget. Other budget-
constrained network design problems are also studied in literature [2, 10]. By moving the cost 
from an objective function in the minimum-cost design to a constraint, it allows the network to 
be designed according to another objective function. For example, in [2] the network is designed 
to maximize the network throughput for a given capacity budget. Unlike the risk-based design 
approach, this design’s objective function is not related to a survivability aspect of the networks. 
The most closely related work to our proposed risk-based design approach is the work in [10], 
which determines a spare capacity allocation to maximize a restoration level for a given spare 
capacity budget using link restoration. However, this design approach is different from the risk-
based design approach in that its design objective considers only the restoration level, whereas 
the risk-based design approach considers both the failure probability and the damage caused by 
the failure. 
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The proposed risk-based design approach is based on an incremental design in which a 
Greenfield condition is not assumed, and the network given to the design problem might be 
partially fault-tolerant. Studies on incremental network design also appear in literature. In [2], the 
design determines an incremental expansion of network working capacity to support the growth 
of traffic demands. In contrast, in the risk-based design approach the spare capacity rather than 
the working capacity is incrementally extended to improve network survivability. The 
incremental design in [42-43] considers an augmentation of both working and spare capacity to 
support the future demands. However, the difference from our risk-based design approach is that 
in the risk-based design, the network is incrementally designed based on a given fixed budget 
amount rather than the growth of traffic demands, and a risk-based objective function is used. 
Lastly, our risk-based design problem is related to the redundancy allocation problem 
considered in [51] which determines how to allocate a redundancy to different parts of the 
systems in order to achieve the most effective result for a given budget. Nevertheless, our risk-
based design problem is considered specifically in the context of network survivability which is 
distinctive from other contexts. For example, it includes a routing sub-problem to determine the 
routes of backup paths which in turn affects the cost of redundancy and the network risk level. 
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3.0  RISK-BASED SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN 
This chapter presents the design methodology for the risk-based survivable network design 
approach. The risk-based design procedure is presented in Section 3.1, which explains the 
process, inputs and outputs of the risk-based design. The two components of the risk-based 
design, namely; a risk assessment and a risk-based investment strategy, are presented in Section 
3.2 and 3.3, respectively. The first risk-based survivable network design considered, the 
minimum-risk survivable network design, is presented in Section 3.4.  Two solution approaches 
for solving the minimum-risk design problem: (1) an Integer Programming (InP) approach, and 
(2) a heuristic approach, are presented in Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, respectively. An extension of 
the minimum-risk design approach to networks with multiple classes of traffic, and an 
incremental network design are presented in Section 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. Numerical results 
illustrating the minimum-risk design approach are presented and discussed in Section 3.7. Lastly, 
Section 3.8 concludes this chapter.  
In this dissertation, we consider two standard survivability techniques:  dedicated-backup 
link protection and dedicated-backup path protection. Also, for ease of presentation the proposed 
design approach is explained in the context of WDM optical networks with only cable cut 
failures. However, the methodology is general in nature and can be applied to other connection-
oriented network technologies and other failure/attack conditions. 
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3.1 RISK-BASED DESIGN PROCEDURE 
This section explains the design procedure of the risk-based survivable network design approach. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates a design process along with inputs and outputs of the risk-based design 
approach. First, a network topology which includes all existing network links and nodes, and an 
end-to-end traffic demand matrix which indicates the source and destination nodes and the traffic 
rate for each demand are given to the design. The working network includes the routes for all the 
traffic demands, which can be based on any design objective, for example, minimizing a cost, 
minimizing an end-to-end delay, maximizing network utilization [2], shortest hop, etc.  
In the design procedure used here, the working network along with a survivability 
technique, a survivability cost model, and a fixed budget are given to the risk-based survivable 
network design. In link protection, the risk-based design determines which network links to 
protect, and the corresponding backup routes for a given budget based on the risk; whereas in 
path protection, the risk-based design determines which end-to-end paths to protect, and the 
routes of backup paths for a given budget based on the risk. Various risk-based design objectives 
are possible in the risk-based design approach. The minimum-risk design, the min-max damage 
design, the min-max risk design, and the minimum-RMS damage design are discussed in Section 
3.4, 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, respectively. A solution algorithm (e.g., branch and bound algorithm) is 
then applied to the design problem to determine the survivable network. A risk-based 
incremental survivable network design can also be applied to the survivable network to further 
reduce the network risk based on a sequence of budgets as discussed in Sections 3.6, 3.7.5 and 
3.7.6. 
A design assumption used in this dissertation is that the survivability cost is considered 
only in term of a spare capacity, and a unit cost of spare capacity on any link is a function of a 
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cable length (i.e., a unit of spare capacity on a longer cable is more expensive than a unit of spare 
capacity on a shorter cable). Also, the budget is considered only in term of the maximum spare 
capacity investment. The spare capacity can only be invested on the existing network links; 
adding new links to the current network topology in order to support backup paths is not 
included in the current formulation but it is relatively straightforward to extend the formulation 
to study this case. In Addition, it is assumed that each OXC has full wavelength conversion 
capability, so that the wavelength continuity constraint can be ignored.  
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Figure 3.1 Risk-based survivable network design procedure 
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3.2 RISK ASSESSMENT  
As noted earlier, the risk-based survivable network design approach has two components 
namely: a risk assessment and a risk-based investment strategy. The two components are 
interrelated since an achievement of the investment’s goal is checked by the risk assessment. 
This section discusses the risk assessment. The notation used in this section is presented in Table 
3.1 
Table 3.1 Notation used in Section 3.2 
L Set of links or cables 
R Set of lightpaths 
S Set of network states 
P = {pr,i}|R| × |L| 
pr,i = 1 if lightpath r uses link i in its working path, and = 0 
otherwise  
m = {mr}|R| mr is the data rate (bits/s) of lightpath r  
ui Unavailability of cable i 
STATE = {states,i}|S| × |L| 
states,i = 1 if cable i is cut in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise 
stateprob = {stateprobs}|S| stateprobs  is the probability of network state s  
dr Damage caused by a failure of lightpath r  
damages Damage occurring in network state s 
risks Amount of risk associated with network state s 
totalrisk Total risk to the network 
1M × N An M × N matrix with only elements “1”  
TI Time Interval over which risk/damage assessed (e.g. 31,536,000 sec/year) 
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The following notation is used in the link protection case only: 
bp = {bpi}|L| bpi = 1 if link i is protected, and = 0 otherwise  
Q = {qi,j}|L| × |L| 
qi,j = 1 if link i is protected and its backup path traverses 
link j, and = 0 otherwise  
The following notation is used in the path protection case only: 
bp = {bpr}|R| bpr =1 if lightpath r is protected, and = 0 otherwise  
Q = {qr,j}|R| × |L| 
qr,j = 1 if lightpath r is protected and its backup path 
traverses link j, and = 0 otherwise 
 
Risk assessment is a process of quantifying the amount of risk associated with the 
potential hazards (i.e., failures, attacks, accidents, etc) in the network. Here, the focus is on 
failures only.  Risk measures two quantities related to failures: the probability of failure and the 
amount of damage resulting from the failure. The risk of failure is defined as the probability of 
failure times the damage from failure [52]; this is the traditional definition in engineering and IT 
security. In a network with n failure-prone components, each of which could be in either a failure 
state or a non-failure state, there are a total of 2n possible network states. Each network state 
uniquely identifies a set of components that are in a failure state and a non-failure state. Let S 
denotes the set of network failure states indexed by s. The risk associated with network state s, 
denoted by risks, is equal to a product of the probability of network being in state s, denoted by 
stateprobs, and the amount of damage occurring in network state s, denoted by damages, as 
shown in (3.1). 
 
 s s srisk stateprob damage= ×                                 (3.1) 
 
Since the network states are mutual exclusive to each other (i.e., no two network states 
can occur at the same time), the total network risk, denoted by totalrisk, can be calculated by 
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summing the risk associated with each network state risks for all network states, as in (3.2) and 
(3.3). 
 s
s S
totalrisk risk
∈
=∑  (3.2) 
 s s
s S
totalrisk stateprob damage
∈
= ×∑                                          (3.3) 
 
It is important to note that the total risk in (3.3) can also be interpreted as an expected 
damage value across all network states. 
In this dissertation, the risk assessment is illustrated in the context of WDM optical 
networks. A WDM network consists of Optical Cross Connects (OXCs) interconnected by 
optical fiber links organized in a mesh topology. An end-to-end connection between a source and 
a destination OXC is called a lightpath (LP). A lightpath occupies a wavelength on each optical 
fiber link that it traverses. Potential failures, such as fiber cuts and equipment failures (e.g., 
OXC, amplifier, etc.) cause a risk to the WDM network. The magnitude of risk that these failures 
pose to the network can be evaluated by (3.3).  In WDM networks, the quantity of interest is the 
damage associated with each lightpath failure due to network component failures. Therefore, the 
amount of damage occurring in network state s is the sum of damages of all failed lightpaths in 
network state s, as shown in (3.4), where dr is the amount of damage caused by a failure of 
lightpath r. 
 
 
all failed lightpaths  
in network state 
( )s r
s S r
s
totalrisk stateprob d
∈
=∑ ∑                (3.4) 
 
The amount of damage caused by the failure of lightpath r, or dr, can be measured in 
many different ways. If knowledge of the higher layer traffic is available, one can construct a 
damage metric associated with each lightpath that incorporates the societal effects of the loss of 
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various traffic. For example, a higher damage value would be placed on emergency 
communications and SCADA for critical infrastructures. One simple damage measure is the 
traffic loss rate resulting from the lightpath failure. In this case, the amount of damage caused by 
a failure of lightpath r (i.e., dr) for the risk calculation in (3.4) is equal to the data rate of 
lightpath r (i.e., mr) as shown in (3.5). In other words, the amount of damage in network state s is 
equal to the sum of the lost traffic rate of all failed lightpaths in that network state.  
 
 
all failed lightpaths  
in network state 
( )s r
s S r
s
totalrisk stateprob m
∈
=∑ ∑                                  (3.5) 
 
If the total risk in (3.5) is multiplied by the time interval TI, for example, TI = 
365×24×60×60 = 31,536,000 sec/year, the result is equal to the Expected Loss of Traffic (ELT) 
per year in the network as shown in (3.6). 
 
 
all failed lightpaths  
in network state 
TI ( )s r
s S r
s
ELT stateprob m
∈
= ∑ ∑  (3.6) 
 
Note that the risk calculation in (3.3) is very similar to the network failure performability 
calculation considered in [45-50], where the network performability is defined as a sum of the 
product of the state probability and the performability measure (e.g., a connection blocking in 
circuit switched networks, or an average packet delay in packet switched networks) for all 
network states. 
For each network state, a state probability can be obtained by multiplying together 
appropriated failure probability and working or non-failure probability of all failure-prone 
network components. If cable cuts are considered as the only source of failures in the network, 
and the failures are statistically independent of each other, the probability of network state s can 
be calculated as in (3.7). Note that in (3.7) L denotes a set of cable links; states,i represents the 
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network failure states, where states,i = 1 if cable i is in a failure state in network state s, and 
states,i = 0 otherwise; and ui denotes the unavailability of cable i. Techniques for the calculation 
of the unavailability of cables due to cable cuts are well known and are discussed in the 
Appendix A. 
 1 ,, (1 ) statestate s is is i i
i L
stateprob u u −
∈
= −∏             (3.7) 
 
Note that the calculation of risk in (3.4)–(3.6) requires the determination of the failed 
lightpaths in each network state. This process must take into account different configurations of 
survivability techniques being deployed in the network. In this dissertation, a fault tree, which is 
a well-developed failure-relationship model commonly used in the risk analysis, is utilized for 
this purpose. 
 
Fault Tree Model 
A fault tree [53-54] is a graphical model that depicts the logical interrelationship of 
failure events in a system. Here, it is used as a failure model for determining the set of failed 
lightpaths in each network state. The construction of a fault tree starts with identifying the tree’s 
root or top events which represent failure events of interest (e.g., lightpath failures in WDM 
networks). Then it proceeds by seeking out the failure events that contribute to an occurrence of 
the top events, and connecting these events to the top events by logic gates.  A variety of logical 
relationship gates (e.g., AND, OR, NOT, etc.) and specialized gates (e.g., K out N Voting, etc.) 
are used to construct the tree. Two types of fundamental logic gates used in the fault tree are an 
AND gate and an OR gate. An AND gate, symbolized by AND , indicates a situation where the 
output event occurs if and only if all the input events occur. Whereas, an OR gate, symbolized by 
OR , is used to indicate that the output event occurs if at least one of the input events occurs. This 
process repeats until it reaches basic events, which are at the lowest level in all branches of the 
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fault tree, and symbolized by circles. The basic events typically represent initiating failure events 
(e.g., fiber cuts, and equipment failures) or events that are not further developed in the fault tree 
model (i.e., underlying failure events that may cause this event to occur are not considered). 
Once completed, the fault tree provides a failure model, which relates the top events to the basic 
events via logic gates, and intermediate events, represented by rectangles.  
Here, the fault tree approach is illustrated by an example using the WDM network in 
Figure 3.2. For the network in Figure 3.2, we assume that there are 10 bi-directional lightpaths 
(LPs) between all node pairs in the network. The lightpath routes in the form of a working path 
link incidence matrix P are given in Figure 3.2, where P = {pr,i}|R| × |L| and pr,i = 1 if lightpath r 
uses link i in its working path, and = 0 otherwise. A fault tree model for a WDM network in 
Figure 3.2 with link protection on link 1 and link 4 is shown in Figure 3.3. Lightpath failures are 
defined as the top events of the fault tree. A lightpath fails when at least one of the links that the 
lightpath traverses fails.  For example, the event LP3_fail occurs when either the event 
Link2_fail or the event Link7_fail occurs, or both events occur. Similarly, each link failure event 
occurs if a corresponding cable cut event occurs. Here, cable cuts are considered as the only 
basic events of the fault tree; however, it is straightforward to include other network component 
failures and attacks (e.g., OXC failures, and optical amplifier failures) into the set of basic 
events. With link protection, a link is determined to be in a failure state only if both the link itself 
(i.e., the working link), and its backup path fail. In this example, the backup path of link 1 
traverses network links 2, 3 and 6, whereas the backup path of link 4 traverses network links 1 
and 2, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. Link protection introduces an additional AND gate located 
under a failure event of the link being protected, which makes an occurrence of the link failure 
event less likely. Note that in this protection technique it is assumed that the backup path is not 
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protected by a link protection mechanism implemented at any links that the backup path 
traverses.  
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Figure 3.2 Network 1 (|N| = 5, |L| = 7) and working route matrix P  
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Figure 3.3 Fault tree model for a WDM network in Figure 3.2 with link protection on links 1 and 4. 
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From the fault tree model, a set of failed lightpaths in each network state can be 
determined by assigning the corresponding failure states (i.e., occurring or not-occurring) to all 
basic events in the fault tree, and evaluating the logic of the tree up to the top events. 
Combining the fault tree logic with the risk calculation in (3.4), a closed-form formula for 
determining the amount of network risk in the cases of no protection, link protection, and path 
protection, can be obtained as given in (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10), respectively. Here, the formulas 
are in matrix form. Note in these formulas, ?  is a Hadamard (Schur) product, obtained by 
multiplying together corresponding elements in each matrix [55], and ?  is a binary matrix 
multiplication operator, which modifies general addition 1+1 = 2 to Boolean addition where 1+1 
= 1 [56]. In (3.8)–(3.10), a binary matrix STATE = {states,i}|S|× |L| is used to list all network 
states, where states,i= 1 if cable i is in a failure state in network state s, and states,i = 0 otherwise. 
A matrix STATE for the WDM network example in Figure 3.2 is shown in Figure 3.4.  In this 
network example, there are 7 network links, and since cable cuts are considered as the only 
sources of failures, therefore there are a total of 27 = 128 possible network failure states.  
Moreover, a column vector stateprob = {stateprobs}|S| is used to list network state probabilities, 
where stateprobs is the probability of a network state s, which is calculated by (3.7). A vector 
stateprob for the WDM network example in Figure 3.2 is also shown in Figure 3.4 (using CC = 
450 km and MTTR = 24 hours for ui calculations as discussed in Appendix A). Column vector d 
= {dr}|R|  represents lightpaths’ damage levels, where dr is the amount of damage caused by the 
failure of lightpath r. For risk calculation in the link protection case in (3.9), matrix bp = {bpi}|L| 
indicates which links are being protected, where bpi = 1 if link i is protected, and = 0 otherwise, 
whereas backup path link incidence matrix Q = {qi,j}|L| × |L|  represents each lightpath’s backup 
route, where qi,j = 1 if link i is protected and uses link j in its backup path, and = 0 otherwise.  
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Similarly, for risk calculation in the path protection case in (3.10), matrix bp = {bpr}|R| indicates 
which lightpaths are being protected, where bpr = 1 if lightpath r is protected, and = 0 otherwise, 
and backup path link incidence matrix Q = {qr,j}|R| × |L|  represents the backup routes, where qr,j = 
1 if lightpath r is protected and uses link j in its backup route, and = 0 otherwise.  
Lastly, note that in this work it is assumed that the recovery process is instantaneous (i.e., 
the down time during the recovery process is negligible), and the network continues to provide 
service with no disruptions or traffic loss as long as the backup paths are available as in [27]. 
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Figure 3.4 Matrix STATE and vector stateprob 
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3.3 RISK-BASED INVESTMENT STRATEGY  
Once the risk have been identified and assessed, the next component in the design approach is a 
risk-based investment strategy. The risk-based investment strategy is used to manage or reduce 
the network risk by deploying risk-reduction techniques in the network, subjected to a budget 
limit. Various techniques for reducing the risk of failures exist. These techniques can be 
categorized as prevention and recovery techniques and are discussed in turn below. 
The prevention techniques seek to reduce the probability of network component failure. 
In communications networks, this can be achieved by for example, using more reliable network 
equipments (e.g., more reliable OXCs), backup power supplies, etc. However, improving 
network components’ reliability is sometimes infeasible, or in some situations, even if the most 
reliable network components are deployed, the desired level of network risk still may not be 
achieved. Therefore, the recovery techniques are also considered. 
Recovery techniques perform a corrective action upon a failure. In other words, these 
techniques aim at reducing the amount of damage resulting from a failure, rather than reducing 
the failure probability of network components as do the prevention techniques. In 
communications networks, these techniques are the same as the survivability techniques 
discussed in Section 1.1. Typically, in survivability techniques the corrective actions are 
achieved by providing backup paths to carry the affected traffic in the event of network 
component failure. Various survivability techniques are also discussed in Section 1.1. 
For a given budget, the risk-based investment strategy is used to determine the best 
budget allocation for deploying risk-reduction techniques in different parts of the network. In this 
dissertation, the focus is on survivability techniques only, specifically the link and path 
protection techniques.  In the link protection case, an investment strategy is used to determine 
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which network links to protect and their corresponding backup routes for a given budget; 
whereas in the path protection case an investment strategy is used to determine which lightpaths 
to protect and their corresponding backup routes subjected to a budget limit.  
3.4 MINIMUM-RISK SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN  
The first risk-based design considered in this dissertation is the minimum-risk survivable 
network design. In this design problem, the working network (i.e., working capacity and working 
routes of all lightpaths) is given, and the design objective is to minimize the total risk for a given 
budget by deploying a survivability technique in different parts of the network. The minimum-
risk link protection design problem is to determine which network links to protect, and their 
corresponding backup routes; whereas the minimum-risk path protection design problem is to 
determine which lightpaths to protect, and their corresponding backup routes.   
Two approaches for solving the minimum-risk survivable network design problem are 
considered in this dissertation. One is based on an Integer Programming (InP) optimization 
problem formulation, which provides optimal solutions; however its computational time does not 
scale well with the problem size. Therefore, a heuristic approach, which can approximate the 
optimal solution in a reasonable time, is also considered.   
3.4.1 Integer Programming (InP) Approach 
In this section, the minimum-risk survivable network design problems are formulated as 0-1 InP 
models. In general, there are two different ways to formulate InP models for network-flow 
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optimization problems; one is based on a node-link model (also known as a node-arc model), and 
the other one is based on a link-path model (also known as an arc-flow model and an arc-path 
model) [1-2]. 
For the minimum-risk design problems, the node-link model determines candidate 
backup routes through the flow conservation constraints defined in the problem formulation. It 
considers all eligible routes in the network as candidate routes for each backup path, and does 
not require a set of pre-computed backup routes.  Therefore, the node-link model provides a true 
optimal solution in a sense that all eligible routes are considered in the optimization problem. On 
the other hand, the link-path model requires a set of pre-computed routes as candidate backup 
routes for each backup path. Therefore, solving a link-path InP model provides an optimal 
solution for a given set of pre-computed backup routes, which is only guaranteed to be the true 
optimal solution if the set of all possible backup routes is used. The advantage of the link-path 
model over the node-link model is that one can scale down the number of backup routes 
considered in the problem, thereby reducing the size of the solution space. As a result, the 
complexity of the problem and the computational time for solving the problem is reduced. 
Another advantage of the link-path model is that the set of pre-computed backup routes can be 
selected in a way that only pre-qualified backup routes are considered in the problem. This is 
especially important in communications networks such as WDM optical networks where the 
signal quality is an important factor, and thus the backup path can take only on some specific 
routes in the network (e.g., limited by distance, signal quality, and latency). 
The node-link model and the link-path model for the minimum-risk survivable network 
design problem are presented in Section 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.1.2 respectively. 
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3.4.1.1 Node-Link InP Formulations 
In this section, the node-link InP formulations for the minimum-risk link protection design 
problem and the minimum-risk path protection design problem are presented. The notation used 
in the node-link InP formulations is presented in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2 Notation used in node-link InP formulations 
Given:  
N Set of nodes 
L Set of links or cables 
R Set of ligthpaths 
S Set of network states 
pr,i 
pr,i = 1 if lightpath r uses link i in its working path, and = 0 
otherwise  
mr Data rate (bits/s) of lightpath r  
wi 
Amount of working capacity on link i, calculated by  
wi , rp mr ir R∑= ∈  
bn,i 
bn,i = 1 if node n is the origin or destination of link i, and = 
0 otherwise  
dr,n 
dr,n = 1 if node n is the source or destination of lightpath r, 
and = 0 otherwise  
states,i 
states,i= 1 if cable i is cut in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise  
stateprobs stateprobs  is the probability of network state s  
dr Damage caused by a failure of lightpath r  
ci The unit cost of spare capacity on link i  
budget The budget  
K A large constant used for bounding 
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gs,r 
gs,r > 0 if a working path for lightpath r fails in network 
state s, and = 0 otherwise (i.e., , , ,s r s i r i
i L
g state p
∈
=∑ ) 
Variables:  
damages Damage occurring in network state s  
totalrisk Total risk to the network  
ys,r 
ys,r > 0 if lightpath r fails in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise 
zs,r 
zs,r = 1 if lightpath r fails in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise  
The following notation is used in the link protection case only: 
bpi bpi = 1 if link i is protected, and = 0 otherwise  
qi,j 
qi,j = 1 if link i is protected and its backup path traverses 
link j, and = 0 otherwise  
hs,i 
hs,i > 0 if a backup path for link i is not available (either 
link i is not protected, or the backup path fails) in network 
state s, and = 0 otherwise  
es,i 
es,i > 0 if link i fails (both working link fails and backup 
path is not available) in network state s, and = 0 otherwise 
The following notation is used in the path protection case only: 
bpr bpr =1 if lightpath r is protected, and = 0 otherwise  
qr,j 
qr,j = 1 if lightpath r is protected and its backup path 
traverses link j, and = 0 otherwise  
hs,r 
hs,r > 0 if a backup path for lightpath r is not available 
(either  lightpath r  is not protected, or the backup path 
fails) in network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
 
The node-link InP formulation for the minimum-risk link protection design problem is 
presented in (3.11)–(3.21). The set of decision variables to be determined are the binary variables 
bpi, which determines a set of links to be protected, where bpi = 1 if link i is protected and bpi = 
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0 otherwise, and the binary variables qi,j, which specifies the route of the backup path protecting 
link i, where qi,j = 1 if link i is protected and uses link j in its backup path and qi,j = 0 otherwise. 
The objective (3.11) is to minimize the total network risk. Constraint set (3.12) is the flow 
conservation constraints for backup paths. Constraints (3.13)–(3.16) are the failure state 
relationships which determine whether lightpath r will fail in network state s, while also taking 
the link protection being deployed in the network into account. More specifically, constraint set 
(3.13) determines whether or not the backup path for link i is available in network state s. The 
backup path for link i might not be available in network state s (i.e., hs,i > 0) for two reasons: 
either the backup path fails due to a cable cut in that network state , ,(i.e., 0)s j i j
j L
state q
∈
>∑ , or 
link i is not protected (i.e., bpi = 0, or 1-bpi > 0). Constraint set (3.14) indicates that link i fails in 
network state s (i.e., es,i > 0) if and only if both the working link fails (i.e., states,i > 0) and its 
backup path is not available in that network state (i.e., hs,i > 0). Constraint set (3.15) indicates that 
lightpath r fails in network state s (ys,r > 0) if and only if at least one of the links that it traverses 
fails (i.e., , , 0s i r i
i L
e p
∈
>∑ ). Constraint set (3.16) relates variable ys,r to binary variable zs,r. 
Constraints (3.17)–(3.18) are for the calculation of the risk as in (3.4). That is, constraint set 
(3.17) calculates the amount of damage in each network state as the sum of damages of all failed 
lightpaths in that network state; and constraint (3.18) calculates the total network risk as the sum 
of the product of the state damage and state probability for all network states. Constraint (3.19) is 
the budget constraint which limits the total spare capacity investment, where cj is the unit cost of 
spare capacity on link j, and wi is the amount of working capacity on link i. Lastly, constraint sets 
(3.20) and (3.21) express the binary nature of the design and failure variables. 
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Minimum-risk link protection design problem (Node-link model) 
 
Objective: 
, ,
min
bp qi i j
totalrisk                                                      (3.11) 
s.t. , , , (mod  2),   ,i j n j n i i
j L
q b b bp i L n N
∈
= ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈∑     (3.12) 
, , , 1 ,    ,s i s j i j i
j L
h state q bp s S i L
∈
= + − ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈∑  (3.13) 
, , , ,    ,s i s i s ie state h s S i L= ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈  (3.14) 
, , , ,    ,s r s i r i
i L
y e p s S r R
∈
= ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈∑             (3.15) 
, ,K ,    ,s r s rz y s S r R≥ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈          (3.16) 
, ,    s s r r
r R
damage z d s S
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                   (3.17) 
,    s s
s S
totalrisk stateprob damage s S
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                                                                              (3.18) 
,j i i j
i L j L
c w q budget
∈ ∈
≤∑∑                          (3.19) 
, , :  ,    ,i j iq bp binary i L j L∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                                (3.20) 
, : ,    ,s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈    (3.21) 
 
The node-link InP formulation for the minimum-risk path protection problem is presented 
in (3.22)–(3.32). The two sets of decision variables to be determined are binary variables bpr, 
which determines whether to protect lightpath r, where bpr = 1 if lightpath r is protected and bpr 
= 0 otherwise, and binary variables qr,j, which specifies a backup route for lightpath r, where qr,j 
= 1 if ligthpath r is protected and uses link j in its backup path and qr,j = 0 otherwise. The 
objective (3.22) is to minimize the total network risk. Constraint set (3.23) is the flow 
conservation constraints for backup paths. Constraints (3.24)–(3.26) are the failure state 
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relationships which determine whether lightpath r will fail in network state s, while also taking 
the path protection being deployed in the network into consideration. More specifically, 
constraint set (3.24) determines whether or not the backup path for lightpath r is available in 
network state s.  The backup path for lightpath r might not be available in network state s (i.e., 
hs,r > 0) for two reasons: either the backup path fails due to a cable cut in that network state 
(i.e., , , 0s j r j
j L
state q
∈
>∑ ), or lightpath r is not protected (i.e., bpr = 0, or 1-bpr > 0). Constraint set 
(3.25) indicates that lightpath r fails in network state s (i.e., ys,r > 0) if and only if both its 
working path fails (i.e., gs,r > 0) and its backup path is not available in that network state (i.e., hs,r 
> 0). Constraint set (3.26) relates integer variable ys,r to binary variable zs,r. Constraints (3.27)–
(3.28) are for the calculation of the risk as (3.17)–(3.18) in the link protection case. Constraint 
(3.29) is the budget constraint. Constraint set (3.30) guarantees that each backup path is link-
disjoint from its working path. Lastly, constraint sets (3.31) and (3.32) express the binary nature 
of the decision and failure variables. 
 
Minimum-risk path protection design problem (Node-link model) 
 
Objective: 
, ,
min
bp qr r j
totalrisk                             (3.22) 
s.t. , , , (mod  2),   ,r j n j r n r
j L
q b d bp r R n N
∈
= ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈∑  (3.23) 
, , , 1 ,    ,s r s j r j r
j L
h state q bp s S r R
∈
= + − ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈∑   (3.24) 
, , , ,    ,s r s r s ry g h s S r R= ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈               (3.25) 
, ,K ,    ,s r s rz y s S r R≥ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈              (3.26) 
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, ,    s s r r
r R
damage z d s S
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                   (3.27) 
,    s s
s S
totalrisk stateprob damage s S
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                                                                              (3.28) 
,j r j r
r R j L
c q m budget
∈ ∈
≤∑∑                                     (3.29) 
, , 1,    ,r j r jp q r R j L+ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                           (3.30) 
, , : ,    ,r j rq bp binary r R j L∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                (3.31) 
, : ,    ,s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                              (3.32) 
3.4.1.2 Link-Path InP Formulations 
In this section, the minimum-risk survivable network design problems are formulated as link-
path InP models for both link protection and path protection cases. The notation used in the link-
path formulations is presented in Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3 Notation used in link-path InP formulations 
Given:  
N Set of nodes 
L Set of links or cables 
R Set of ligthpaths 
S Set of network states 
pr,i 
pr,i = 1 if lightpath r uses link i in its working path, and = 0 
otherwise  
mr Data rate (bits/s) of lightpath r  
wi 
Amount of working capacity on link i, calculated by  
wi , rp mr ir R∑= ∈  
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states,i 
states,i = 1 if cable i is cut in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise  
stateprobs stateprobs  is the probability of network state s  
dr Damage caused by a failure of lightpath r  
ci The unit cost of spare capacity on link i 
budget The budget  
K A large constant used for bounding 
The following notation is used in the link protection case only: 
Qi Set of eligible backup routes for link i   
,
q
i jδ  ,
q
i jδ  = 1 if the qth eligible backup route for link i in the set 
Qi includes link j, and = 0 otherwise  
,
q
s iζ  ,
q
s iζ  = 1 if the qth backup route for link i in the set Qi  fails 
in network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
The following notation is used in the path protection case only: 
Qr Set of eligible backup routes for lightpath r  
,
q
r jδ  ,
q
r jδ  = 1 if the qth eligible backup route for lightpath r in 
the set Qr includes link j, and = 0 otherwise  
,
q
s rζ  ,
q
s rζ  = 1 if the qth backup route for lightpath r in the set Qr 
fails in network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
gs,r 
gs,r > 0 if a working path for lightpath r fails in network 
state s, and = 0 otherwise (i.e., , , ,s r s i r i
i L
g state p
∈
=∑ ) 
Variables:  
damages Damage occurring in network state s  
totalrisk Total risk to the network  
ys,r 
ys,r > 0 if lightpath r fails in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise  
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zs,r 
zs,r = 1 if lightpath r fails in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise  
The following notation is used in the link protection case only: 
bpi  bpi = 1 if link i is protected, and = 0 otherwise  
q
if  
q
if = 1 if link i is protected and uses the q
th route in the 
backup route set Qi for its backup path, and = 0 otherwise  
hs,i 
hs,i = 1 if a backup path for link i is not available (either 
link i is not protected, or the backup path fails) in network 
state s, and = 0 otherwise  
es,i 
es,i = 1 if link i fails (both working link fails and backup 
path is not available) in network state s, and = 0 otherwise 
The following notation is used in the path protection case only: 
bpr bpr =1 if lightpath r is protected, and = 0 otherwise  
q
rf  
q
rf = 1 if lightpath r is protected and uses the q
th route in 
the backup route set Qr for its backup path, and = 0 
otherwise  
hs,r 
hs,r = 1 if a backup path for lightpath r is not available 
(either  lightpath r  is not protected, or the backup path 
fails) in network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
 
The link-path formulation for the minimum-risk link protection design problem is 
presented in (3.33)–(3.43). The sets of decision variables are the binary variables bpi, which 
determines which links to be protected, where bpi = 1 if link i is protected and bpi = 0 otherwise, 
and the binary variables qif  which specifies the backup route for link i, where 
q
if = 1 if link i is 
protected and uses the qth route in the backup route set Qi for its backup path, and = 0 otherwise. 
The objective (3.33) is to minimize the total network risk. Constraint set (3.34) indicates that if 
link i is protected, there must exist one backup path, for which the route is selected from a set of 
eligible backup routes Qi. Constraints (3.35)–(3.38) are the failure state relationships which 
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determine whether or not lightpath r fails in network state s, taking into account the link 
protection being deployed in the network. More specifically, constraint set (3.35) determines 
whether or not the backup path for link i is available in network state s. The backup path for link 
i might not be available in network state s (i.e., hs,i = 1) for two reasons: either the backup path 
exists but fails due to a cable cut in that network state (i.e., ,
i
q q
i s i
q Q
f ζ
∈
∑ =1), or link i is not 
protected (i.e., bpi = 0, or 1-bpi = 1). Constraint set (3.36) indicates that link i fails in network 
state s (i.e., es,i = 1) if and only if both the working link fails (i.e., states,i =1) and its backup path 
is not available (i.e., hs,i = 1) in that network state. Constraint set (3.37) indicates that lightpath r 
fails in network state s (ys,r > 0) if and only if at least one of the links that it traverses fails 
(i.e., , , 0s i r i
i L
e p
∈
>∑ ). Constraint set (3.38) relates variable ys,r to binary variable zs,r. Constraints 
(3.39–(3.40) are for the calculation of the risk as in (3.4). That is, constraint set (3.39) calculates 
the amount of damage for each network state as the sum of damages of all failed lightpaths in 
that network state; and constraint (3.40) calculates the total network risk as the sum of the 
products of the state damage and the state probability for all network states. Constraint (3.41) is 
the budget constraint which limits the total spare capacity investment, where cj is the unit cost of 
spare capacity on link j, wi is the amount of working capacity on link i, and parameter ,
q
i jδ  = 1 if 
qth eligible backup route for link i in the set Qi includes link j, and = 0 otherwise. Lastly, 
constraints (3.42) and (3.43) express the binary nature of the design and failure variables. 
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Minimum-risk link protection design problem (Link-path model) 
 
Objective: 
,
min
qbp fi i
totalrisk                       (3.33) 
,    
i
q
i i
q Q
f bp i L
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                                  (3.34) 
, , 1 ,    ,
i
q q
s i i s i i
q Q
h f bp s S i Lζ
∈
= + − ∈ ∈∑                      (3.35) 
, , , ,    ,s i s i s ie state h s S i L= ∈ ∈                          (3.36) 
, , , ,    ,s r s i r i
i L
y e p s S r R
∈
= ∈ ∈∑                       (3.37) 
, ,K ,    ,s r s rz y s S r R≥ ∈ ∈                       (3.38) 
, ,    s s r r
r R
damage z d s S
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                                             (3.39) 
s s
s S
totalrisk stateprob damage
∈
=∑                      (3.40) 
,
i
q q
j i i i j
i L q Q j L
c w f budgetδ
∈ ∈ ∈
≤∑∑∑                       (3.41) 
, : ,    ,qi i ibp f binary i L q Q∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                      (3.42) 
, : ,    ,s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                       (3.43) 
    
For the minimum-risk path protection design problem, the link-path formulation is 
presented in (3.44)–(3.53). The set of decision variables to be determined are binary variables 
bpr, which determines a set of lightpaths to be protected, where bpr = 1 if lightpath r is protected 
and bpr = 0 otherwise, and the binary variables qrf , which specifies the backup route for lightpath 
r, where qrf = 1 if lightpath r is protected and uses the q
th route in the backup route set Qr for its 
backup path, and = 0 otherwise. The objective (3.44) is to minimize the total network risk. 
 42 
Constraint set (3.45) indicates that if lightpath r is protected, there must exist one backup path, 
whose route is selected from a set of eligible backup routes Qr. Constraints (3.46)–(3.48) are the 
failure state relationships which determine whether or not lightpath r will fail in network state s, 
taking into account the path protection being deployed in the network. More specifically, 
constraint set (3.46) determines whether or not the backup path for lightpath r is available in 
network state s. The backup path for lightpath r might not be available in network state s (i.e., hs,r 
= 1) for two reasons: either the backup path exists but fails due to a cable cut in that network 
state (i.e., ,
r
q q
r s r
q Q
f ζ
∈
∑ =1), or lightpath r is not protected (i.e., bpr = 0, or 1-bpr = 1). Constraint set 
(3.47) indicates that lightpath r fails in network state s (i.e., ys,r > 0) if and only if both its 
working path fails (i.e., gs,r > 0) and its backup path is not available in that network state (i.e., hs,r 
= 1). Constraint set (3.48) relates variable ys,r to binary variable zs,r. Constraints (3.49)–(3.50) are 
for the calculation of the risk. Constraint (3.51) is the budget constraint. Lastly, constraints (3.52) 
and (3.53) express the binary nature of the design and failure variables. 
 
Minimum-risk path protection design problem (Link-path model) 
 
Objective: 
,
min
qbp fr r
totalrisk                       (3.44) 
,    
r
q
r r
q Q
f bp r R
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                         (3.45) 
, , 1 ,    ,
r
q q
s r r s r r
q Q
h f bp s S r Rζ
∈
= + − ∈ ∈∑            (3.46) 
, , , ,    ,s r s r s ry g h s S r R= ∈ ∈              (3.47) 
, ,K ,    ,s r s rz y s S r R≥ ∈ ∈              (3.48) 
 43 
, ,    s s r r
r R
damage z d s S
∈
= ∀ ∈∑               (3.49) 
s s
s S
totalrisk state damage
∈
=∑                         (3.50) 
,
r
q q
j r r r j
r R q Q j L
c m f budgetδ
∈ ∈ ∈
≤∑∑∑                      (3.51) 
, : ,    ,qr r rbp f binary r R q Q∀ ∈ ∀ ∈             (3.52) 
, : ,    ,s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈               (3.53) 
3.4.2 Heuristic Approach 
In the heuristic approach, a set of eligible link-disjoint backup routes is pre-computed and given 
to the problem. Our heuristics are based on a greedy method, which repeatedly selects the best 
link (in the link protection case), or the best lightpath (in the path protection case), to be 
protected along with its corresponding backup route one at a time based on a risk-reduction 
criteria.  Here, three greedy heuristic algorithms are proposed.   
 
Heuristic 1: Greedy heuristic with greatest risk reduction  
The basic idea of this greedy heuristic is that at each step, the algorithm chooses to protect the 
link (in the link protection case) or the lightpath (in the path protection case) using one of the 
backup routes in the pre-computed route set, where the protection produces the greatest risk 
reduction and does not violate the budget limit. The process repeats until no more 
links/lightpaths can be selected due to the budget constraint, or all the links/lightpaths have been 
protected. The flow chart of the greedy heuristic algorithm with greatest risk reduction is 
presented in Figure 3.5. 
 44 
 
Given a working network, a survivability 
technique, and a fixed budget
Compute amount of risk reduction associated 
with each link/lightpath and backup path
Compute cost of each backup path
Choose to protect link/lightpath which results 
in greatest risk reduction, subject to budget 
constraint
Update budget
Any link/lightpath 
with backup cost 
lower than budget?
All links/lightpaths protected?
End
End
Y
Y
N
N
 
Figure 3.5 Flow chart of the greedy heuristic algorithm with greatest risk reduction 
 
Heuristic 2: Greedy heuristic with greatest risk reduction/cost ratio  
This heuristic is similar to Heuristic 1 except that at each step, the algorithm chooses to protect 
the link (in the link protection case) or the lightpath (in the path protection case) using one of the 
backup routes in the pre-computed route set, where the protection produces the greatest ratio of 
risk reduction to backup path cost while not violating the budget limit. The flow chart of the 
heuristic algorithm with greatest risk reduction/cost ratio is presented in Figure 3.6. 
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Given a working network, a survivability 
technique, and a fixed budget
Compute amount of risk reduction associated 
with each link/lightpath and backup path
Compute cost of each backup path
Choose to protect link/lightpath which results 
in greatest ratio of risk reduction to backup 
cost, subject to budget constraint
Update budget
Any link/lightpath 
with backup cost 
lower than budget?
All links/lightpaths protected?
End
End
Y
Y
N
N
 
Figure 3.6 Flow chart of the greedy heuristic algorithm with greatest risk reduction/cost ratio 
 
Heuristic 3: Iterative greedy heuristic  
This heuristic algorithm consists of two steps. The first step is the same as Heuristic 2. Since the 
first step may not yield an optimal solution, an iterative process in the second step is deployed to 
improve the solution. The second step is based on an idea that it is possible to improve the 
current solution by iteratively selecting a protected link/lightpath then removing the protection 
from the protected link/lightpath in the current solution, followed by updating the budget, and 
then choosing to protect the unprotected links/lightpaths that could produce the greatest risk 
reduction.  The iterative process keeps reducing the amount of total network risk; and terminates 
when the current solution cannot be improved further, or a predefined number of iterations is 
reached. The flow chart of the iterative greedy heuristic algorithm is presented in Figure 3.7. 
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Given a working network, a survivability 
technique, and a fixed budget
Compute amount of risk reduction associated 
with each link/lightpath and backup path
Apply Heuristic 2 - Greedy heuristic with 
greatest risk reduction to cost ratio
Initial
solution
Iteratively select protected link/lightpath in 
current solution then remove protection
Update budget
Choose to protect links/lightpaths which 
results in greatest risk reduction, subject to 
budget constraint
Current
solution
Update budget
 
Figure 3.7 Flow chart of the iterative greedy heuristic algorithm  
3.5 MINIMUM-RISK SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN FOR NETWORKS WITH 
MULTIPLE CLASSES OF TRAFFIC 
This section extends the minimum-risk survivable network design to networks supporting 
multiple classes of traffic with different levels of protection. Three different classes of traffic are 
defined for traffic flows (i.e., lightpaths): bronze, silver and gold, each associated with a different 
level of damage upon failure. The gold class represents the traffic flows that cause the highest 
damage level when they fail, for example, the traffic flows with the highest availability 
requirement and associated violation penalty defined in a Service Level Agreement (SLA). On 
the other hand, the bronze class represents the traffic flows with the lowest damage level.  
The notation used in the minimum-risk survivable network design for networks with 
multiple classes of traffic is presented in Table 3.4.  
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Table 3.4 Notation used in minimum-risk design formulations for networks with multiple classes of traffic 
Given:  
N Set of nodes 
L Set of links or cables 
RB, RS, RG Set of bronze, silver, and gold-class ligthpaths respectively 
S Set of network states 
,
B
r ip  ,
B
r ip  = 1 if bronze-class lightpath r uses link i in its 
working path, and = 0 otherwise  
,
S
r ip  ,
S
r ip = 1 if silver-class lightpath r uses link i in its working 
path, and = 0 otherwise  
,
G
r ip  ,
G
r ip  = 1 if gold-class lightpath r uses link i in its working 
path, and = 0 otherwise  
, ,B S Gr r rm m m  
Data rate (bits/s) of bronze, silver and gold-class lightpath 
r, respectively 
wi 
Amount of working capacity on link i, calculated by  
, , ,
B S G
B B S S G G
i r i r r i r r i r
r R r R r R
w p m p m p m
∈ ∈ ∈
= + +∑ ∑ ∑  
states,i 
states,i = 1 if cable i is cut in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise  
stateprobs stateprobs  is the probability of network state s  
, ,B S Gr r rd d d  
Damage caused by a failure of bronze, silver, and gold-
class lightpath r, respectively 
ci The unit cost of spare capacity on link i 
budget The budget  
K A large constant used for bounding 
The following notation is used in the link protection case only: 
Qi Set of eligible backup routes for link i  
,
q
i jδ  ,
q
i jδ  = 1 if the qth eligible backup route for link i in the set 
Qi includes link j, and = 0 otherwise  
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,
q
s iζ  ,
q
s iζ  = 1 if the qth backup route for link i in the set Qi  fails 
in network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
The following notation is used in the path protection case only: 
B
rQ  Set of eligible backup routes for bronze-class lightpath r  
S
rQ  Set of eligible backup routes for silver-class lightpath r   
G
rQ  Set of eligible backup routes for gold-class lightpath r  
,
,
B q
r jδ  
,
,
B q
r jδ  = 1 if the qth eligible backup route for bronze-class 
lightpath r in the set BrQ  includes link j, and = 0 otherwise 
,
,
S q
r jδ  
,
,
S q
r jδ  = 1 if the qth eligible backup route for silver-class 
lightpath r in the set SrQ  includes link j, and = 0 otherwise  
,
,
G q
r jδ  
,
,
G q
r jδ  = 1 if the qth eligible backup route for gold-class 
lightpath r in the set GrQ  includes link j, and = 0 otherwise 
,
,
B q
s rζ  
,
,
B q
s rζ  = 1 if the qth backup route for bronze-class lightpath 
r in the set BrQ  fails in network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
,
,
S q
s rζ  
,
,
S q
s rζ  = 1 if the qth backup route for silver-class lightpath r 
in the set SrQ  fails in network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
,
,
G q
s rζ  
,
,
G q
s rζ  = 1 if the qth backup route for gold-class lightpath r 
in the set GrQ  fails in network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
,
B
s rg  
,
B
s rg  > 0 if a working path for bronze-class lightpath r fails 
in network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
(i.e., , , ,
B B
s r s i r i
i L
g state p
∈
=∑ ) 
,
S
s rg  
,
S
s rg  > 0 if a working path for silver-class lightpath r fails 
in network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
(i.e., , , ,
S S
s r s i r i
i L
g state p
∈
=∑ ) 
,
G
s rg  
,
G
s rg  > 0 if a working path for gold-class lightpath r fails in 
network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
(i.e., , , ,
G G
s r s i r i
i L
g state p
∈
=∑ ) 
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Variables: 
damages Damage occurring in network state s  
totalrisk Total risk to the network  
,
B
s ry  ,
B
s ry  > 0 if bronze-class lightpath r fails in network state s, 
and = 0 otherwise  
,
S
s ry  ,
S
s ry  > 0 if silver-class lightpath r fails in network state s, 
and = 0 otherwise  
,
G
s ry  ,
G
s ry  > 0 if gold-class lightpath r fails in network state s, 
and = 0 otherwise  
,
B
s rz  ,
B
s rz = 1 if bronze-class lightpath r fails in network state s, 
and = 0 otherwise  
,
S
s rz  ,
S
s rz = 1 if silver-class lightpath r fails in network state s, 
and = 0 otherwise  
,
G
s rz  ,
G
s rz = 1 if gold-class lightpath r fails in network state s, 
and = 0 otherwise  
The following notation is used in the link protection case only: 
bpi  bpi = 1 if link i is protected, and = 0 otherwise  
q
if  
q
if = 1 if link i is protected and uses the q
th route in the 
backup route set Qi for its backup path, and = 0 otherwise  
hs,i 
hs,i = 1 if a backup path for link i is not available (either 
link i is not protected, or the backup path fails) in network 
state s, and = 0 otherwise  
es,i 
es,i = 1 if link i fails (both working link fails and backup 
path is not available) in network state s, and = 0 otherwise 
The following notation is used in the path protection case only: 
B
rbp  
B
rbp  =1 if bronze-class lightpath r is protected, and = 0 
otherwise  
S
rbp  
S
rbp  =1 if silver-class lightpath r is protected, and = 0 
otherwise  
G
rbp  
G
rbp  =1 if gold-class lightpath r is protected, and = 0 
otherwise  
 50 
  
,B q
rf  
,B q
rf = 1 if bronze-class lightpath r is protected and uses 
the qth route in the backup route set BrQ  for its backup 
path, and = 0 otherwise  
,S q
rf  
,S q
rf = 1 if silver-class lightpath r is protected and uses the 
qth route in the backup route set SrQ  for its backup path, 
and = 0 otherwise  
,G q
rf  
,G q
rf = 1 if gold-class lightpath r is protected and uses the 
qth route in the backup route set GrQ  for its backup path, 
and = 0 otherwise  
,
B
s rh  
,
B
s rh = 1 if a backup path for bronze-class lightpath r is not 
available (either  bronze-class lightpath r  is not protected, 
or the backup path fails) in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise  
,
S
s rh  
,
S
s rh = 1 if a backup path for silver-class lightpath r is not 
available (either  silver-class lightpath r  is not protected, 
or the backup path fails) in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise  
,
G
s rh  
,
G
s rh = 1 if a backup path for gold-class lightpath r is not 
available (either  gold-class lightpath r  is not protected, or 
the backup path fails) in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise 
 
The link-path formulation for the minimum-risk link protection design for networks with 
multiple classes of traffic is presented in (3.54)–(3.70). Two sets of decision variables are used. 
First set are the binary variables bpi, which determine which links to be protected, where bpi = 1 
if link i is protected and bpi = 0 otherwise. The second set are the binary variables qif  which 
specifies the backup route for link i, where qif = 1 if link i is protected and uses the q
th route in 
the backup route set Qi for its backup path, and = 0 otherwise. The design objective in (3.54) is 
to minimize the total network risk. Constraint set (3.55) indicates that if link i is protected, there 
must exist one backup path, for which the route is selected from a set of eligible backup routes 
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Qi.  Constraints (3.56)–(3.63) are the failure state relationships which determine which lightpaths 
in each traffic class fail in each network state, taking into account the link protection being 
deployed in the network. More specifically, constraint set (3.56) determines whether or not the 
backup path for link i is available in network state s. The backup path for link i might not be 
available in network state s (i.e., hs,i = 1) for two reasons: either the backup path exists but fails 
due to a cable cut in that network state (i.e., ,
i
q q
i s i
q Q
f ζ
∈
∑ =1), or link i is not protected (i.e., bpi = 0, 
or 1-bpi = 1). Constraint set (3.57) indicates that link i fails in network state s (i.e., es,i = 1) if and 
only if both the working link fails (i.e., states,i =1) and its backup path is not available (i.e., hs,i = 
1) in that network state. Constraint sets (3.58)–(3.60) are similar to the constraint set (3.15) in the 
design for networks with single class of traffic, except that they determine which lightpaths fail 
in network state s for each traffic class separately. For example, constraint set (3.58) indicates 
that bronze-class lightpath r fails in network state s (i.e., ,
B
s ry > 0) if and only if at least one of the 
links that it traverses fails (i.e., , , 0
B
s i r i
i L
e p
∈
>∑ ). Constraint sets (3.61)–(3.63) relate variables ,Bs ry , 
,
S
s ry , and ,
G
s ry  to binary variables ,
B
s rz , ,
S
s rz , and ,
G
s rz  for bronze, silver and gold-class traffic, 
respectively. Constraint (3.64) calculates the damage in network state s as the sum of the damage 
resulting from failed lightpaths of all traffic classes in network state s, where Brd , 
S
rd , and 
G
rd  
denote the damage caused by a failure of bronze, silver, and gold-class lightpath r, respectively. 
Constraint (3.65) is the calculation of the total network risk as the sum of the product of the state 
damage and the state probability for all network states. Constraint (3.66) is the budget constraint 
which limits the total spare capacity investment, where cj is the unit cost of spare capacity on 
link j, wi is the amount of working capacity on link i, and parameter ,
q
i jδ  = 1 if the qth eligible 
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backup route for link i in the set Qi includes link j, and = 0 otherwise. Lastly, constraints (3.67)–
(3.70) express the binary nature of the design and failure variables. 
 
Minimum-risk link protection design problem for networks with multiple classes of traffic 
 
Objective: 
,
min
qbp fi i
totalrisk                                (3.54) 
,    
i
q
i i
q Q
f bp i L
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                                             (3.55) 
, , 1 ,    ,
i
q q
s i i s i i
q Q
h f bp s S i Lζ
∈
= + − ∈ ∈∑                                 (3.56) 
, , , ,    ,s i s i s ie state h s S i L= ∈ ∈                                     (3.57) 
, , , ,    ,
B B B
s r s i r i
i L
y e p s S r R
∈
= ∈ ∈∑                                 (3.58) 
, , , ,    ,
S S S
s r s i r i
i L
y e p s S r R
∈
= ∈ ∈∑                                                                                                  (3.59) 
, , , ,    ,
G G G
s r s i r i
i L
y e p s S r R
∈
= ∈ ∈∑                      (3.60) 
, ,K ,    ,
B B B
s r s rz y s S r R≥ ∈ ∈                                  (3.61) 
, ,K ,    ,
S S S
s r s rz y s S r R≥ ∈ ∈            (3.62) 
, ,K ,    ,
G G G
s r s rz y s S r R≥ ∈ ∈             (3.63) 
, , , ,    
B S G
B B S S G G
s s r r s r r s r r
r R r R r R
damage z d z d z d s S
∈ ∈ ∈
= + + ∀ ∈∑ ∑ ∑                               (3.64) 
s s
s S
totalrisk stateprob damage
∈
=∑                        (3.65) 
,
i
q q
j i i i j
i L q Q j L
c w f budgetδ
∈ ∈ ∈
≤∑∑∑                       (3.66) 
, : ,    ,qi i ibp f binary i L q Q∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                                                     (3.67) 
 53 
, : ,    ,
B B
s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                                            (3.68) 
, : ,    ,
S S
s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈           (3.69) 
, : ,    ,
G G
s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈           (3.70) 
 
For the minimum-risk path protection design problem for networks with multiple classes 
of traffic, the link-path formulation is presented in (3.71)–(3.92). The formulation is very similar 
to the minimum-risk path protection design formulation for the single class of traffic case in 
(3.22)–(3.32) except that it considers each traffic class separately. 
The design objective in (3.71) is to minimize the total risk. The set of decision variables 
to be determined are binary variables Brbp , 
S
rbp , and 
G
rbp which determine a set of bronze, silver 
and gold-class lightpaths to be protected, respectively, and the binary variables ,B qrf ,
,S q
rf , and 
,G q
rf  which specifies the backup route for each lightpath of the bronze, silver and gold traffic 
class, respectively. Constraint sets (3.72)–(3.74) determine the backup route for each protected 
lightpath of the bronze, silver and gold traffic class, respectively. For example, constraint set 
(3.72) indicates that if bronze class lightpath r is protected, there must exist one backup path, 
whose route is selected from a set of eligible backup routes BrQ . Constraints (3.75)–(3.83) are the 
failure state relationships which determine which lightpaths of each traffic class fail in each 
network state, taking into account the path protection being deployed in the network. More 
specifically, constraint sets (3.75)–(3.77) determine whether or not the backup path for each 
lightpath of the bronze, silver and gold traffic class is available in each network state.  For 
example in (3.75), the backup path for bronze lightpath r might not be available in network state 
s (i.e., ,
B
s rh = 1) for two reasons: either the backup path exists but fails due to a cable cut in that 
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network state (i.e., , ,,
B
r
B q B q
r s r
q Q
f ζ
∈
∑ = 1), or lightpath r is not protected (i.e., Brbp = 0, or 1- Brbp = 1). 
Constraint sets (3.78)–(3.80) determine which lightpaths of the bronze, silver, and gold traffic 
classes, respectively, fail in each network state. For example, constraint set (3.78) indicates that 
bronze-class lightpath r fails in network state s (i.e., ,
B
s ry > 0) if and only if both its working path 
fails (i.e., ,
B
s rg > 0) and its backup path is not available in that network state (i.e., ,
B
s rh  = 1). 
Constraint sets (3.81)–(3.83) relate variables ,
B
s ry , ,
S
s ry , and ,
G
s ry to binary variables ,
B
s rz , ,
S
s rz , and 
,
G
s rz , for the bronze, silver and gold traffic classes, respectively. Constraints (3.84) calculates the 
damage in network state s as the sum of the damage resulting from failed lightpaths of all traffic 
classes in network state s, where Brd , 
S
rd , and 
G
rd  denote the damage caused by a failure of 
bronze, silver, and gold-class lightpath r, respectively. Constraint (3.85) is the calculation of the 
total network risk as the sum of the product of the state damage and the state probability for all 
network states. Constraint (3.86) is the budget constraint. Lastly, constraints (3.87)–(3.92) 
express the binary nature of the design and failure variables. 
 
Minimum-risk path protection design problem for networks with multiple classes of traffic 
Objective: 
, , ,, , , , ,
min
B q S q G qB S Gbp bp bp f f fr r r r r r
totalrisk                      (3.71) 
, ,    
B
r
B q B B
r r
q Q
f bp r R
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                           (3.72) 
, ,    
S
r
S q S S
r r
q Q
f bp r R
∈
= ∀ ∈∑            (3.73) 
, ,    
G
r
G q G G
r r
q Q
f bp r R
∈
= ∀ ∈∑            (3.74) 
, ,
, , 1 ,    ,
B
r
B B q B q B B
s r r s r r
q Q
h f bp s S r Rζ
∈
= + − ∈ ∈∑              (3.75) 
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, ,
, , 1 ,    ,
S
r
S S q S q S S
s r r s r r
q Q
h f bp s S r Rζ
∈
= + − ∈ ∈∑          (3.76) 
, ,
, , 1 ,    ,
G
r
G G q G q G G
s r r s r r
q Q
h f bp s S r Rζ
∈
= + − ∈ ∈∑          (3.77) 
, , , ,    ,
B B B B
s r s r s ry g h s S r R= ∈ ∈                (3.78) 
, , , ,    ,
S S S S
s r s r s ry g h s S r R= ∈ ∈            (3.79) 
, , , ,    ,
G G G G
s r s r s ry g h s S r R= ∈ ∈            (3.80) 
, ,K ,    ,
B B B
s r s rz y s S r R≥ ∈ ∈                  (3.81) 
, ,K ,    ,
S S S
s r s rz y s S r R≥ ∈ ∈            (3.82) 
, ,K ,    ,
G G G
s r s rz y s S r R≥ ∈ ∈            (3.83) 
, , , ,    
B S G
B B S S G G
s s r r s r r s r r
r R r R r R
damage z d z d z d s S
∈ ∈ ∈
= + + ∀ ∈∑ ∑ ∑             (3.84) 
s s
s S
totalrisk state damage
∈
=∑                           (3.85) 
, , , , , ,
, , ,
B B S S G G
r r r
B B q B q S S q S q G G q G q
j r r r j j r r r j j r r r j
j L j L j Lr R q Q r R q Q r R q Q
c m f c m f c m f budgetδ δ δ
∈ ∈ ∈∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
+ + ≤∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   
                             (3.86) 
,, : ,    ,B B q B Br r rbp f binary r R q Q∀ ∈ ∀ ∈              (3.87) 
,, : ,    ,S S q S Sr r rbp f binary r R q Q∀ ∈ ∀ ∈          (3.88) 
,, : ,    ,G G q G Gr r rbp f binary r R q Q∀ ∈ ∀ ∈          (3.89) 
, : ,    ,
B B
s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                (3.90) 
, : ,    ,
S S
s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈           (3.91) 
, : ,    ,
G G
s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈           (3.92) 
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3.6 INCREMENTAL MINIMUM-RISK DESIGH WITH DUAL PROTECTION 
As communication services require a higher level of network availability, network operators may 
consider protecting the network using dual protection (i.e., protected by two backup paths). By 
deploying dual protection, it ensures that the network will survive any dual-link failure, given 
that the protected link (in link protection) or the protected path (in path protection) and the two 
backup paths are link-disjoint. However, the deployment of dual protection requires a much 
higher capital investment than the protection with single backup paths; this is due to the fact that 
the second link-disjoint backup path is typically longer than the first backup path, especially in 
sparse networks.  In this situation, network operators may not have sufficient monetary funds to 
deploy dual protection for the whole network, and therefore have to determine in which parts of 
the network to deploy dual protection based on a fixed budget.  
In this section, we consider an incremental minimum-risk survivable network design 
problem in which the given network was designed to protect against all single-link failures using 
single backup paths (i.e., all the working routes and the backup routes are given), then the design 
problem considered is to determine how best to spend a given budget for deploying dual 
protection (i.e., deploying second backup paths) in different parts of the network such that the 
total network risk is minimized. 
In link protection, the design problem is to determine for which links to deploy the dual 
protection second backup paths, and their corresponding routes for a given budget. Whereas, in 
path protection, the design problem is to determine for which lightpaths to deploy the dual 
protection second backup paths, and their corresponding backup routes.  
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The incremental minimum-risk design problems with dual protection are formulated as 
node-link Integer Programming (InP) models. The notation used in this section is presented in 
Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5 Notation used in incremental minimum-risk design with dual protection formulations  
Given:  
N Set of nodes 
L Set of links or cables 
R Set of ligthpaths 
S Set of network states 
pr,i 
pr,i = 1 if lightpath r uses link i in its working path, and = 0 
otherwise  
mr Data rate (bits/s) of lightpath r  
wi 
Amount of working capacity on link i, calculated by  
,i r i r
r R
w p m
∈
=∑  
bn,i 
bn,i = 1 if node n is the origin or destination of link i, and = 
0 otherwise  
dr,n 
dr,n = 1 if node n is the source or destination of lightpath r, 
and = 0 otherwise  
states,i 
states,i= 1 if cable i is cut in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise  
stateprobs stateprobs  is the probability of network state s  
dr Damage caused by a failure of lightpath r  
ci The unit cost of spare capacity on link i  
budget The budget  
K A large constant used for bounding 
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The following notation is used in the link protection case only: 
qi,j 
qi,j = 1 if the first backup path for link i traverses link j, 
and = 0 otherwise  
hs,i 
hs,i = 1 if the first backup path for link i fails in network 
state s, and = 0 otherwise (i.e., hs,i = 1 if , ,s j i j
j L
state q
∈
∑ > 0, 
and = 0 otherwise) 
The following notation is used in the path protection case only: 
qr,j 
qr,j = 1 if the first backup path of lightpath r traverses link 
j, and = 0 otherwise  
hs,r 
hs,r = 1 if the first backup path for lightpath r fails in 
network state s, and = 0 otherwise (i.e., hs,r = 1 if 
, ,s j r j
j L
state q
∈
∑ > 0, and = 0 otherwise) 
gs,r 
gs,r = 1 if a working path for lightpath r fails in network 
state s, and = 0 otherwise (i.e., gs,r = 1 if , ,s j r j
j L
state p
∈
∑  > 
0, and = 0 otherwise) 
Variables:  
damages Damage occurring in network state s  
totalrisk Total risk to the network  
zs,r 
zs,r = 1 if lightpath r fails in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise  
The following notation is used in the link protection case only: 
2
ibp  
2
ibp = 1 if link i is dual protected, and = 0 otherwise  
2
,i jq  
2
,i jq  = 1 if link i is dual protected and its second backup 
path traverses link j, and = 0 otherwise  
2
,s ih  
2
,s ih = 1 if the second backup path for link i is not available 
(either link i is not dual-protected, or the second backup 
path fails) in network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
es,i 
es,i = 1 if link i fails (both working link and first backup 
path fail and second backup path is not available) in 
network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
ys,r 
ys,r > 0 if lightpath r fails in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise 
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The following notation is used in the path protection case only: 
2
rbp  
2
rbp =1 if lightpath r is dual protected, and = 0 otherwise  
2
,r jq  
2
,r jq  = 1 if lightpath r is dual protected and its second 
backup path traverses link j, and = 0 otherwise  
2
,s rh  
2
,s rh = 1 if the second backup path for lightpath r is not 
available (either lightpath r is not dual-protected, or the 
second backup path fails) in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise  
 
The node-link InP formulation for the incremental minimum-risk dual link protection 
design problem is presented in (3.93)–(3.105). The set of decision variables to be determined are 
the binary variables 2ibp , which determines a set of links which have dual protection, where 
2
ibp  
= 1 if link i is dual protected, and 2ibp  = 0 otherwise, and the binary variables 
2
,i jq , which 
specifies the route of the dual-protection second backup path protecting link i, where 2,i jq = 1 if 
link i is dual protected, and its second backup path uses link j, and 2,i jq  = 0 otherwise. The 
objective (3.93) is to minimize the total network risk. Constraint set (3.94) is the flow 
conservation constraints for second backup paths. Constraints (3.95)–(3.98) are the failure state 
relationships which determine whether lightpath r will fail in network state s, while also taking 
the link protection being deployed in the network into account. More specifically, constraint set 
(3.95) determines whether or not the second backup path for link i is available in network state s. 
The second backup path for link i might not be available in network state s (i.e., 2,s ih = 1) for two 
reasons: either the second backup path fails due to a cable cut in that network state 
2
, ,(i.e., 0)s j i j
j L
state q
∈
>∑ , or link i is not dual protected (i.e., 2ibp  = 0, or 1- 2ibp  > 0). Constraint set 
(3.96) indicates that link i fails in network state s (i.e., es,i = 1) if and only if all of these events 
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occur: the working link fails (i.e., states,i = 1), the first backup path fails (i.e., hs,i = 1), and the 
second backup path is not available (i.e., 2,s ih  = 1) in that network state. Constraint set (3.97) 
indicates that lightpath r fails in network state s (ys,r > 0) if and only if at least one of the links 
that it traverses fails (i.e., , , 0s i r i
i L
e p
∈
>∑ ). Constraint set (3.98) relates variable ys,r to binary 
variable zs,r. Constraints (3.99)–(3.100) are for the calculation of the risk as in (3.4). That is, 
constraint set (3.99) calculates the amount of damage in each network state as the sum of the 
damages of all failed lightpaths in that network state; and constraint (3.100) calculates the total 
network risk as the sum of the product of the state damage and the state probability for all 
network states. Constraint (3.101) is the budget constraint which limits the total spare capacity 
investment in dual protection backup paths, where cj is the unit cost of spare capacity on link j, 
and wi is the amount of working capacity on link i. Constraint set (3.102) ensures that each 
second backup path is link-disjoint from the corresponding first backup path. If the second link-
disjoint backup path cannot be found in the network, the link is only protected by one backup 
path. Lastly, constraint sets (3.103)–(3.105) express the binary nature of the design and failure 
variables.  
 
Incremental minimum-risk dual link protection design problem (Node-link model) 
 
Objective: 
2 2, ,
min
bp qi i j
totalrisk                                                      (3.93) 
s.t. 2 2, , , (mod  2),   ,i j n j n i i
j L
q b b bp i L n N
∈
= ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈∑     (3.94) 
2 2 2
,  , ,K 1 ,    ,s i s j i j i
j L
h state q bp s S i L
∈
≥ + − ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈∑  (3.95) 
2
, , , , 2,    ,s i s i s i s ie state h h s S i L≥ + + − ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈  (3.96) 
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, , , ,    ,s r s i r i
i L
y e p s S r R
∈
= ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈∑             (3.97) 
, ,K ,    ,s r s rz y s S r R≥ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈          (3.98) 
, ,    s s r r
r R
damage z d s S
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                   (3.99) 
,    s s
s S
totalrisk stateprob damage s S
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                                                                   (3.100) 
2
,j i i j
i L j L
c w q budget
∈ ∈
≤∑∑                          (3.101) 
2
, , 1,    ,i j i jq q i L j L+ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈  (3.102) 
2 2
, , :  ,    ,i j iq bp binary i L j L∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                                  (3.103) 
2
, ,, : ,    ,s i s ih e binary s S i L∀ ∈ ∀ ∈   (3.104) 
, : ,    ,s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈    (3.105) 
 
The node-link InP formulation for the incremental minimum-risk dual path protection 
design problem is presented in (3.106)–(3.117). The two sets of decision variables to be 
determined are the binary variables 2rbp , which determines a set of lightpaths which have dual 
protection, where 2rbp  = 1 if lightpath r is dual protected and 
2
rbp  = 0 otherwise, and the binary 
variables 2,r jq , which specifies the route of the dual-protection second backup path for lightpath 
r, where 2,r jq  = 1 if ligthpath r is dual protected and uses link j in its second backup path, and 
2
,r jq  = 0 otherwise. The objective (3.106) is to minimize the total network risk. Constraint set 
(3.107) is the flow conservation constraints for second backup backup paths. Constraints 
(3.108)–(3.109) are the failure state relationships which determine whether lightpath r will fail in 
network state s, while also taking the path protection being deployed in the network into 
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consideration. More specifically, constraint set (3.108) determines whether or not the second 
backup path for lightpath r is available in network state s.  The second backup path for lightpath 
r might not be available in network state s (i.e., 2,s rh = 1) for two reasons: either the backup path 
fails due to a cable cut in that network state (i.e., 2, , 0s j r j
j L
state q
∈
>∑ ), or lightpath r is not dual 
protected (i.e., 2rbp = 0, or 1-
2
rbp > 0). Constraint set (3.109) indicates that lightpath r fails in 
network state s (i.e., zs,r = 1) if and only if all of these events occur: the working path fails (i.e., 
gs,r = 1), the first backup path fails (i.e., hs,r = 1), and the second backup path is not available 
(i.e., 2,s rh  = 1) in that network state. Constraints (3.110)–(3.111) are for the calculation of the risk 
as (3.99)–(3.100) in the link protection case. Constraint (3.112) is the budget constraint which 
limits the total spare capacity investment in dual protection backup paths. Constraint sets 
(3.113)–(3.114) ensure that each second backup path is link-disjoint from the corresponding 
working path, and the corresponding first backup path, respectively. If the second link-disjoint 
backup path cannot be found in the network, the lightpath is only protected by one backup path. 
Lastly, constraint sets (3.115)–(3.117) express the binary nature of the decision and failure 
variables. 
 
Incremental minimum-risk dual path protection design problem (Node-link model) 
 
Objective: 
2 2, ,
min
bp qr r j
totalrisk                             (3.106) 
s.t. 2 2, , , (mod  2),   ,r j n j r n r
j L
q b d bp r R n N
∈
= ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈∑  (3.107) 
2 2 2
,  , ,K 1 ,    ,s r s j r j r
j L
h state q bp s S r R
∈
≥ + − ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈∑  (3.108) 
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2
, , , , 2,    ,s r s r s r s rz g h h s S r R≥ + + − ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈              (3.109) 
, ,    s s r r
r R
damage z d s S
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                   (3.110) 
,    s s
s S
totalrisk stateprob damage s S
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                                                             (3.111) 
2
,j r j r
r R j L
c q m budget
∈ ∈
≤∑∑                                     (3.112) 
2
, , 1,    ,r j r jp q r R j L+ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                           (3.113) 
2
, , 1,    ,r j r jq q r R j L+ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈          (3.114) 
2 2
, , : ,    ,r j rq bp binary r R j L∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                (3.115) 
2
, : ,    ,s rh binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈          (3.116) 
, : ,    ,s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                              (3.117) 
3.7 NUMERICAL RESULTS 
This section presents the numerical results for the proposed minimum-risk survivable network 
design. Three networks are used in the experiments: Network 1, Network 2, and Network 3, as 
shown in Figure 3.2, Figure 3.8, and Figure 3.9, respectively. The cable lengths (km), and the 
Cable Cut (CC) metric, which is the average cable length (km) that results in a single cable cut 
per year, if not specified otherwise, are indicated in the figures. All the cables have the same 
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) of 24 hours. For each network, a full mesh of lightpath demands 
between all node pairs are assumed, each of which carries the same data rate of 10 Gbps.  The 
working path of each lightpath is routed along the shortest path based on the hop count, and 
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given to the design problem.  The spare capacity cost is defined as 1 budget unit per 10 Gbps per 
1000 km. Also, the amount of damage for the risk calculation is measured as the traffic loss rate 
resulting from failed lightpaths. 
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Figure 3.8 Network 2 (|N| = 10, |L| = 22) with cable length (km) and Cable Cut (CC) metric (km) within parentheses 
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Figure 3.9 Network 3 (|N| = 13, |L| = 23) with cable length (km) and Cable Cut (CC) metric (km) within parentheses  
 
Several numerical cases were studied. First, the minimum-risk curves (i.e., risk vs 
budget) for link protection and path protection are compared and discussed. Based on the risk 
curves, a cost-benefit analysis can show whether an investment in network survivability is 
justified by the reduction in risk level, and can show an optimal budget value for investing in 
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network protection, which maximizes the investment benefit. Then, the proposed heuristic 
algorithms and the InP approach are evaluated in terms of the optimality of results and the 
computational time. Lastly, results from an extension of the minimum-risk design approach to 
networks with multiple classes of traffic, and an incremental survivable network design are 
presented.  
3.7.1 Minimum-risk curves   
In the first set of experiments, a budget in term of the maximum spare capacity investment is 
given for each problem instance. The minimum-risk design problem as formulated in the InP 
models of Section 3.4.1 was solved for each budget value using the AMPL/CPLEX solver. For 
Network 1, we consider budget values ranging from 0 to 30 units in 0.5 increments. The 
minimum-risk curves (risk vs budget) for Network 1 with link protection and path protection and 
a fixed CC value of 450 km for all network links are shown in Figure 3.10. In addition, Table 3.6 
shows the results of which links and lightpaths are being protected for some specific budget 
values.  
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Figure 3.10 Minimum-risk curves (risk vs budget) for link protection and path protection on Network 1 
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Table 3.6 Investment strategy results indicating which links or lighpaths (LPs) being protected for some 
specific budget values 
Link Protection Path Protection 
Budget 
Protected Links Protected LPs 
1.5 None LP 7  
2 Link 6  LP 2 
2.5 Link 6 LP 6 
3 Link 4 LP 6 
7 Link 4, 5 and 6 LP 2, 3, and 6 
8 Link 3, 5 and 6 LP 2, 3,  6 and 7 
19.5 Links 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 ALL LPs 
23.5 All links All LPs 
 
Without any protection in the network, the amount of risk to the network or the expected 
traffic loss rate is 699.37 Mbps. As the budget increases, the set of protected links and the set of 
protected lilghtpaths which yield the minimum-risk level vary as illustrated in Table 3.6, and the 
risk level is continually decreasing as shown in Figure 3.10. For most budget values, the path-
protected network has a lower risk level than the link-protected network. This is understandable 
because path protection is more capacity efficient than link protection due to its higher flexibility 
in choosing the backup routes; and therefore requiring a lower cost to protect the same amount of 
traffic (i.e., path protection can protect more traffic for a given budget). For example, path 
protection requires only 19.5 units of budget to protect all the lightpaths in the network, whereas 
link protection requires 23.5 units to protect all the network links. Nevertheless, path-protected 
connections are more vulnerable to multiple-links failures, which can fail the working and 
backup paths at the same time. This can be seen by, for example, when all the links and all the 
lightpaths are protected, the total network risk with path protection is 8.56 Mbps, higher than in 
the network with link protection, which is only 7.88 Mbps. 
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For Network 2 and Network 3, we run the experiments with two different sets of Cable 
Cut (CC) values: a fixed CC value of 450 km for all links, and varied CC values as indicated in 
Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9 for Network 2 and Network 3, respectively. The minimum-risk curves 
for network 2 with a fixed CC value of 450 km, and varied CC values are shown in Figure 3.11 
(a), and Figure 3.11 (b), respectively. Whereas, the minimum-risk curves for network 3 with a 
fixed CC value of 450 km, and varied CC values are shown in Figure 3.12 (a), and Figure 3.12 
(b), respectively. 
  In the experiments for Network 2 and Network 3, in order to reduce the number of 
network states in the risk calculation, we consider only network states with at most two 
simultaneous failures, rather than all possible network states. This reduces the number of 
network states considered from 2|L| to 1 + |L|(|L|+1)/2, but this underestimates the risk level. 
However, it still gives a very close approximation of the overall risk level because most of the 
probability mass is in the network states with a small number of simultaneous failures (e.g., in 
Network 3 with CC of 450 km, the network states with at most two simultaneous failures 
constitute the total state probability of .99958). This type of assumption is very common in the 
network survivability literature which considers only single and dual failures in their analysis 
[10, 27, 44]. In addition, the work in [46] shows that by considering only m most probable states, 
a good approximation of a performance measure can be obtained with the proper choice of m 
without having to analyze all possible states. In short, considering all possible network states is 
not necessary in the risk calculation. 
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Figure 3.11 Minimum-risk curves (risk vs budget) for link protection and path protection on Network 2 with (a) a 
fixed Cable Cut (CC) value of 450 km, and (b) varied Cable Cut (CC) values as indicated in Figure 3.8 
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Figure 3.12 Minimum-risk curves (risk vs budget) for link protection and path protection on Network 3 with (a) a 
fixed Cable Cut (CC) value of 450 km, and (b) varied Cable Cut (CC) values as indicated in Figure 3.9 
 
From Figures 3.11 and 3.12, we observe that the minimum-risk curves for both link 
protection and path protection have a convex shape (i.e., the slope of the risk curve increases, or 
becomes less negative, as the budget increases), which means that the amount of risk reduction 
per unit of budget decreases as the budget increases. This is because different parts of the 
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network are associated with different risk levels; and for a given budget the minimum-risk design 
seeks to protect a set of links/lightpaths which results in the maximum risk reduction (e.g., more-
critical links/lightpaths). Hence, as the budget increases, more links/lightpaths that are relatively 
less-critical are protected, resulting in a lower risk reduction per unit cost. 
The convexity of the risk curve is more apparent in the network with a higher variability 
of risk level across different parts of the network. For example, the risk curve for Network 2 and 
Network 3 with varied CC values shown in Figure 3.11 (b) and Figure 3.12 (b) is more convex 
than the risk curve for the same network with the fixed CC value shown in Figure 3.11 (a) and 
Figure 3.12 (a), respectively. Note that in Figure 3.10 it is not obvious that the risk curve has a 
convex shape since Network 1 is too small, in which there are not many selections of 
links/lightpaths to be protected; and thus the shape of the risk curve is heavily affected by the 
granularity of backup cost.  
The amount of risk in the risk curves in Figures 3.10–3.12 is presented as a value of risk 
(i.e., in Mbps of traffic loss rate). However, for a comparison of risk levels across different 
networks, a normalized risk level should be considered instead. In this experiment, the 
normalized risk is equal to the value of risk in Mbps of traffic loss rate divided by the total 
working traffic rate in the network (i.e., r
r R
m
∈
∑ ) multiplied by a hundred. The minimum-risk 
curves based on the normalized risk for network 2 with a fixed CC value, and varied CC values 
are shown in Figure 3.13 (a), and Figure 3.13 (b), respectively. Whereas, the minimum-risk 
curves based on the normalized risk for network 3 with a fixed CC value, and varied CC values 
are shown in Figure 3.14 (a), and Figure 3.14 (b), respectively. The results show that the initial 
normalized risk level of Network 2 with varied CC values in Figure 3.13 (b) is higher than other 
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networks. This is mainly because on average Network 2 with varied CC values has a higher 
cable cut rate per km than other networks. 
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Figure 3.13 Minimum-risk curves (normalized risk vs budget) for link protection and path protection on Network 2 
with (a) a fixed Cable Cut (CC) value of 450 km, and (b) varied Cable Cut (CC) values as indicated in Figure 3.8 
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Figure 3.14 Minimum-risk curves (normalized risk vs budget) for link protection and path protection on Network 3 
with (a) a fixed Cable Cut (CC) value of 450 km, and (b) varied Cable Cut (CC) values as indicated in Figure 3.9 
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3.7.2 Cost-benefit analysis  
Based on the minimum-risk curves, if information is available, one can convert the amount of 
risk reduction into a monetary unit; then calculate an investment benefit, which is defined as the 
reduction in the risk level (in a monetary unit) subtracted by the cost of deploying the 
survivability technique (i.e., a budget), as shown in (3.118).      
 
 Investment Benefit ($) = Risk Reduction ($) - Survivability Cost ($)              (3.118) 
 
The purpose of the cost-benefit analysis here is to demonstrate whether the cost of 
providing network survivability can be economically justified by the reduction in the risk level. 
The investment is justified only if the benefit is positive.  
 For the risk curve of Network 3 in Figure 3.12 (b), if we assume that the reduction in risk 
level (i.e., expected traffic loss rate) of 40 Mbps is equivalent to one monetary unit, the benefit 
plot (i.e., benefit vs budget) for link protection, and path protection can be determined as in 
Figure 3.15 (a), and 3.15 (b), respectively. The benefit plot for link protection in Figure 3.15 (a) 
shows that the cost of deploying link protection is justified by the reduction in the risk level 
when the cost is less than or equal to 107.5 units, and it is not justified to invest in link protection 
for more than or equal to 110 units. In other words, it is not justified to protect all the network 
links (i.e., it requires 140 budget units to protect all the network links where the benefit is 
negative), but only some links in the network (i.e., critical links). The benefit plot also suggests 
that by investing only 27.5 budget units in link protection it results in the maximum benefit. In 
Appendix B, we give a proof that if the risk curve is convex, there always exists an optimal 
budget value which maximizes the investment benefit. 
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Unlike the link protection case, the benefit plot for path protection on the same network 
in Figure 3.15 (b) suggests that an investment in path protection is justified for all budget values. 
This can be explained as a result of the higher capacity efficiency of path protection. Since for 
each budget value, path protection results in a higher risk reduction than link protection as shown 
in the risk curve in Figure 3.12 (b), and this higher amount of risk reduction can always 
overcome the cost of path protection in the network. Thus the investment benefit is always 
positive. The benefit plot for path protection also shows that the optimal budget value, which 
maximizes the investment benefit, is equal to 52.5 units. 
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Figure 3.15 Benefit Plot (benefit vs budget) for (a) link protection, and (b) path protection on Network 3 with varied 
CC values (assuming a risk reduction of 40 Mbps = 1 monetary unit) 
 
Note that the shape of a benefit plot is greatly affected by the equivalent monetary value 
of a unit of risk reduction. If the equivalent monetary value of a unit of risk reduction is larger, 
the benefit plot will tend to shift toward the right, indicating it is more beneficial to invest more 
in network protection. For example, Figure 3.16 (a) shows the benefit plot for link protection on 
Network 3, assuming that the reduction in risk level of 30 Mbps is worth one monetary unit.  The 
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plot indicates that it is justified to invest in a full protection (as compared to the partial protection 
in Figure 3.15 (a)), and the optimal budget value is now 65 units (as compared to 27.5 units in 
Figure 3.15 (a)). On the other hand, if the equivalent monetary value for a unit of risk reduction 
is smaller, the benefit plot will tend to shift toward the left, indicating it is more beneficial to 
decrease the budget for investing in network protection. For example, Figure 3.16 (b) shows the 
benefit plot for link protection on Network 3 assuming the reduction in risk level of 50 Mbps is 
equivalent to one monetary unit.  The plot indicates that an investment is only justified when the 
budget is less than or equal to 67.5 budget units (as compared to 107.5 budget units in Figure 
3.15 (a)). 
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Figure 3.16 Benefit plot (benefit vs budget) for link protection on Network 3 with varied CC values assuming (a) a 
risk reduction 30 Mbps = 1 monetary unit, and (b) a risk reduction of 50 Mbps = 1 monetary unit 
 
 
The benefit plots for link protection and path protection on Network 2 with a fixed CC 
value of 450 km, and varied CC values are shown in Figures 3.17, and 3.18, respectively; 
whereas the benefit plots for link protection and path protection on Network 3 with a fixed CC 
value of 450 km are shown in Figures 3.19.  These plots assume that the reduction in risk level of 
40 Mbps is equal to one monetary unit. 
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Figure 3.17 Benefit plot (benefit vs budget) for (a)  link protection and (b) path protection on Network 2 with a 
fixed CC value of 450 km (assuming a risk reduction of 40 Mbps = 1 monetary unit) 
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Figure 3.18 Benefit plot (benefit vs budget) for (a) link protection and (b) path protection on Network 2 with varied 
CC values (assuming a risk reduction of 40 Mbps = 1 monetary unit) 
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Figure 3.19 Benefit plot (benefit vs budget) for (a) link protection and (b) path protection on Network 3 with a fixed 
CC value of 450 km (assuming a risk reduction of  40 Mbps = 1 monetary unit) 
3.7.3 Comparison of heuristic and InP approaches 
In this section, the heuristic solution algorithms and the InP approach are evaluated and 
compared both in terms of the optimality and the computational times. For link-path InP models, 
all possible routes within two hops from the shortest backup route are used as the set of pre-
computed backup routes. These pre-computed backup routes are link-disjoint from their 
corresponding working entity. The numbers of pre-computed routes used in the experiments for 
each network and each protection technique are summarized in Table 3.7, as the average number, 
the minimum number, and the maximum number. 
Table 3.7 The number of pre-computed backup routes used in link-path InP models 
 Network 1 Network 2 Network 3 
 
Link 
protection 
Path 
protection 
Link 
protection 
Path 
protection 
Link 
protection 
Path 
protection
Average 3.1 2.8 16.5 21.3 5.9 10.7 
[Min,Max] [3, 4] [2, 4] [10, 28] [10, 53] [3, 17] [1, 53] 
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The results on Network 1, Network 2 and Network 3 with link protection and path 
protection show that the link-path InP formulation with all possible routes within two hops from 
the shortest backup route as a set of pre-computed backup routes always yields the same optimal 
results as the node-link formulation.  This proves that for our sample networks a set of pre-
computed routes is large enough to include the optimal backup routes. 
For the heuristic approach, a link-disjoint route with minimum path unavailability is used 
as a pre-computed backup route for each protected link and protected lightpath.  Since there is 
only one candidate  backup route available, the design problem does not need to determine which 
backup route to use, but only to determine which links to protect in the link protection case, and 
which lightpaths to protect in the path protection case. Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 present, for each 
heuristic algorithm, an average error from the optimal result obtained from the InP approach over 
a number of problem instances on Network 2 and Network 3 with a fixed CC value of 450 km. 
Note, that only the problem instances with budget values that result in partial protection are used 
in the calculation of average errors, since for all other budget values, the InP and heuristic 
approaches produce the same results (i.e., not protecting at all, or protecting all links/lightpaths).  
 
 
Table 3.8 Average error of heuristics for link protection and path protection on Network 2  
Average error (%) from Optimal Solutions 
 
Link Protection Path Protection 
Heuristic 1 18.97 7.78 
Heuristic 2 6.97 1.36 
Heuristic 3 1.99 0.29 
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Table 3.9 Average error of heuristics for link protection and path protection on Network 3  
Average Error (%) from Optimal Solutions 
 
Link Protection Path Protection 
Heuristic 1 27.42 7.72 
Heuristic 2 19.63 1.53 
Heuristic 3 3.70 0.53 
 
On average, Heuristic 2 outperforms Heuristic 1. This is because Heuristic 2 takes the 
cost of the backup path into consideration when making decisions (i.e., the amount of risk 
reduction per unit cost is used as the selection criteria rather than the amount of risk reduction 
alone). Furthermore, Heuristic 3 always outperforms Heuristic 2 since it uses the result from 
Heuristic 2 as an initial solution upon which it iteratively improves to produce a better solution.  
The computational times of Heuristic 3, node-link InP approach, and link-path InP 
approach for link protection and path protection on Network 2 are compared in Figure 3.20 (a) 
and Figure 3.20 (b), respectively; whereas the computational times for link protection and path 
protection on Network 3 are shown in Figure 3.21 (a), and Figure 3.21 (b), respectively. The 
computational times of Heuristic 1 and Heuristic 2 are not shown because they are shorter than 
the computational time of Heuristic 3.  
The results show that the node-link InP model cannot guarantee to produce an optimal 
solution within a reasonable time. For example in Figure 3.21 (a) there are many problem 
instances where the computational time is longer than 3 hours, and two problem instances where 
the node-link model cannot find an optimal solution in 3 days (represented by 7×104 sec in the 
figure). The results also show that the link-path InP model can provide an optimal solution with a 
much faster time than the node-link model, i.e., for our network examples an optimal solution 
can be found within 1 minute for each problem instance. This is understandable because the link-
 78 
path InP model limits the number of candidate backup routes considered, thereby reducing the 
size of the searching space for the optimization problem. However, in general as in any InP 
approach, the link-path model cannot guarantee a scalable computational time since it is well 
known that InP problems are NP-hard.  This is one of the motivations why the heuristic approach 
is necessary.  Another motivation for considering the heuristic approach is that it can be applied 
to a problem with a non-linear objective function, which cannot be solved by the InP approach 
(note that one of the risk-based design problems with non-linear objective function, namely the 
minimum-RMS damage design, is considered in Chapter 4).  For our network examples, the 
results show that Heuristic 3 could provide good near-optimal solutions within a reasonable time, 
i.e., a few ten seconds for most of problem instances, and less than 5 minutes for all problem 
instances.  
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Figure 3.20  Computational times of InP approach and Heuristic 3 for (a) link protection, and (b) path protection on 
Network 2 with a fixed CC value of 450 km   
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Figure 3.21  Computational times of InP approach and Heuristic 3 for (a) link protection, and (b) path protection on 
Network 3 with a fixed CC value of 450 km 
3.7.4 Minimum-risk survivable network design for networks with multiple classes of 
traffic 
This section presents the results from the minimum-risk survivable network design for networks 
with multiple classes of traffic. The design problems as formulated in the Integer Programming 
(InP) models of Section 3.5 were solved using a commercial AMPL/CPLEX solver. In the 
experiments, we define the damage level caused by a failure of a bronze, silver, and gold traffic 
flow as 1,000, 10,000, and 50,000 units, respectively (i.e., Brd =1,000, 
S
rd =10,000, and 
G
rd =50,000). For bronze traffic, full-mesh lightpath demands between all node-pairs are 
assumed; whereas for silver and gold traffics, partial-mesh lightpath demands (i.e., between 
some node-pairs) are assumed in each network. Each lightpath carries the same data rate of 10 
Gbps. In Network 2, the bronze, silver, and gold traffic flows are account for 53.79%, 38.64%, 
and 7.57% of the total network working capacity; whereas in network 3, the bronze, silver, and 
gold traffic flows are account for 56.16%, 35.62%, and 8.22% of the total network working 
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capacity, respectively. In addition, only network states with at most two simultaneous failures are 
considered in the risk calculation. 
The minimum-risk curve for Network 2 with multiple classes of traffic and a fixed CC 
value of 450 km is shown in Figure 3.22 (a), and with varied CC values in Figure 3.22 (b). 
Whereas, the minimum-risk curve for Network 3 with multiple classes of traffic and a fixed CC 
value of 450 km is shown in Figure 3.23 (a), and with varied CC values in Figure 3.23 (b). The 
results show that in networks with multiple classes of traffic, the path protection technique 
results in the higher rate of risk reduction than the link protection at low budget values. This is 
understandable because at low budget values the path protection technique can choose to protect 
only the traffic flows associated with higher damage levels (e.g., gold traffic flows only), 
whereas the link protection technique when protecting a link has to protect all of the traffic on 
the link regardless of class. 
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Figure 3.22  Minimum-risk curves (risk vs budget) for Network 2 with multiple classes of traffics and (a) fixed CC 
values of 450 km, and (b) varied CC values 
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Figure 3.23  Minimum-risk curves (risk vs budget) for Network 3 with multiple classes of traffics and (a) fixed CC 
value of 450 km, (b) varied CC values 
 
Figures 3.22–3.23 show the risk curves as the total risk level of all traffic in the network 
regardless of traffic class. In contrast, the risk curves for different classes of traffic are presented 
in Figures 3.24–3.27. The risk curves in Figures 3.24 and 3.25 show the risk levels of different 
traffic classes that constitute the total risk level in Network 2 and Network 3, respectively. In 
these figures, the risk is presented as a percentage of the initial total risk level in the network. 
Whereas, the risk curves in Figures 3.26 and 3.27 show the risk level as a percentage of the 
initial risk level of its own traffic class and all traffic in Network 2 and Network 3, respectively. 
The results in Figures 3.24–3.27 show that the gold traffic class has the highest rate of 
risk reduction; whereas the bronze traffic class has the lowest rate of risk reduction. The 
differentiation in the rate of risk reduction among traffic classes is more apparent in the path 
protection case in which the protection technique can choose to protect only specific traffic flows 
based on the class. Note that the risk levels of different traffic classes as presented in Figures 
3.24 and 3.25 also depend on the amount of traffic, and the damage level caused by the failure of 
a lightpath in each traffic class. 
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Figure 3.24  Risk curves (a percentage of the initial total risk level) for different classes of traffic in Network 2 with 
varied CC values and (a) link protection, and (b) path protection 
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Figure 3.25  Risk curves (a percentage of the initial total risk level) for different classes of traffic in Network 3 with 
varied CC values and (a) link protection, and (b) path protection 
 
 
 
 
 
 83 
 
 
 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Budget (units)
R
is
k 
(%
 o
f i
ni
tia
l r
is
k 
le
ve
l o
f e
ac
h 
tra
ffi
c 
cl
as
s)
All traffic
Bronze traffic
Silver traffic
Gold traffic
 
(a) 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Budget (units)
R
is
k 
(%
 o
f i
ni
tia
l r
is
k 
le
ve
l o
f e
ac
h 
tra
ffi
c 
cl
as
s)
All traffic
Bronze traffic
Silver traffic
Gold traffic
 
(b) 
 
Figure 3.26  Risk curves (a percentage of the initial risk level of each traffic class) in Network 2 with varied CC 
values and (a) link protection, and (b) path protection 
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Figure 3.27  Risk curves (percentage of the initial risk level of each traffic class) in Network 3 with varied CC 
values and (a) link protection, and (b) path protection 
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The minimum-risk network design is also compared with the minimum-cost network 
design in terms of the total risk, and the survivability cost.  Table 3.10–3.13 show the remaining 
risk level in the network, and the corresponding required budget for both the minimum-risk 
design and the minimum-cost design, with link protection and path protection on Network 2, and 
Network 3 supporting multiple classes of traffic, respectively.  In these tables, the remaining risk 
level is presented as a percentage of the initial risk level in the network given to the current 
design (i.e., in this case, it is the amount of total risk when the network is not protected), whereas 
the budget is presented as a percentage of the cost required by the minimum-cost design to 
survive all single-link failures. The results show a tradeoff between the remaining risk level in 
the network, and the amount of budget saving that can be achieved in the minimum-risk network 
design. For example, Table 3.11 shows that by allowing the remaining risk level of 5% in the 
network, the protection requires only 53.11% of the cost required by the minimum-cost design; 
thereby we can achieve a budget saving of 46.89%. Moreover, if the same network is designed to 
have the remaining risk level of about 2% and 1%, we can achieve a budget saving of 30% and 
15.51%, respectively. 
Note that the minimum-risk design can achieve the lower risk level than the minimum-
cost design, but possibly requiring a higher cost. For example in Table 3.11, the minimum-risk 
design requires a budget of 103.80% of the minimum cost to achieve the lowest risk level at 0.50 
%; whereas the minimum-cost design results in a remaining risk level of 0.59%. In this case both 
designs protect all the links or all the lightpaths in the network; however the difference is that the 
minimum-risk design chooses the backup routes that have a lower risk, but require higher costs 
than the minimum-cost design. 
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Table 3.10 Risk and budget comparisons between minimum-risk design and minimum-cost design for 
Network 2 with link protection and varied CC values 
Remaining Risk Level 
(% of initial risk level) 
Budget 
(% of cost required by minimum-cost design) 
Minimum-risk design 
50% 14.58% 
25% 30.98% 
10% 54.67% 
5% 69.25% 
2% 85.65% 
0.74% 94.76% 
0.44% (minimum risk level) 112.98% 
Minimum-cost design 
0.57% 100% 
 
 
Table 3.11 Risk and budget comparisons between minimum-risk design and minimum-cost design for 
Network 2 with path protection and varied CC values 
Remaining Risk Level 
(% of initial risk level) 
Budget 
(% of cost required by minimum-cost design) 
Minimum-risk design 
 50% 7.24% 
25% 19.31% 
10% 36.21% 
 5% 53.11% 
2% 70.00% 
 0.97% 84.49% 
0.50% (minimum risk level) 103.80% 
Minimum-cost design 
0.59% 100% 
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Table 3.12 Risk and budget comparisons between minimum-risk design and minimum-cost design for 
Network 3 with link protection and varied CC values 
Remaining Risk Level 
(% of initial risk level) 
Budget 
(% of cost required by minimum-cost design) 
Minimum-risk design 
50% 22.80% 
25% 48.14% 
10% 72.21% 
5% 84.88% 
2% 92.48% 
0.99% 98.82% 
0.51% (minimum risk level) 113.89% 
Minimum-cost design 
0.54% 100% 
 
 
Table 3.13 Risk and budget comparisons between minimum-risk design and minimum-cost design for 
Network 3 with path protection and varied CC values 
Remaining Risk Level 
(% of initial risk level) 
Budget 
(% of cost required by minimum-cost design) 
Minimum-risk design 
50% 8.42% 
25% 23.14% 
10% 39.97% 
5% 56.80% 
2% 79.94% 
0.95% 94.67% 
0.72% (minimum risk level) 100.98% 
Minimum-cost design 
0.76% 100% 
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Lastly, the results from the minimum-risk design are presented in term of the connection 
availability. Unlike the total network risk presented earlier which is a measure for the whole 
network, the connection availability presented here is a measure for each traffic flow. Figures 
3.28 and 3.29 present the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of connection availability 
across all connections in each traffic class in Network 2, and Network 3 with varied CC values, 
respectively. The given budget values used in the experiments for link protection, and path 
protection are the same, which are 28 units and 48 units for Network 2 and Network 3, 
respectively. The given budget of 28 units is about one fourth of the minimum cost required for 
protecting all the links, and about one third of the minimum cost required for protecting all the 
end-to-end paths in Network 2. Whereas, the given budget of 48 units is about one fifth of the 
minimum cost required for protecting all the links, and about one third of the minimum cost 
required for protecting all the end-to-end paths in Network 3. 
Figures 3.28 (a) and 3.29 (a) show that when the networks are not protected, the 
connection availability for all traffic classes are roughly the same. In the link protection case, the 
results in Figures 3.28 (b) and 3.29 (b) show that for the given budget the connection availability 
for all traffic classes are improved; the gold-class traffic flows have the highest connection 
availability, followed by the silver-class traffic flows which have a slightly higher connection 
availability than the bronze-class traffic flows. 
In path protection, for the given budget the results in Figure 3.28 (c) and Figure 3.29 (c) 
show that the minimum-risk design could improve the connection availability for the gold-class 
traffic flows significantly; whereas the connection availability for the silver traffic class is 
improved moderately, and the connection availability for the bronze-class traffic flows is 
unchanged. This is understandable because in this example the minimum-risk design allocates 
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the fixed budget to protect all the traffic flows in the gold class, and then allocate the remaining 
budget to protect the silver-class traffic flows such that the total network risk is minimized. 
In conclusion, the above results show that path protection has a better differentiation 
among traffic classes than link protection, and the minimum-risk design approach can be used to 
provide differential classes of availability or protection to traffic in accordance with the different 
availability requirements of different traffic classes (e.g., as defined in SLA). 
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Figure 3.28  Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of connection availability across all connections in each 
traffic class for (a) no protection, (b) link protection with a budget of 28 units, and (c) path protection with a budget 
of 28 units, on Network 2 with varied CC values. 
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Figure 3.29  Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of connection availability across all traffic connections in 
each traffic class for (a) no protection, (b) link protection with a budget of 48 units, and (c) path protection with a 
budget of 48 units, on Network 3 with varied CC values. 
3.7.5 Sequence of incremental minimum-risk designs 
The risk-based survivable network design approach does not assume a Greenfield network 
condition. In fact, it is well suit to an incremental design approach where the risk is reduced 
through a series of incremental designs (e.g., quarterly, semi-annual, etc.). A network given to 
the design problem might be partially fault-tolerant, in which a survivability technique can be 
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incrementally deployed to further reduce the network risk. For each design increment, the design 
problem is to determine in which parts of the network to deploy a survivability technique as an 
addition to the existing survivability mechanisms already in the network in order to minimize the 
total network risk, while subject to a budget constraint. Typically, it is also assumed that a 
reconfiguration of existing survivability mechanisms is not possible.  
Note, that in general the InP formulations for incremental survivable network design 
require sets of constraints to fix the values of decision variables corresponding to all protected 
links (in the link protection case), or all protected lightpaths (in the path protection case), and 
their backup routes at the values from the previous design. Thus the design problem is to 
optimize over the remaining variables only. Furthermore, a budget constraint must calculate the 
spare capacity cost that occurs only in the current incremental design.      
In this section, different incremental investment alternatives are compared on the basis of 
risk. In the experiment, each incremental investment alternative is given the same capital 
expenditure, but invested at different times. Three incremental investment alternatives are 
considered: annual, semi-annual, and quarterly investments, representing one-time investment, 
two consecutive investments, and four consecutive investments, respectively. For each 
incremental investment alternative the amount of capital expenditure is divided equally over the 
investments (i.e., uniform series of investments). Due to a modular cost of a backup path, a 
portion of budget might be left uninvested from each investment. This remaining budget is made 
available to the subsequent investment for a fair comparison. 
For Network 2 and Network 3, the given capital expenditure is 40 units and 50 units, 
respectively. Table 3.14 and Table 3.15 show the resulting risk after each incremental investment 
for three different investment alternatives using link protection on Network 2 and Network 3, 
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with a fixed CC value of 450 km. The result shows that, after all investments, the quarterly 
investment results in a higher risk remaining to the network (e.g., 381.96 Mbps in Network 2, 
and 1,809.37 Mbps in Network 3) than the other two investment alternatives (e.g., 357.80 Mbps 
in Network 2, and 1,737.21 Mbps in Network 3). This is understandable because the quarterly 
investment has a smaller available budget per investment; therefore it may select to protect links 
that are not a part of optimal set of protected links selected by the investment alternatives with a 
larger budget per investment.   
 
Table 3.14 Risk results from three different incremental minimum-risk investment alternatives for link 
protection on Network 2, and a given capital expenditure of 40 units 
Risk result from each investment (Mbps)  
Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
Annual 
Investment 357.80    
Semi-annual 
Investment 1061.85  357.80  
Quarterly 
Investment 1638.86 1092.56 654.09 381.96 
 
 
Table 3.15 Risk results from three different incremental minimum-risk investment alternatives for link 
protection on Network 3, and a given capital expenditure of 50 units 
Risk result from each investment (Mbps)  
Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
Annual 
Investment 1737.21    
Semi-annual 
Investment 2598.51  1737.21  
Quarterly 
Investment 3090.42 2604.73 2135.92 1809.37 
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The results in Table 3.14 and Table 3.15 also show that, in incremental investments the 
prior investment always results in a higher level of risk reduction than each subsequent 
investment. For example, the semi-annually incremental investments in Table 3.15 show that the 
first investment which invests half of the capital expenditure results in an amount of risk 
reduction of 3,803.54 – 2,598.51 = 1,205.03 Mbps (3,803.54 Mbps is an amount of risk in 
Network 3 with no protection deployed as shown in Figure 3.12 (a)), whereas the second 
investment which invest the other half of the capital expenditure results in a lower amount of risk 
reduction, which is only 2,598.51 – 1,737.21 = 861.30 Mbps. These observations can be 
explained based on the fact that different links in the network are associated with different risk 
levels; and each incremental investment tries to protect a set of links that are associated with the 
maximum risk reduction, and thus leaves a set of links that only result in a lower risk reduction 
per investment to be protected in subsequent investments. 
3.7.6 Incremental minimum-risk design with dual protection 
In the numerical experiments, the incremental minimum-risk design problems with dual 
protection as formulated in the Integer Programming (InP) models of Section 3.6 were solved 
using a commercial AMPL/CPLEX solver. A network given to the problem was designed using 
the minimum-cost design approach to protect all single-link failures. In addition, only network 
states with at most two simultaneous failures are considered in the risk calculation. 
The minimum-risk curves for dual protection on Network 2, and Network 3 are shown in 
Figure 3.30 (a) and Figure 3.30 (b), respectively. In these figures, a budget represents the spare 
capacity cost for the second backup paths only, not including the cost for the first backup paths.  
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The results show that the initial risk level (i.e., the risk level when budget = 0) in the 
path-protected network is higher than in the link-protected network. This is because in the 
networks which are designed to survive any single-link failure, path protection is more 
susceptible to dual-link failures which can fail the working and backup paths at the same time 
than the link protection since it has a longer backup path, and the protected path is also longer 
than a protected link. As the budget increases, path protection results in a higher rate of risk 
reduction than the link protection due to its higher spare capacity efficiency; therefore there is a 
point where the two risk curves intersect as shown in the figures. In addition, the risk curves for 
Network 2 in Figure 3.30 (a) also shows that when the budget is sufficiently enough to protect all 
the links, or all the lightpaths with dual backup paths, the total risk is reduced to zero, as the 
network could survive any single-link and dual-link failure. On the other hand, the risk curves 
for Network 3 in Figure 3.30 (b) show that the risk can never be reduced to zero as the budget 
increases. This is understandable because node 1 in Network 3 has a nodal degree of two, 
therefore there are some links and lighpaths in the network (e.g., any links and any lightpaths 
that has node 1 as an end node such as link 1-8 and link 1-9) for which two link-disjoint backup 
paths cannot be found, and thus the network is still susceptible to some dual-link failures. 
The results also show that the minimum-risk curves for an investment in the second 
backup paths also have a convex shape similar to the risk curves for investing in the single 
backup paths in Section 3.7.1. Therefore, we can conclude that there always exists an optimal 
budget value which maximizes the benefit of an investment in the second backup paths.  
 
 94 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Budget (units)
R
is
k 
(M
bp
s)
Link Protection 
Path Protection
 
(a) 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Budget (units)
R
is
k 
(M
bp
s)
Link Protection
Path Protection
 
(b) 
Figure 3.30  Minimum-risk curves (risk vs budget) for deploying the second backup paths in (a) Network 2, and (b) 
Network 3 with varied CC values 
3.8 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, the methodology for the proposed risk-based design approach is presented. The 
design approach consists of two components: a risk assessment and a risk-based investment 
strategy. The risk assessment is a process of quantifying the risk associated with failures in the 
network. A fault tree model is used as a failure-relationship model to determine a set of failed 
lightpaths in each network state. Closed-form formulas for the risk calculation for link-protected 
networks and path-protected networks are determined. The risk-based investment strategy is used 
to determine how best to spend a fixed budget for deploying a survivability technique in different 
parts of the network based on the risk.  
The basic risk-based survivable network design approach, namely; the minimum-risk 
survivable network design, is presented in the chapter. The minimum-risk link protection design 
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problem and the minimum-risk path protection design problem are formulated as Integer 
Programming (InP) models. Both the node-link model and the link-path model are provided for 
each design problem. However, since the InP approach is not scalable to large problems and 
cannot guarantee to provide an optimal solution within a reasonable time, a set of greedy-based 
heuristic algorithms are proposed as a method to approximate an optimal solution within a 
reasonable time. 
Through numerical results, various aspects of the minimum-risk survivable network 
design are disclosed. First, for a given budget, the minimum-risk path protection design provides 
a lower total network risk than the minimum-risk link protection design due to its higher capacity 
efficiency. Moreover, the minimum-risk curves (risk vs budget) have a convex shape, which 
reflects the fact that different parts of the network are associated with different risk levels; 
therefore the risk reduction rate is not a constant, but a decreasing function of budget. The results 
also show that the degree of risk curves’ convexity varies according to a variation in risk levels 
associated with different parts of the network. Based on the risk curve, a cost-benefit analysis 
can be conducted to determine whether an investment in network protection is economically 
justified by the amount of risk reduction, and one can determine the optimal budget value which 
maximizes the benefit of an investment. A proof in Appendix B shows that if the risk curve is 
convex, there always exists an optimal budget value. 
In term of the performance of the risk-based network design solution methods, the results 
show that for the network examples considered, the link-path InP model could provide the same 
optimal solutions as the node-link InP models with much shorter computational times. Also, the 
third proposed greedy algorithm (i.e., the iterative greedy heuristic) could provide good near-
optimal solutions within scalable times. 
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The extension of the minimum-risk design to networks with multiple classes of traffic 
was also presented. For our network examples, the results show that we can achieve a substantial 
budget saving by allowing a slightly higher risk level in the network. This shows one advantage 
of the risk-based design over the conventional minimum-cost design in that it allows a tradeoff 
between the budget and the reduction in risk level in the network. In addition, the results indicate 
that the minimum-risk design approach can be used to provide differential classes of availability 
or protection to traffic in accordance with the different availability requirements of different 
traffic classes defined in Service Level Agreements (SLA); and that path protection has a better 
differentiation among traffic classes than link protection. 
Another extension considered is the incremental minimum-risk design. Two different 
scenarios for the incremental minimum-risk design are considered: a sequence of minimum-risk 
investments, and an incremental minimum-risk design with dual protection. The results from the 
sequence of incremental minimum-risk investments show a disadvantage of the quarterly 
investments which results in a higher risk level as compared to the annual investment or semi-
annual investments.  The results from the incremental minimum-risk investment with dual 
protection show that its risk curves also have a convex shape.  
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4.0  ALTERNATIVE RISK-BASED SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGNS 
The minimum-risk survivable network design presented in Chapter 3 is aimed at minimizing the 
total risk, or equivalently the expected damage value across network failure states. This design 
objective focuses only on the mean aspect of the risk, while ignoring other aspects related to the 
risk such as the variation in the damage and failure probabilities across the network failure states, 
and the amount of damage that could occur in the worst-case failure scenario.  
This chapter presents alternative risk-based survivable network designs which take into 
account different aspects of risk in the design objectives. First, the min-max damage survivable 
network design is considered in Section 4.1.  This design approach considers the minimization of 
the maximum damage that could occur in the network in the design objective. Section 4.2 
presents the min-max risk survivable network design, which takes into consideration a 
minimization of the maximum risk that could occur in the network. Next, the minimum-root 
mean square (RMS) damage survivable network design is presented in Section 4.3.  In contrast 
to the minimum-risk survivable network design which minimizes the expected damage value, the 
minimum-RMS damage design is aimed at minimizing the square root of the expected damage-
squared value across all network failure states. The numerical results illustrating various risk-
based survivable network designs are presented in Section 4.4.  Lastly, Section 4.5 concludes the 
chapter. 
The notation used in this chapter is summarized in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Notation used in Chapter 4 
Given:  
N Set of nodes 
L Set of links or cables 
R Set of  lightpaths 
S Set of network states 
pr,i 
pr,i = 1 if lightpath r uses link i in its working path, and = 0 
otherwise  
mr Data rate (bits/s) of lightpath r  
wi 
Amount of working capacity on link i, calculated by  
wi , rp mr ir R∑= ∈  
states,i 
states,i = 1 if cable i is cut in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise 
stateprobs Probability of network state s  
dr Damage caused by a failure of lightpath r  
ci The unit cost of spare capacity on link i  
budget The budget  
K A large constant used for bounding 
The following notation is used in the link protection case only: 
Qi Set of eligible backup routes for link i  
,
q
i jδ  ,
q
i jδ  = 1 if the qth eligible backup route for link i in the set Qi 
includes link j, and = 0 otherwise  
,
q
s iζ  
,
q
s iζ  = 1 if the qth backup route for link i in the set Qi  fails in 
network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
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The following notation is used in the path protection case only: 
Qr Set of eligible backup routes for lightpath r  
,
q
r jδ  ,
q
r jδ  = 1 if the qth eligible backup route for lightpath r in the 
set Qr includes link j, and = 0 otherwise  
,
q
s rζ  ,
q
s rζ  = 1 if the qth backup route for lightpath r in the set Qr 
fails in network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
gs,r 
gs,r > 0 if a working path for lightpath r fails in network state 
s, and = 0 otherwise (i.e., , , ,s r s i r i
i L
g state p
∈
=∑ ) 
Variables:  
damages Damage occurring in network state s  
maxdamage Maximum damage that could occur in the network in any network state  
risks Amount of risk in the network in network state s  
maxrisk Maximum amount of risk that could occur in the network from any network state  
totalrisk Total risk to the network  
ys,r 
ys,r > 0 if lightpath r fails in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise  
zs,r 
zs,r = 1 if lightpath r fails in network state s, and = 0 
otherwise  
The following notation is used in the link protection case only: 
bpi bpi = 1 if link i is protected, and = 0 otherwise  
q
if  
q
if = 1 if link i is protected and uses the q
th route in the 
backup route set Qi for its backup path, and = 0 otherwise  
hs,i 
hs,i = 1 if a backup path for link i is not available (either link 
i is not protected, or the backup path fails) in network state 
s, and = 0 otherwise  
es,i 
es,i = 1 if link i fails (both working link fails and backup 
path is not available) in network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
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The following notation is used in the path protection case only: 
bpr bpr =1 if lightpath r is protected, and = 0 otherwise  
q
rf  
q
rf = 1 if lightpath r is protected and uses the q
th route in the 
backup route set Qr for its backup path, and = 0 otherwise  
hs,r 
hs,r = 1 if a backup path for lightpath r is not available 
(either  lightpath r  is not protected, or the backup path fails) 
in network state s, and = 0 otherwise  
 
4.1 MIN-MAX DAMAGE SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN  
In the risk-based design approach of Chapter 3, the goal is to minimize the total network risk, or 
the expected damage value across all network states. However, by focusing only on the expected 
value, the amount of damage that could occur in the worst-case failure scenario might be too 
high and unacceptable to the network operators, or society. Therefore, in designing survivable 
networks an alternative approach is to minimize the maximum amount of damage that could 
occur in the network in addition to the expected damage. In this section, the min-max damage 
survivable network design is presented. The objective of this design is to minimize a multi-
objective function: k1×totalrisk + k2×maxdamage, or a linear summation of the total network 
risk, denoted by totalrisk, and the maximum amount of damage that could occur in any network 
state, denoted by maxdamage, where k1 and k2 are design parameters. By varying the values of 
k1 and k2, different survivable network designs are obtained. In the extreme cases, when k1 = 0, 
the design is aimed at minimizing the maximum damage only, whereas when k2 = 0, the 
minimum-risk survivable network design is obtained.   
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The link-path InP formulation for the min-max damage link protection design is 
presented in (4.1)–(4.12).  The decision variables are the binary variables bpi, which determines 
which links to be protected, where bpi = 1 if link i is protected and bpi = 0 otherwise, and the 
binary variables qif  which specifies the backup route for link i, where 
q
if = 1 if link i is protected 
and uses the qth route in the backup route set Qi for its backup path, and = 0 otherwise. The 
design objective in (4.1) is to minimize a linear summation of the total risk and the maximum 
damage that could occur in any network state. The constraint sets (4.2)–(4.12) are similar to the 
constraints (3.34)–(3.43) in the minimum-risk link protection design except for constraint set 
(4.8) which determines the maximum amount of damage that could occur in the network. 
Constraint set (4.2) indicates that if link i is protected, there must exist one backup path, 
for which the route is selected from a set of eligible backup routes Qi.  Constraints (4.3)–(4.6) are 
the failure state relationships which determine whether or not lightpath r fails in network state s, 
taking into account the link protection being deployed in the network. More specifically, 
constraint set (4.3) determines whether or not the backup path for link i is available in network 
state s. The backup path for link i might not be available in network state s (i.e., hs,i = 1) for two 
reasons: either the backup path exists but fails due to a cable cut in that network state (i.e., 
,
i
q q
i s i
q Q
f ζ
∈
∑ =1), or link i is not protected (i.e., bpi = 0, or 1-bpi = 1). Constraint set (4.4) indicates 
that link i fails in network state s (i.e., es,i = 1) if and only if both the working link fails (i.e., 
states,i =1) and its backup path is not available (i.e., hs,i = 1) in that network state. Constraint set 
(4.5) indicates that lightpath r fails in network state s (ys,r > 0) if and only if at least one of the 
links that it traverses fails (i.e., , , 0s i r i
i L
e p
∈
>∑ ). Constraint set (4.6) relates variable ys,r to binary 
variable zs,r. Constraint set (4.7) calculates the amount of damage for each network state as the 
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sum of damages for all failed lightpaths in that network state.  Constraint set (4.8) determines an 
amount of maximum damage that could occur in the network. Constraint (4.9) calculates the total 
network risk as the sum of the product of the state damage and the state probability for all 
network states. Constraint (4.10) is the budget constraint which limits the total spare capacity 
investment, where cj is the unit cost of spare capacity on link j, wi is the amount of working 
capacity on link i, and parameter ,
q
i jδ  = 1 if the qth eligible backup route for link i in the set Qi 
includes link j, and = 0 otherwise. Lastly, constraint sets (4.11) and (4.12) express the binary 
nature of the design and failure variables. 
 
Min-max damage link protection design problem (Link-path model) 
Objective: 
,
min 1 2
qbp fi i
k totalrisk k maxdamage× + ×                   (4.1) 
,    
i
q
i i
q Q
f bp i L
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                             (4.2) 
, , 1 ,    ,
i
q q
s i i s i i
q Q
h f bp s S i Lζ
∈
= + − ∈ ∈∑             (4.3) 
, , , ,    ,s i s i s ie state h s S i L= ∈ ∈                 (4.4) 
, , , ,    ,s r s i r i
i L
y e p s S r R
∈
= ∈ ∈∑              (4.5) 
, , ,    ,s r s rz K y s S r R≥ ∈ ∈               (4.6) 
, ,    s s r r
r R
damage z d s S
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                                    (4.7) 
,    smaxdamage damage s S≥ ∀ ∈             (4.8) 
s s
s S
totalrisk stateprob damage
∈
=∑               (4.9) 
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,
i
q q
j i i i j
i L q Q j L
c w f budgetδ
∈ ∈ ∈
≤∑∑∑              (4.10) 
, : ,    ,qi i ibp f binary i L q Q∀ ∈ ∀ ∈             (4.11) 
, : ,    ,s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                    (4.12) 
 
The link-path InP formulation for the min-max damage path protection design is 
presented in (4.13)–(4.23). The decision variables to be determined are binary variables bpr, 
which determines a set of lightpaths to be protected, where bpr = 1 if lightpath r is protected, and 
bpr = 0 otherwise, and the binary variables qrf , which specifies the backup route for lightpath r, 
where qrf = 1 if lightpath r is protected and uses the q
th route in the backup route set Qr for its 
backup path, and = 0 otherwise. The design objective in (4.13) is to minimize a linear summation 
of the total risk and the maximum damage that could occur in the network. The constraint sets 
(4.14)–(4.23) are similar to the constraints (3.45)–(3.53) in the minimum-risk path protection 
design except for constraint set (4.19) which determines the maximum amount of damage.  
Constraint set (4.14) indicates that if lightpath r is protected, there must exist one backup 
path, whose route is selected from a set of eligible backup routes Qr. Constraints (4.15)–(4.18) 
are the failure state relationships which determine whether or not lightpath r will fail in network 
state s, taking into account the path protection being deployed in the network. More specifically, 
constraint set (4.15) determines whether or not the backup path for lightpath r is available in 
network state s.  The backup path for lightpath r might not be available in network state s (i.e., 
hs,r = 1) for two reasons: either the backup path exists but fails due to a cable cut in that network 
state (i.e., ,
r
q q
r s r
q Q
f ζ
∈
∑ =1), or lightpath r is not protected (i.e., bpr = 0, or 1-bpr = 1). Constraint set 
(4.16) indicates that lightpath r fails in network state s (i.e., ys,r > 0) if and only if both its 
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working path fails (i.e., gs,r > 0) and its backup path is not available in that network state (i.e., hs,r 
= 1). Constraint set (4.17) relates variable ys,r to binary variable zs,r. Constraints (4.18)–(4.20) are 
for the calculation of the total risk and the maximum damage as in the link protection case. 
Constraint (4.21) is the budget constraint. Lastly, constraint sets (4.22) and (4.23) express the 
binary nature of the design and failure variables. 
 
Min-max damage path protection design problem (Link-path model) 
Objective: 
,
min k1 k2
qbp fr r
totalrisk maxdamage× + ×                  (4.13) 
,    
r
q
r r
q Q
f bp r R
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                       (4.14) 
, , 1 ,    ,
r
q q
s r r s r r
q Q
h f bp s S r Rζ
∈
= + − ∈ ∈∑                     (4.15) 
, , , ,    ,s r s r s ry g h s S r R= ∈ ∈                       (4.16) 
, ,K ,    ,s r s rz y s S r R≥ ∈ ∈              (4.17) 
, ,    s s r r
r R
damage z d s S
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                           (4.18) 
,    smaxdamage damage s S≥ ∀ ∈            (4.19) 
s s
s S
totalrisk stateprob damage
∈
=∑                      (4.20) 
,
r
q q
j r r r j
r R q Q j L
c m f budgetδ
∈ ∈ ∈
≤∑∑∑                      (4.21) 
, : ,    ,qr r rbp f binary r R q Q∀ ∈ ∀ ∈           (4.22) 
, : ,    ,s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                                  (4.23) 
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4.2 MIN-MAX RISK SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN 
The min-max damage survivable network design presented in Section 4.1 considers the 
maximum amount of damage that could occur in the network, while ignoring the occurrence 
probability of that failure. Therefore, the network might be designed to protect against failure 
scenarios that have a high damage level, but are unlikely to occur (e.g., multiple-link failures).  
In this section, the min-max risk survivable network design is presented. This design approach 
takes into account the maximum risk that could occur in any network state, where the risk 
associated with each network state is defined as the product of the amount of damage in that 
network state and the state probability. The design objective is to minimize a multi-objective 
function: k1×totalrisk + k2×maxrisk, which is a linear summation of the total risk, and the 
maximum risk that could occur in any network state, denoted by maxrisk, where k1 and k2 are 
design parameters.  By varying the values of k1 and k2, different survivable network designs can 
be obtained. In the extreme cases, when k1 = 0, the design is aimed at minimizing the maximum 
risk only, whereas when k2 = 0, the design is aimed at minimizing the total risk. 
The link-path InP formulation for the min-max risk link protection design is presented in 
(4.24)–(4.36). Two sets of decision variables are the binary variables bpi, which determines 
which links to be protected, where bpi = 1 if link i is protected and bpi = 0 otherwise, and the 
binary variable qif  which specifies the backup route for link i, where 
q
if = 1 if link i is protected 
and uses the qth route in the backup route set Qi for its backup path, and = 0 otherwise. The 
design objective in (4.24) is to minimize a linear summation of the total risk and the maximum 
risk that could occur in any network state. The constraint sets (4.25)–(4.36) are similar to the 
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constraints (3.34)–(3.43) in the minimum-risk link protection design except for constraint sets 
(4.31)–(4.32) which calculate the maximum risk that could occur in any network state. 
Constraint set (4.25) indicates that if link i is protected, there must exist one backup path, 
for which the route is selected from a set of eligible backup routes Qi.  Constraints (4.26)–(4.29) 
are the failure state relationships which determine whether or not lightpath r fails in network 
state s, taking into account the link protection being deployed in the network. More specifically, 
constraint set (4.26) determines whether or not the backup path for link i is available in network 
state s. The backup path for link i might not be available in network state s (i.e., hs,i = 1) for two 
reasons: either the backup path exists but fails due to a cable cut in that network state (i.e., 
,
i
q q
i s i
q Q
f ζ
∈
∑ =1), or link i is not protected (i.e., bpi = 0, or 1-bpi = 1). Constraint set (4.27) indicates 
that link i fails in network state s (i.e., es,i = 1) if and only if both the working link fails (i.e., 
states,i =1) and its backup path is not available (i.e., hs,i = 1) in that network state. Constraint set 
(4.28) indicates that lightpath r fails in network state s (ys,r > 0) if and only if at least one of the 
links that it traverses fails (i.e., , , 0s i r i
i L
e p
∈
>∑ ). Constraint set (4.29) relates variable ys,r to binary 
variable zs,r. Constraint set (4.30) calculates the damage for each network state as the sum of the 
damage from all failed lighpaths in that network state. Constraint set (4.31) calculates the risk for 
each network state as the product of the damage and the probability of that network state. 
Constraint set (4.32) determines the maximum amount of risk that could occur in the network 
from any network state. Constraint (4.33) calculates the total network risk as the sum of the risk 
from all network states. Constraint (4.34) is the budget constraint which limits the total spare 
capacity investment, where cj is the unit cost of spare capacity on link j, wi is the amount of 
working capacity on link i, and parameter ,
q
i jδ  = 1 if the qth eligible backup route for link i in the 
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set Qi includes link j, and = 0 otherwise. Lastly, constraint sets (4.35) and (4.36) express the 
binary nature of the design and failure variables. 
 
Min-max risk link protection design problem (Link-path model) 
Objective: 
,
min 1 2
qbp fi i
k totalrisk k maxrisk× + ×                                               (4.24) 
,    
i
q
i i
q Q
f bp i L
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                                 (4.25) 
, , 1 ,    ,
i
q q
s i i s i i
q Q
h f bp s S i Lζ
∈
= + − ∈ ∈∑           (4.26) 
, , , ,    ,s i s i s ie state h s S i L= ∈ ∈               (4.27) 
, , , ,    ,s r s i r i
i L
y e p s S r R
∈
= ∈ ∈∑            (4.28) 
, ,K ,    ,s r s rz y s S r R≥ ∈ ∈             (4.29) 
, ,    s s r r
r R
damage z d s S
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                                  (4.30) 
,    s s srisk damage stateprob s S= ∀ ∈                                  (4.31) 
,    smaxrisk risk s S≥ ∀ ∈                       (4.32) 
s
s S
totalrisk risk
∈
=∑                 (4.33) 
,
i
q q
j i i i j
i L q Q j L
c w f budgetδ
∈ ∈ ∈
≤∑∑∑              (4.34) 
, : ,    ,qi i ibp f binary i L q Q∀ ∈ ∀ ∈             (4.35) 
, : ,    ,s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈              (4.36) 
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The link-path InP formulation for the min-max risk path protection design is presented in 
(4.37)–(4.48). The decision variables to be determined are binary variables bpr, which 
determines a set of lightpaths to be protected, where bpr = 1 if lightpath r is protected, and bpr = 
0 otherwise, and the binary variables qrf , which specifies the backup route for lightpath r, where 
q
rf = 1 if lightpath r is protected and uses the q
th route in the backup route set Qr for its backup 
path, and = 0 otherwise. The design objective in (4.37) is to minimize a linear summation of the 
total risk and the maximum risk that could occur in any network state. The constraint sets (4.38)–
(4.48) are similar to the constraints (3.45)–(3.53) in the minimum-risk path protection design 
except for constraint sets (4.43)–(4.44) which calculate the maximum risk. 
Constraint set (4.38) indicates that if lightpath r is protected, there must exist one backup 
path, whose route is selected from a set of eligible backup routes Qr. Constraints (4.39)–(4.41) 
are the failure state relationships which determine whether or not lightpath r will fail in network 
state s, taking into account the path protection mechanism being deployed in the network. More 
specifically, Constraint set (4.39) determines whether or not the backup path for lightpath r is 
available in network state s.  The backup path for lightpath r might not be available in network 
state s (i.e., hs,r = 1) for two reasons: either the backup path exists but fails due to a cable cut in 
that network state (i.e., ,
r
q q
r s r
q Q
f ζ
∈
∑ =1), or lightpath r is not protected (i.e., bpr = 0, or 1-bpr = 1). 
Constraint set (4.40) indicates that lightpath r fails in network state s (i.e., ys,r > 0) if and only if 
both its working path fails (i.e., gs,r > 0) and its backup path is not available in that network state 
(i.e., hs,r = 1). Constraint set (4.41) relates variable ys,r to binary variable zs,r. Constraints (4.42)– 
(4.45) are for the calculation of the total risk and the maximum risk as in the link protection case. 
Constraint (4.46) is the budget constraint. Lastly, constraint sets (4.47) and (4.48) express the 
binary nature of the design and failure variables. 
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Min-max risk path protection design problem (Link-path model) 
Objective: 
,
min 1 2
qbp fr r
k totalrisk k maxrisk× + ×                      (4.37) 
,    
r
q
r r
q Q
f bp r R
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                       (4.38) 
, , 1 ,    ,
r
q q
s r r s r r
q Q
h f bp s S r Rζ
∈
= + − ∈ ∈∑                     (4.39) 
, , , ,    ,s r s r s ry g h s S r R= ∈ ∈                       (4.40) 
, ,K ,    ,s r s rz y s S r R≥ ∈ ∈              (4.41) 
, ,    s s r r
r R
damage z d s S
∈
= ∀ ∈∑                         (4.42) 
,    s s srisk damage stateprob s S= ∀ ∈            (4.43) 
,    smaxrisk risk s S≥ ∀ ∈             (4.44) 
s
s S
totalrisk risk
∈
=∑                 (4.45) 
,
r
q q
j r r r j
r R q Q j L
c m f budgetδ
∈ ∈ ∈
≤∑∑∑                      (4.46) 
, : ,    ,qr r rbp f binary r R q Q∀ ∈ ∀ ∈           (4.47) 
, : ,    ,s rz binary s S r R∀ ∈ ∀ ∈                          (4.48) 
4.3 MINIMUM-RMS DAMAGE SURVIVABLE NETWORK DESIGN 
In this section, the minimum Root-Mean-Squared (RMS) damage survivable network design is 
presented. This design approach can avoid some drawbacks of other design approaches. In the 
minimum-risk design approach, the design only focuses on the minimization of the expected 
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damage value, while ignoring how low or high the damage from each failure scenario could be 
or the variability of damage across the failure scenarios, as long as the expected value is 
minimized. In addition, the min-max damage design and the min-max risk design are only 
concerned about the expected damage value and the worst-case values (i.e., the maximum 
damage, and the maximum risk), while not directly considering the variability of damage or the 
probability distribution of damage that could occur in the network. 
In contrast, the minimum-RMS damage design takes into account how small or large the 
damage from each network state could be by minimizing the variability of damage that could 
occur in the network. The objective of this design is to minimize the square root of the expected 
damage-squared value across all network states, or the RMS of damage, as calculated in (4.49). 
 
 2 of s s
s S
RMS damage stateprob damage
∈
= ∑                (4.49) 
 
By squaring the damage level of each network failure state, the damage in the network 
states with higher damage levels is increased to a greater extent than the damage in the network 
states with lower damage levels, thus encouraging the design to protect against failures with 
higher damage levels. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates a difference between the minimum-RMS damage survivable 
network design and the minimum-risk survivable network design. In the figure, two probability 
distributions of damage are shown. The damage distribution in Figure 4.1 (b) has both low and 
high damage levels, but the same expected damage value as the one in Figure 4.1 (a) (i.e., 2). 
However the damage distribution in (b) has a higher RMS value of damage (i.e., 5 ) than the 
one in (a) (i.e., 2), and therefore the minimum-RMS damage design prefers the damage 
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distribution in Figure 4.1(a) to the distribution in Figure 4.1(b). This example shows that the 
minimum-RMS damage design tends to protect the network from high damage values. 
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Figure 4.1 Two probability distributions of damage illustrating a difference between the minimum-RMS damage 
design and the minimum-risk design  
 
Since the objective function of the minimum-RMS damage design is non-linear, the 
design problem cannot be solved using an InP approach. Here, a greedy heuristic algorithm 
similar to Heuristic 3 in Section 3.4.2 is proposed for solving the minimum-RMS damage design. 
The flow chart of this iterative greedy heuristic algorithm is presented in Figure 4.2. 
This heuristic algorithm consists of two steps.  In the first step, the algorithm chooses to 
protect a link (in the link protection case) or a lightpath (in the path protection case) one at a time 
using one of the backup routes in the pre-computed route set, where the protection produces the 
greatest ratio of the reduction in RMS of damage to the backup path cost, and does not violate 
the budget limit. The process repeats until no more links or lightpaths can be selected due to the 
budget constraint, or all the links or lightpaths have been protected. Since the first step might not 
yield an optimal solution, an iterative process in the second step is deployed to improve the 
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solution. The second step is based on an idea that it is possible to improve the current solution by 
iteratively removing the protection from a protected link or lightpath in the current solution, 
followed by updating the budget, and then choosing to protect other unprotected links or 
lightpaths using one of the pre-computed backup routes that could produce a greater reduction in 
RMS of damage.  The iterative process keeps reducing the amount of RMS of damage, and 
terminates when the current solution cannot be improved further, or a predefined number of 
iterations is reached. 
 
 
Given a working network, a survivability 
technique, and a fixed budget
Compute amount of RMS of damage 
reduction associated with each link/lightpath 
and backup path
Apply heuristic algorithm similar to Heuristic 2, 
with greatest RMS of damage reduction to 
cost ratio, instead of greatest risk reduction 
to cost ratio
Initial
solution
Iteratively select protected link/lightpath in 
current solution then remove protection
Update budget
Choose to protect links/lightpaths which 
results in greatest RMS of damage reduction, 
subject to budget constraint
Current
solution
Update budget
 
 
Figure 4.2 Flow chart of the iterative greedy heuristic algorithm for solving the minimum-RMS damage design 
problem 
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4.4 NUMERICAL RESULTS 
The numerical results from the min-max damage survivable network design, and the min-max 
risk survivable network design with different values of design parameters k1 and k2, are 
presented in Section 4.4.1, and 4.4.2, respectively.  Then, a numerical comparison of different 
risk-based survivable network designs for networks with single class of traffic is presented in 
Section 4.4.3; and a comparison for networks supporting multiple classes of traffic is presented 
in Section 4.4.4. 
In the experiments, the minimum-risk design problems, the min-max damage design 
problems, and the min-max risk design problems as formulated in the InP models of Sections 
3.4.1, 4.1, and 4.2 were solved using the commercial CPLEX/AMPL solver with all possible 
routes within two hops from the shortest backup route used as a set of pre-computed backup 
routes. Whereas the minimum-RMS damage design problems were solved using the heuristic 
algorithm explained in Section 4.3 with the same set of pre-computed backup routes. Also, the 
damage is measured as the traffic loss rate caused by lightpath failures; and only network states 
with at most two simultaneous link failures are considered in the risk calculation. 
Network 2 shown in Figure 3.8, with cable lengths and Cable Cut (CC) metrics indicated 
in the figure, is used as a network example. All the cables have the same Mean Time To Repair 
(MTTR) of 24 hours. For each network, a full mesh of lightpath demands between all node pairs 
are assumed, each of which carries the same data rate of 10 Gbps.  The working path of each 
lightpath is routed along the shortest path based on the hop count, and given to the design 
problem.  Also, the spare capacity cost is defined as 1 budget unit per 10 Gbps per 1000 km.  
The numerical results are only presented for some particular budget values. For link 
protection on Network 2, budget values of 15, 30, and 45 units are considered, which represents 
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approximately about 25%, 50%, and 75% of the minimum cost required for protecting all the 
network links, respectively. Whereas for path protection on Network 2, budget values of 10, 20, 
and 30 units are considered, which represents approximately about 25%, 50%, and 75% of the 
minimum cost required for protecting all the lightpaths in the network, respectively. 
4.4.1 Min-max damage survivable network design 
Table 4.2 shows a list of all network states in Network 2 which have the highest damage level 
(i.e., 100 Gbps) and the second highest damage level (i.e., 90 Gbps), when the network is not 
protected. Each network state is represented as the failed links in that network state and the 
corresponding damage level. As shown in Table 4.2, the network states which have the highest 
damage levels are those among the dual-link failure states. 
 
Table 4.2 A list of all network states in Network 2 which have the two highest damage levels 
 
Network state 
(shown as failed links) 
 
Damage level 
(Gbps) 
Network state 
(shown as failed links) 
Damage level 
(Gbps) 
3-4, 5-9 100 2-10, 8-9 90 
3-4, 8-9 100 3-4, 6-7 90 
1-7, 3-4 90 3-10, 5-9 90 
1-7, 5-9 90 3-10, 8-9 90 
1-7, 8-9 90 4-7, 5-9 90 
1-8, 3-4 90 4-7, 8-9 90 
2-10, 3-4 90 5-9, 6-7 90 
2-10, 5-9 90 6-7, 8-9 90 
 
Table 4.3 presents the results from the min-max damage link protection designs on 
Network 2 with a budget of 30 units (about 50% of the minimum cost for protecting all network 
links); whereas Table 4.4 presents the results for the path protection case with a budget of 20 
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units (about 50% of the minimum cost for protecting all lightpaths). The results are presented in 
terms of the set of protected links or lightpaths, the total risk or the expected damage, and the 
maximum damage for different values of design parameters k1, and k2.  
In the link protection case, the results in Table 4.3 show that the min-max damage design 
with k1=0 and k2=1, which minimizes the maximum damage only, provides the lowest 
maximum damage level, i.e., 80 Gbps. This design could avoid the high damage levels (i.e., 100 
Gbps and 90 Gbps) from occurring in the network by choosing to protect at least one of the two 
failed links in each of the network states listed in Table 4.2, and deploying the backup route for 
each protected link that does not traverse the other failed link in that network state. Note that the 
design with k1=0 and k2=1 is only considered as to provide the lowest value of maximum 
damage. However, this design could result in a very high risk level, because a minimization of 
total risk is not a part of the design objective. Thus the design might not spend any money for 
protecting the network to reduce the total risk level, or might choose backup routes that do not 
result in the minimum risk level. 
For the min-max damage design with k1=1 and k2=1, since the maximum damage value 
is typically much larger than the total risk value (i.e., the expected damage value), therefore this 
design puts a higher priority on minimizing the maximum damage level than minimizing the 
total risk level. The results in Table 4.3 show that the design with k1=1 and k2=1 chooses to 
protect at least one of the two failed links in each network state listed in Table 4.2 (i.e., links 1-7, 
2-10, 3-4, 5-9, and 8-9) in order to minimize the maximum damage, which results in the lowest 
maximum damage level (i.e., 80 Gbps), and protect some additional links (i.e., links 2-3, 5-6, 5-
10, 6-7, 7-8, and 9-10) in order to reduce the total risk level as much as possible, which results in 
a total risk that is 28.56% higher than the lowest total risk level. In contrast, the design with k1=1 
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and k2=0, or the minimum-risk design, yields the lowest total risk level, but results in a 
maximum damage level that is 12.5% higher than the lowest possible value. For this network 
example the experiments reveal that there is no other values of design parameters k1 and k2 that 
could provide other results than those shown in Table 4.3. 
In the path protection case, the results in Table 4.4 show that the min-max damage design 
with k1=1 and k2=1, which put a higher priority on minimizing the maximum damage than 
minimizing the total risk, can achieve the lowest maximum damage level (i.e., 50 Gbps), but 
results in the total risk that is 81.38% larger than the smallest total risk level. On the other hand, 
the design with k1=1 and k2=0, or the minimum-risk path protection design, could provide the 
smallest total risk level, but a maximum damage that is 60% higher than the lowest possible 
value. Whereas, the design with k1=20 and k2=1 provides a compromise between the minimum-
risk design (k1=1 and k2=0) and the min-max damage design with k1=1 and k2=1. Even though 
this design cannot achieve the smallest total risk level or the smallest maximum damage level, it 
yields the total risk that is only 17.45% larger than the smallest total risk level, and the maximum 
damage that is only 20% larger than the minimum possible value. 
 
Table 4.3 Results from min-max damage link protection design on Network 2 for a given budget of 30 units  
Metric k1=1, k2=0 k1=1, k2=1 k1=0, k2=1 
Protected links 
1-2, 1-7, 2-3, 
2-10, 3-4, 4-8, 
5-6, 5-10, 6-7, 
7-8, 8-9, 9-10 
1-7, 2-3, 2-10, 
3-4, 5-6, 5-9, 
5-10, 6-7, 7-8, 
8-9, 9-10 
1-7, 2-10, 3-4, 
3-10, 5-9, 8-9 
Total Risk 
(Mbps) 
549.53 
(0%) 
706.63 
(+28.56%) 
1852.90 
(+237.18%) 
Maximum 
Damage 
(Gbps) 
90 
(+12.5%) 
80 
(0%) 
80 
(0%) 
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Table 4.4 Results from min-max damage path protection design on Network 2 for a given budget of 20 units  
Metric k1=1, k2=0 k1=20, k2=1 k1=1, k2=1 k1=0, k2=1 
Protected 
lightpaths 
1-4, 1-6, 1-7, 
1-10, 2-5, 2-6, 
2-7, 2-9, 2-10, 
3-4, 3-6, 3-7, 
4-10, 5-6, 5-7, 
6-10, 7-8, 7-9, 
7-10, 8-9, 9-10 
1-4, 1-5, 1-6,  
1-7, 2-5, 2-6,  
2-7, 2-9, 2-10,  
3-4, 3-6, 3-7,  
4-5, 4-10, 5-6,  
5-7, 6-10, 7-9,  
8-9, 9-10 
1-3, 1-4, 1-5,  
1-6, 1-7, 2-5,  
2-6, 2-7, 2-9,  
3-5, 3-7, 4-10,  
5-8, 5-9, 7-9,  
7-10, 9-10 
1-2, 1-3, 1-5,  
1-6, 2-5, 2-6,  
2-7, 2-9, 3-5,  
3-7, 4-10, 5-8,  
5-9, 7-9, 7-10  
Total Risk 
(Mbps) 
1,013.69 
(0%) 
1,190.54 
(+17.45%) 
1,838.67 
(+81.38%) 
2,448.11 
(+141.51%) 
Maximum 
Damage 
(Gbps) 
80 
(+60%) 
60 
(+20%) 
50 
(0%) 
50 
(0%) 
 
4.4.2 Min-max risk survivable network design 
Table 4.5 lists the ten network states in Network 2 that have the highest risk levels in decreasing 
order, when the network is not protected. Each of the network states is represented by the failed 
links in that network state. We observe that the network states that have the highest risk levels 
are those among the single-link failure states. This is because the single-link failure states have a 
much higher state probability than the dual-link failure states, despite their lower damage level. 
 
Table 4.5 A list of ten network states in Network 2 with the highest risk levels in decreasing order 
Network state 
(shown as failed links) 
Risk level 
(Mbps) 
Network state 
(shown as failed links) 
Risk level 
(Mbps) 
1-7 1,771.64 9-10 519.58 
3-4 1,298.95 6-7 386.10 
8-9 848.11 5-10 354.36 
5-6 631.48 1-8 192.52 
2-10 580.76 4-8 162.50 
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Table 4.6 presents the results from the min-max risk link protection designs on Network 
2 with a budget of 30 units; whereas Table 4.7 presents the results for the path protection case 
with a budget of 20 units. The results are presented in terms of the set of protected 
links/lightpaths, the total risk, and the maximum risk for different values of design parameters 
k1, and k2. The results from the design with k1=1 and k2=0 which yields the minimum total risk 
level, and the design with k1=0 and k2=1 which gives the minimum maximum risk level are also 
provided as references.   
The results for the min-max risk link protection case in Table 4.6 show that for the given 
budget the min-max risk design tends to protect those high-risk links listed in Table 4.5, 
especially when k2 is large relative to k1 (i.e., when the design puts a higher priority on 
minimizing the maximum risk). The results show that the design with k1=1, k2=100 achieves the 
smallest value for the maximum risk, and results in the total risk that is 18.21% higher than the 
minimum value. In contrast, the design with k1=1 and k2=0, or the minimum-risk design, yields 
the lowest total risk level, but results a maximum risk level that is 19.97% higher than the lowest 
value. Whereas, the design with k1=1 and k2=5 provides a compromise between the minimum-
risk design and the min-max risk design with k=1 and k2=100. Even though this design does not 
achieve the lowest possible values for the total risk and the maximum risk, it yields the total risk 
that is only 4.55% higher than the minimum total risk level, and the maximum risk that is only 
1.26% higher than the lowest value. 
Similarly, the results for the path protection case in Table 4.7 show that the min-max risk 
design with k1=1 and k2=100, which puts a higher priority on minimizing the maximum risk 
rather than the total risk, can achieve the lowest possible value for the maximum risk, but results 
in a high total risk that is 14.83% larger than the minimum total risk level. In contrast, the design 
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with k1=1 and k2=0 or the minimum-risk design yields the lowest total risk level, but results in a 
maximum risk that is 141.75% larger than the minimum maximum risk level. Whereas the 
design with k1=1 and k2=1 provides a compromise between the minimum-risk design and the 
min-max risk design with k1=1 and k2=100. 
Note that the design with k1=0 yields a higher total risk level than other design 
alternatives.  This is understandable because when k1=0 the minimization of the total risk is not a 
part of the design objective, therefore the design might not choose the backup routes that result 
in the lowest total risk level, or not spend any budget for protecting the network to reduce the 
total risk level, as long as it could achieve the smallest maximum risk level. 
 
Table 4.6 Results from the min-max risk link protection design on Network 2 for a given budget of 30 units 
Metric k1=1, k2=0 k1=1, k2=5 k1=1, k2=100 k1=0, k2=1 
Protected links 
1-2, 1-7, 2-3,  
2-10, 3-4, 4-8,  
5-6, 5-10, 6-7,  
7-8, 8-9, 9-10 
1-7, 1-8, 2-3, 
2-10, 3-4, 4-9, 
5-6, 5-10, 6-7, 
7-8, 8-9, 9-10 
1-7, 1-8, 2-10, 
3-4, 5-6, 5-10, 
6-7, 8-9, 9-10 
1-7, 1-8, 2-10, 
3-4, 5-6, 5-10, 
6-7, 8-9, 9-10 
Total Risk 
(Mbps) 
549.53 
(0%) 
574.53 
(+4.55%) 
649.58 
(+18.21%) 
651.62 
(+18.58%) 
Maximum Risk 
(Mbps) 
96.26 
(+19.97%) 
81.25 
(+1.26%) 
80.24 
(0%) 
80.24 
(0%) 
 
Table 4.7 Results from the min-max risk path protection design on Network 2 for a given budget of 20 units 
Metric k1=1, k2=0 k1=1, k2=1 k1=1, k2=100 k1=0, k2=1 
Protected 
lightpaths 
1-4, 1-6, 1-7,  
1-10, 2-5, 2-6,  
2-7, 2-9, 2-10,  
3-4, 3-6, 3-7,  
4-10, 5-6, 5-7,  
6-10, 7-8, 7-9,  
7-10, 8-9, 9-10 
1-4, 1-6, 1-7,   
1-9, 1-10, 2-5,  
2-6, 2-7, 2-9,  
2-10, 3-4, 3-6,  
3-7, 4-10, 5-6,  
5-7, 6-10, 7-10, 
8-9, 9-10 
1-4, 1-6, 1-7,  
1-9, 2-5, 2-6,  
2-7, 2-9, 2-10,  
3-4, 3-6, 3-7,  
4-10, 5-7, 5-8,  
6-10, 7-10, 8-9, 
9-10 
1-4, 1-6, 1-7,  
1-9, 2-5, 2-6,  
2-7, 2-9, 2-10,  
3-4, 3-6, 3-7,  
4-10, 5-7, 5-8,  
6-10, 7-10, 8-9, 
9-10 
Total Risk 
(Mbps) 
1,013.69 
(0%) 
1,033.85 
(1.99%) 
1,164.04 
(14.83%) 
1,164.63 
(14.89%) 
Maximum Risk 
(Mbps) 
254.43 
(141.75%) 
169.62 
(61.17%) 
105.25 
(0%) 
105.25 
(0%) 
 120 
4.4.3 Comparisons of different risk-based survivable network designs 
This section compares and analyzes the results from the different proposed risk-based survivable 
network design alternatives: the minimum-risk design, the min-max damage design, the min-max 
risk design, and the minimum-RMS damage design. For the min-max damage design, the design 
parameters: k1=1 and k2=1, are used; whereas for the min-max risk design, the parameters: k1=1 
and k2=100, are used. These parameter values are chosen such that the min-max damage design 
puts a higher priority on minimizing the maximum damage than minimizing the total risk; and 
the min-max risk design puts a higher priority on minimizing the maximum risk than minimizing 
the total risk. 
The comparisons are made based on the following measures: the probability of no 
damage which is the probability that the network is in the states that have a zero-damage level 
taking into account the protection deployed in the network, the total risk (i.e., the expected 
damage value), the maximum damage, the maximum risk, the RMS of damage, the standard 
deviation of damage, the sum of the expected damage value and the standard deviation of 
damage, and lastly the probability distribution of damage.   
Tables 4.8–4.10 presents the results from different risk-based link protection designs on 
Network 2 for a budget of 15, 30, and 45 units, which are approximately about 25%, 50%, and 
75% of the minimum cost for protecting all the network links, respectively. Whereas, Table 
4.11–4.13 presents the results from different risk-based designs using path protection on 
Network 2 for a budget of 10, 20, and 30 units, which are approximately about 25%, 50%, and 
75% of the minimum cost for protecting all the lightpaths in the network, respectively. In these 
tables, each number in the parenthesis represents the percentage difference of the metric of 
interest from the smallest value that can be achieved from any design being considered. 
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Table 4.8 Comparison of different risk-based link protection designs on Network 2 for a budget of 15 units 
Design’s objective function 
Metric 
Total Risk Total Risk + MaxDamage 
Total Risk + 
100×MaxRisk RMS Damage 
Probability of 
no Damage 0.9499 0.9088 0.9373 0.9372 
Total Risk 
(Mbps) 
1,675.09 
(0%) 
2,826.26 
(+68.72%) 
1,814.05 
(+8.30%) 
1,817.03 
(+8.47%) 
Maximum Damage 
(Gbps) 
90 
(+12.5%) 
80 
(0%) 
90 
(+12.5%) 
90 
(+12.5%) 
Maximum Risk 
(Mbps) 
424.06 
(+46.04%) 
885.82 
(+205.06%) 
290.38 
(0%) 
290.38 
(0%) 
RMS Damage 
(Mbps) 
8,054.61 
(+3.80%) 
10,074.28 
(+29.82%) 
7,767.15 
(+0.09%) 
7,759.97 
(0%) 
Std. of Damage 
(Mbps) 
7,707.46 
(+5.06%) 
9,286.65 
(+26.59%) 
7,345.24 
(+0.12%) 
7,336.25 
(0%) 
Expected Damage  + 
Std. of Damage 
(Mbps) 
9,382.54 
(+2.50%) 
12,112.91 
(+32.33%) 
9,159.29 
(+0.07%) 
9,153.27 
(0%) 
 
 
Table 4.9 Comparison of different risk-based link protection designs on Network 2 for a budget of 30 units 
Design’s objective function 
Metric 
Total Risk Total Risk + MaxDamage 
Total Risk + 
100×MaxRisk RMS Damage 
Probability of 
no Damage 0.9819 0.9765 0.9701 0.9762 
Total Risk 
(Mbps) 
549.53 
(0%) 
706.63 
(+28.59%) 
649.58 
(+18.21%) 
589.58 
(+7.29%) 
Maximum Damage 
(Gbps) 
90 
(+12.5%) 
80 
(0%) 
90 
(+12.5%) 
90 
(+12.5%) 
Maximum Risk 
(Mbps) 
96.26 
(+19.96%) 
96.26 
(+19.96%) 
80.24 
(0%) 
81.25 
(+1.25%) 
RMS Damage 
(Mbps) 
4,312.29 
(+2.85%) 
4,814.95 
(+14.84%) 
4,264.56 
(+1.71%) 
4,192.67 
(0%) 
Std. of Damage 
(Mbps) 
4,242.32 
(+3.22%) 
4,711.34 
(+14.63%) 
4,165.94 
(+1.36%) 
4,109.92 
(0%) 
Expected Damage  + 
Std. of Damage 
(Mbps) 
4,791.84 
(+1.96%) 
5,417.97 
(+15.29%) 
4,815.53 
(+2.47%) 
4,699.50 
(0%) 
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Table 4.10 Comparison of different risk-based link protection designs on Network 2 for a budget of 45 units 
Design’s objective function 
Metric 
Total Risk Total Risk + MaxDamage 
Total Risk + 
100×MaxRisk RMS Damage 
Probability of 
no Damage 0.9961 0.9507 0.9961 0.9947 
Total Risk 
(Mbps) 
140.22 
(0%) 
1,101.73 
(+685.73%) 
140.22 
(0%) 
154.94 
(+10.50%) 
Maximum Damage 
(Gbps) 
90 
(+28.57%) 
70 
(0%) 
90 
(+28.57) 
90 
(+28.57) 
Maximum Risk 
(Mbps) 
36.05 
(0%) 
259.79 
(+620.67%) 
36.05 
(0%) 
48.13 
(+33.52%) 
RMS Damage 
(Mbps) 
2,390.79 
(+1.43%) 
5,417.21 
(+129.82%) 
2,390.79 
(+1.43%) 
2,357.16 
(0%) 
Std. of Damage 
(Mbps) 
2,382.57 
(+1.52%) 
5,194.04 
(+121.31%) 
2,382.57 
(+1.52%) 
2,346.98 
(0%) 
Expected Damage  + 
Std. of Damage 
(Mbps) 
2,522.79 
(+0.83%) 
6,295.77 
(+151.64%) 
2,522.79 
(+0.83%) 
2,501.93 
(0%) 
 
 
Table 4.11 Comparison of different risk-based path protection designs on Network 2 for a budget of 10 units 
Design’s objective function 
Metric 
Total Risk Total Risk + MaxDamage 
Total Risk + 
100×MaxRisk RMS Damage 
Probability of 
no Damage 0.9089 0.8981 0.8865 0.8760 
Total Risk 
(Mbps) 
2,210.96 
(0%) 
2,550.38 
(+15.35%) 
2,355.91 
(+6.56%) 
2,462.35 
(+11.37%) 
Maximum Damage 
(Gbps) 
90 
(+28.57%) 
70 
(0%) 
90 
(+28.57%) 
90 
(+28.57%) 
Maximum Risk 
(Mbps) 
424.06 
(+63.23%) 
389.68 
(+50%) 
259.79 
(0%) 
259.79 
(0%) 
RMS Damage 
(Mbps) 
8,408.52 
(+8.90%) 
8,609.02 
(+11.50%) 
7,721.01 
(0%) 
7,752.86 
(+0.41%) 
Std. of Damage 
(Mbps) 
7,833.94 
(+12.22%) 
7,859.21 
(+12.58%) 
7,010.13 
(0.42%) 
6,980.76 
(0%) 
Expected Damage  + 
Std. of Damage 
(Mbps) 
10,044.89 
(+7.25%) 
10,409.59 
(+11.14%) 
9,366.04 
(0%) 
9,443.10 
(+0.82%) 
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Table 4.12 Comparison of different risk-based path protection designs on Network 2 for a budget of 20 units 
Design’s objective function 
Metric 
Total Risk Total Risk + MaxDamage 
Total Risk + 
100×MaxRisk RMS Damage 
Probability of 
no Damage 0.9496 0.8981 0.9248 0.9164 
Total Risk 
(Mbps) 
1,013.69 
(0%) 
1,838.67 
(+81.38%) 
1,164.04 
(+14.83%) 
1,180.75 
(+16.48%) 
Maximum Damage 
(Gbps) 
80 
(+60%) 
50 
(0%) 
80 
(+60%) 
80 
(+60%) 
Maximum Risk 
(Mbps) 
254.43 
(+141.75%) 
259.79 
(+146.78%) 
105.25 
(0%) 
169.62 
(+61.17%) 
RMS Damage 
(Mbps) 
5,164.57 
(13.76%) 
6,216.14 
(36.92%) 
4,806.33 
(5.86%) 
4,540.08 
(0%) 
Std. of Damage 
(Mbps) 
4,966.81 
(+17.26%) 
5,676.48 
(+34.02%) 
4,526.86 
(+6.88%) 
4,235.57 
(0%) 
Expected Damage  + 
Std. of Damage 
(Mbps) 
5,980.49 
(+10.42%) 
7,515.15 
(+38.75%) 
5,690.90 
(+5.07%) 
5,416.32 
(0%) 
 
 
Table 4.13 Comparison of different risk-based path protection designs on Network 2 for a budget of 30 units 
Design’s objective function 
Metric 
Total Risk Total Risk + MaxDamage 
Total Risk + 
100×MaxRisk RMS Damage 
Probability of 
no Damage 0.9782 0.8986 0.9781 0.9633 
Total Risk 
(Mbps) 
367.36 
(0%) 
1,163.61 
(+216.75%) 
378.18 
(+2.95%) 
447.85 
(+21.91%) 
Maximum Damage 
(Gbps) 
70 
(+75%) 
40 
(0%) 
70 
(+75%) 
60 
(+50%) 
Maximum Risk 
(Mbps) 
54.17 
(+12.54%) 
129.89 
(+169.88%) 
48.13 
(0%) 
59.06 
(+22.71%) 
RMS Damage 
(Mbps) 
2,712.28 
(+5.68%) 
3,927.99 
(+53.04%) 
2,819.78 
(+9.86%) 
2,566.61 
(0%) 
Std. of Damage 
(Mbps) 
2,662.60 
(+6.99%) 
3,585.82 
(+44.08%) 
2,769.15 
(+11.27%) 
2,488.70 
(0%) 
Expected Damage  + 
Std. of Damage 
(Mbps) 
3,029.96 
(+3.18%) 
4,749.43 
(+61.73%) 
3,147.33 
(+7.18%) 
2,936.56 
(0%) 
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The results show the tradeoffs among different risk-based survivable network designs. 
First, a comparison in term of the total risk or the average damage level is considered. The 
results show that the minimum-risk design always yields the smallest total risk level. Whereas, 
the min-max risk design (with k1=1, k2=100) and the minimum-RMS damage design have the 
comparable total risk levels; The min-max damage design (with k1=1, k2=1) results in the 
highest total risk level, much larger than the other designs (e.g., 68.72%, and 216.75% higher 
than the smallest possible value in Table 4.8, and Table 4.13, respectively). This is 
understandable because when the min-max damage design minimizes the maximum damage 
level, it does not take the probability of failure into a consideration. Therefore, the design might 
protect the network against failure scenarios which have high damage levels but a small 
probability of occurring, which results in a small risk reduction. Another reason is that in order 
for the min-max damage design to reduce the damage occurring in a dual-link failure state, the 
design must select the backup route for each failed link (in link protection) and each failed 
lightpath (in path protection) such that it does not traverse the other failed link in that dual-link 
failure state. As a result, the backup paths in the min-max damage design might take longer 
routes, and therefore require a higher spare capacity cost. 
Next, we compare different risk-based designs in term of the maximum damage that 
could occur in the network from any network state. The results show that the min-max damage 
design provides the lowest maximum damage level; whereas all other designs result in the 
comparable maximum damage levels.  For example, in the link protection case in Table 4.10, the 
min-max damage design results in a maximum damage of 70 Gbps, whereas other designs result 
in the same maximum damage level of 90 Gbps. Also, in the path protection case in Table 4.12, 
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the min-max damage design results in a maximum damage of 50 Gbps, whereas other designs 
result in the same maximum damage level of 80 Gbps.  
We also compare the different risk-based designs in term of the maximum risk that could 
occur from any network state. The results show that the min-max risk design provides the lowest 
maximum risk level. Whereas, in most cases the min-max damage design results in the highest 
maximum risk level, which is significantly larger than the smallest maximum risk level (e.g., 
about 3 times higher in Tables 4.8 and 4.13) 
Then, different risk-based designs are compared in term of the variability of damage that 
could occur in the network. The variability of damage is an important measure because the 
expected damage value seems to be the most appropriate measure only when an observation of 
damage level is made over an infinite period of time; however, in reality we are interested in the 
measures which are observed over a finite-time period, such as the loss of traffic per year, or the 
down time per year as defined in the Service Level Agreement (SLA). Over a finite period of 
time, the actual damage level that occurs could vary significantly and might be different from the 
expected value; therefore in this case the expected damage value is no longer the best measure, 
and the variability of damage should be considered.  
Two measures of the variability of damage are presented here: the RMS of damage and 
the one-side standard deviation (Std.) of damage. The one-side standard deviation of damage is 
defined as  2
:    
(   )
s
s s
s S damage expected damage value
stateprob damage expected damage value
∈ >
−∑ , where 
only the network states with the damage level greater than the expected damage value are 
included in the variability calculation since it makes sense to be only concerned about the  
variability of damage that is worse than the expected damage value. The RMS of damage 
measures the variability of damage above the zero-damage level, whereas the Std. of damage 
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measures the variability of damage above an expected damage value. In fact, the RMS damage 
can be viewed as the Std. of damage with zero expected damage value.  
The results show that, among the risk-based designs being considered, the minimum-
RMS damage design yields the lowest RMS value of damage, and the lowest one-side Std. of 
damage. Nevertheless, there is one case in Table 4.11 where the minimum-RMS damage design 
did not provide the lowest value for RMS damage level. This is understandable because the 
minimum-RMS damage design problem is solved by a heuristic approach which sometimes 
might not yield the optimal solution. The results also show that in most cases, the min-max risk 
design yields a lower RMS value of damage, and lower Std. of damage than the minimum-risk 
design. This is understandable because the min-max risk design includes a minimization of the 
maximum risk in its design objective, which tends to result in the lower variability of damage 
level. Whereas, the min-max damage design results in the highest values for both RMS of 
damage and Std. of damage. In fact, all of the above results show that the minimization of the 
maximum damage is a very costly design in terms of the total risk, the maximum risk, and the 
variability of damage. 
We also compare different risk-based designs in term of a linear summation of the 
expected damage value (i.e., the total risk) and the one-side Std. of damage. This measure takes 
into account together the expected value and the variability of damage above the expected value. 
This is a common approach for comparing different investments in financial industry (i.e., an 
expected value and a variance of the portfolio’s return). Based on this measure, we can say that 
one design is preferred to another design when it has a lower expected damage value and a lower 
Std. of damage than the other design; otherwise, a tradeoff between the minimization of the 
expected damage and the minimization of the variability of damage must be considered. This 
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tradeoff can be achieved through assigning the weight to each quantity indicating its relative 
importance according to the preference toward the expected value or the Std. of damage (i.e., 
risk-averse or risk-seeking).  Here, we assume that the weights for both the expected damage and 
the variation of damage are equal to one. 
From the results we observe that even though the minimum-risk design could provide the 
lowest expected damage value, it does not yield the lowest value for the sum of the expected 
damage and the one-side standard deviation of damage, due to its high Std. of damage value. The 
results show that in most cases the minimum-RMS damage design provides the lowest value for 
the sum of the expected damage and the one-side standard deviation of damage. The results also 
show that in most cases, the min-max risk design provides the value that is slightly higher than 
that from the minimum-RMS damage design; whereas the min-max damage design results in the 
highest value. Based on the results, by considering together the expected damage and the 
variability of damage, network operators may choose the minimum-RMS damage design and the 
min-max risk design as preferred design alternatives to the minimum-risk design approach, 
which is aimed at minimizing the expected damage value only. 
Lastly, we compare different risk-based designs based on the probability distribution of 
damage. The damage distribution plots provide complete information about the damage levels 
and their associated probability. The probability distribution of damage in Network2 with no 
protection is shown in Figure 4.3. The probability distribution of damage for different risk-based 
link protection designs on Network 2 with a budget of 30 units are presented in Figure 4.4 (a)–
(d); whereas the probability distributions of damage for the risk-based path protection designs on 
Network 2 with a budget of 20 units are presented in Figures 4.5 (a)–(d). Note that the 
probability associated with zero-damage level is not shown in the damage distribution plots due 
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to its higher value which cannot fit well with other probability value in the same plot, but are 
presented in Tables 4.9 and 4.12. 
These damage distribution plots in Figures 4.4–4.5 show how the different risk-based 
designs reduce the failure probability associated with each damage level from the initial value in 
Figure 4.3. The results show the advantage of the minimum-RMS damage design over other 
design alternatives in that it results in lower probabilities for the higher damage levels. The 
minimum-RMS damage design, which aims at minimizing the variability of damage above zero 
damage, protects the network in a way that the network tends to have lower likelihood of high 
damage levels, at the expense of higher probabilities for the smaller damage levels, as compared 
to other design approaches. This can be illustrated by considering, for example, the results in the 
link protection case from the minimum-risk design in Figures 4.4 (a) and the minimum-RMS 
damage design in Figure 4.4 (d). The minimum-RMS damage design results in higher or 
comparable probabilities for the low damage levels (i.e., traffic loss rate of 10, 20, and 30 Gbps) 
than the minimum-risk design, but smaller or comparable probabilities for the larger damage 
levels (i.e., traffic loss rate of 40 Gbps and above). Another example is to compare the results 
from the minimum-risk path protection design in Figure 4.5 (a) and the minimum-RMS damage 
path protection design in Figure 4.5 (d). The minimum-RMS damage design results in higher 
probabilities for the low damage levels (i.e., traffic loss rate of 10 and 20 Gbps) than the 
minimum-risk design, but smaller or comparable probabilities for the larger damage levels (i.e., 
traffic loss rate of 30 Gbps and above).  
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Figure 4.3 Probability distribution of damage in Network 2 with no protection deployed 
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Figure 4.4 Probability distribution of damage in Network 2 with link protection using (a) minimum-risk design, (b) 
min-max damage design, (c) min-max risk design, and (d) minimum-RMS damage design for a budget of 30 units 
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Figure 4.5 Probability distribution of damage in Network 2 with path protection using (a) minimum-risk design, (b) 
min-max damage design, (c) min-max risk design, and (d) minimum-RMS damage design for a budget of 20 units 
 
4.4.4 Comparisons of different risk-based survivable network designs for networks with 
multiple classes of traffic 
The results from different risk-based designs for networks supporting multiple classes of traffic 
are presented in this section. Three classes of traffic are defined for traffic flows (i.e., lightpaths): 
bronze, silver and gold, each associated with a different level of damage upon failure. In the 
experiments, we define the damage level caused by a failure of a bronze, silver, and gold traffic 
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flow as 1,000, 10,000, and 50,000 units, respectively. For the bronze traffic, a full-mesh of 
lightpath demands between all node-pairs are assumed; whereas for the silver and gold traffics, 
partial-mesh lightpath demands (i.e., between some node-pairs) are assumed in each network. 
Each lightpath carries the same data rate of 10 Gbps. In Network 2, the bronze, silver, and gold 
traffic are account for 53.79%, 38.64%, and 7.57% of the total network working capacity, 
respectively. 
Table 4.14 compares the results from different risk-based link protection designs on 
Network 2 for a given budget of 54 units, which is about 50% of the minimum cost required to 
protect all the network links; whereas Table 4.15 compares the results from different risk-based 
path protection designs on the same network for a given budget of 40 units, which is about 50% 
of the minimum cost required to protect all the connections. Figure 4.6 shows the probability 
distribution of damage in Network2 with no protection; where as the probability distributions of 
damage in the same network with link protection, and path protection are given in Figures 4.7 
(a)–(d), and Figures 4.8 (a)–(d), respectively.  
We observe that the results presented here for networks supporting multiple classes of 
traffic are very consistent with the results for networks with single class of traffic in Section 
4.4.3. The different risk-based deigns exhibit the same advantages and disadvantages as 
described in Section 4.4.3. That is, the minimum-risk design yields the smallest total risk level or 
average damage level. Whereas, the min-max risk design (with k1=1 and k2=100) and the 
minimum-RMS damage design have the comparable total risk levels; The min-max damage 
design (with k1=1 and k2=1) results in the highest total risk level, much larger than the other 
designs (e.g., 107.46% and 169.56% higher than the smallest possible value in Table 4.14, and 
Table 4.15, respectively). The result also shows that the min-max damage design provides the 
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lowest maximum damage level; whereas all other designs result in the comparable maximum 
damage levels. Moreover, the min-max risk design provides the lowest maximum risk level. 
Whereas, the min-max damage design results in the highest maximum risk level. Also, the 
minimum-RMS damage design yields the lowest value for RMS of damage, the lowest one-side 
Std. of damage, and the lowest value for the sum of the expected damage and the one-side 
standard deviation of damage. Whereas, the min-max damage design results in the highest values 
for the RMS of damage, the Std. of damage, and the sum of the expected damage and the one-
side standard deviation of damage. Lastly, the result for the probability distribution of damage 
shows that the minimum-RMS damage design tends to have lower likelihood of high damage 
levels, at the expense of higher probabilities for the smaller damage levels, as compared to other 
design approaches. 
 
Table 4.14 Comparison of different risk-based link protection designs on Network 2 with multiple classes 
of traffic for a budget of 54 units 
 
Design’s objective function 
Metric 
Total Risk Total Risk + MaxDamage 
Total Risk + 
100×MaxRisk RMS Damage 
Probability of 
no Damage 0.9807 0.9415 0.9715 0.9688 
Total Risk 
(units) 
814.79 
(0%) 
1690.39 
(+107.46%) 
832.67 
(+2.19%) 
911.90 
(+11.92%) 
Maximum Damage 
(units) 
169,000 
(+40.83%) 
120,000 
(0%) 
169,000 
(+40.83%) 
169,000 
(+40.83%) 
Maximum Risk 
(units) 
173.27 
(+27.55%) 
454.63 
(+234.68%) 
135.84 
(0%) 
212.03 
(+56.09%) 
RMS Damage 
(units) 
6,739.90 
(+16.87%) 
7,968.75 
(+38.18%) 
5,936.28 
(+2.94%) 
5,766.85 
(0%) 
Std. of Damage 
(units) 
6,641.62 
(18.11%) 
7,612.66 
(+35.38%) 
5,819.99 
(+3.50%) 
5,623.09 
(0%) 
Expected Damage  + 
Std. of Damage 
(units) 
7,456.40 
(+14.10%) 
9,303.05 
(+42.36%) 
6,652.67 
(+1.80%) 
6,534.90 
(0%) 
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Table 4.15 Comparison of different risk-based path protection designs on Network 2 with multiple classes 
of traffic for a budget of 40 units 
 
Design’s objective function 
Metric 
Total Risk Total Risk + MaxDamage 
Total Risk + 
100×MaxRisk RMS Damage 
Probability of 
no Damage 0.8981 0.8760 0.8760 0.8760 
Total Risk 
(units) 
380.31 
(0%) 
1,025.15 
(+169.56%) 
424.54 
(+11.63%) 
417.77 
(+9.85%) 
Maximum Damage 
(units) 
135,000 
(+132.76%) 
58,000 
(0%) 
145,000 
(+150%) 
135,000 
(+132.76%) 
Maximum Risk 
(units) 
51.96 
(+79.92%) 
212.03 
(634.18%) 
28.88 
(0%) 
51.96 
(+79.92%) 
RMS Damage 
(units) 
2,048.29 
(+8.45%) 
4,493.77 
(+137.94%) 
2,354.43 
(+24.66) 
1,888.61 
(0%) 
Std. of Damage 
(units) 
1,980.13 
(+10.02%) 
4,268.75 
(+137.18%) 
2,281.49 
(+26.76%) 
1,799.83 
(0%) 
Expected Damage  + 
Std. of Damage 
(units) 
2,360.44 
(+6.44%) 
5,293.89 
(+138.72%) 
2,706.03 
(+22.03%) 
2,217.60 
(0%) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Probability distribution of damage in Network 2 with multiple classes of traffic with no protection 
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Figure 4.7 Probability distribution of damage in Network 2 supporting multiple classes of traffic with link 
protection using (a) minimum-risk design, (b) min-max damage design, (c) min-max risk design, and (d) minimum-
RMS damage design for a budget of 54 units 
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Figure 4.8 Probability distribution of damage in Network 2 supporting multiple classes of traffic with path 
protection using (a) minimum-risk design, (b) min-max damage design, (c) min-max risk design, and (d) minimum-
RMS damage design for a budget of 40 units 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Various risk-based survivable network designs are presented in this chapter. The min-max 
damage survivable network design, and the min-max risk survivable network design are 
formulated as Integer Programming (InP) models; where as the minimum-route mean square 
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(RMS) damage survivable network design is solved by a heuristic algorithm due to its non-linear 
objective function. 
The advantages and disadvantages of different risk-based designs are illustrated through 
numerical results. If the total network risk or equivalently the expected value of damage is the 
only measure under consideration, the minimum-risk design is a preferred design alternative as it 
provides the minimum average damage level (i.e., total risk). However, if the expected value and 
the variability of damage are considered together, the minimum-risk design might not be the 
most preferred design, since it results in a higher variability than the minimum-RMS damage 
design. Determining which design is better depends on a preference toward the expected value or 
the variability of the damage. The results show that the minimum-RMS damage design could 
provide the lowest value for the sum of the expected damage and the standard deviation of 
damage. Also, the plots of probability distribution of damage also show an advantage of the 
minimum-RMS damage design in that the design results in smaller probabilities for the high 
damage levels, at the expense of higher probabilities for the smaller damage levels, when 
compared to other designs. 
The results also show that minimizing the maximum damage that could occur in the 
network is a very expensive design approach. The min-max damage design is the most 
conservative design which tries to minimize the worst damage from failures, but it results in a 
much higher value of the expected damage and the variability of damage (i.e., RMS of damage, 
and Std. of damage) than other designs in most cases.  
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5.0  CONTRIBUTIONS AND SUMMARY 
The contributions of this dissertation are twofold. First, this dissertation proposes a new 
approach for designing survivable networks, namely; risk-based survivable network design, 
which integrates risk analysis techniques into an incremental network design procedure with 
budget constraints. This design approach takes into account the network survivability aspects, as 
well as the economic aspects of an investment in network survivability. Then, based on the 
proposed risk-based design approach, this dissertation presents the solution methods, results, and 
analysis for different risk-based designs. Four risk-based designs are considered in the 
dissertation: the minimum-risk design, the min-max damage design, the min-max risk design, 
and the minimum-RMS damage design. These design problems are considered for the first time. 
The Integer Programming (InP) formulations for each design problem with link protection and 
path protection are also presented; whereas the minimum-RMS damage design is solved by the 
proposed greedy heuristic algorithm due to its nonlinearity. 
Based on the numerical results, interesting observations about the risk-based design 
approach are made. First, the results reveal that the minimum-risk curves have a convex shape. 
Then, based on the minimum-risk curves, a cost-benefit analysis is presented. Network operators 
can use the cost-benefit analysis to determine whether an investment in network survivability is 
justified by the amount of risk reduction, and determine the optimal budget value which 
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maximizes the benefit of an investment. The proof in Apendix B shows that if the risk curve is 
convex, an optimal budget value always exists. 
One advantage of the risk-based design approach is that it allows a tradeoff between the 
survivability cost saving and the amount of risk reduction in the network. The results show that 
network operators can achieve a substantial budget savings by allowing a slightly higher risk 
level in the network.   
The minimum-risk design for networks with multiple classes of traffic is also presented. 
The results show that network operators can use the minimum-risk design approach to design the 
networks in accordance with different availability requirements for different traffic classes as 
defined in the Service Level Agreement (SLA). 
As communication services require a higher level of network availability, network 
operators may consider protecting their network with dual protection. This dissertation also 
presents the incremental minimum-risk design for dual-protected networks, which can be used to 
determine in which parts of the networks to deploy the additional protection for a given budget. 
The results show that the risk curves for an investment in dual protection also have a convex 
shape, which indicates the existence of an optimal budget value for investing. 
The results from different risk-based designs are also compared. If only the total network 
risk or expected damage value is considered, the minimum-risk design is the most preferred 
design as it could provide the minimum value. However, if the expected value and the variability 
of damage are considered together, the minimum-risk design might not be the best design, since 
other designs such as the min-max risk design, and especially the minimum-RMS damage design 
provide lower variability in the damage. Different network operators may choose different 
design alternatives based on their preferences toward the expected value or the variability of 
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damage. In addition, if the maximum damage that could occur in the network is the major 
concern for network operators, the min-max damage design should be considered as this 
conservative design approach provides the smallest maximum damage level. However, this 
design approach results in a very high expected damage level, and a high variability in the 
damage. 
Additional future research works on risk-based survivable network design approaches are 
possible. The simplest extension is to consider other survivability techniques, such as link 
restoration, and path restoration. Unlike the dedicated protection techniques, the risk-based 
design for restorable networks is to determine how to allocate spare capacity to different parts of 
the network without specifying which links or connections to protect, because spare capacity is 
shared and can be used for failure recovery of any failed links or failed connections in the 
network. Another possible extension is to consider the risk-based designs for multi-layer 
networks. The cost model used in the risk-based designs can also be improved as the current 
model only considers the spare capacity cost. Lastly, another future research direction is to 
incorporate connection availability requirements along with the associated violation penalties as 
defined in Service Level Agreements (SLA), directly into the risk-based design approach. This 
may provide an answer to questions, such as, how should network operators set the required 
availability level and the associated penalty value in the SLA so that an investment in network 
survivability is justified. 
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APPENDIX A 
UNAVAILABILITY CALCULATION OF CABLE LINK 
Unavailability (U) is defined as the probability that the component will be found in the failure 
state at a random time in the future. In repairable systems in which failed components are 
replaced or repaired after a failure occurs, the unavailability of a component is  
 ,MTTR MTTRU
MTTF MTTR MTBF
= =+           (A.1) 
where MTTR denotes Mean Time To Repair, and MTTF denotes Mean Time To Failure. Note 
that, the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) is given by MTBF = MTTR+MTTF. For fiber 
optic cables, the MTBF is typically represented by a Cable Cut (CC) metric [4], which is the 
average cable length (km) that results in a single cable cut per year. For a given CC, MTBF of a 
fiber optic cable can be calculated by (A.2), where 365×24 is the amount of time in hours per 
year. 
 365 24( )
 ( )
CCMTBF hourcable cable length km
× ×=       (A.2) 
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APPENDIX B 
PROOF OF EXSISTENCE OF OPTIMAL BUDGET VALUE  
This appendix provides a proof that if the risk curve is convex, there always exists an optimal 
budget value which maximizes the benefit of an investment in network protection. 
The notation used in this section is shown in Table B.1 
 
Table B.1 Notation used in APPENDIX B 
x A variable denoting the budget (monetary unit) 
B(x) The benefit (monetary unit) as a function of variable x 
I A constant representing an initial risk level (risk unit) in the network 
R(x) Amount of risk (risk unit) in the network as a function of variable x (i.e., a 
minimum-risk curve) 
M A constant representing an equivalent monetary value per unit of risk 
reduction (monetary/risk unit) 
 
 
The benefit (monetary unit) of an investment in network protection is defined as the 
amount of risk reduction (monetary unit) subtracted by the budget or the protection cost 
(monetary unit) as shown in (3.118).  Based on the notation in Table B.1, the investment benefit 
equation can be written as in (B.1), where B(x) and R(x) are defined over a budget range [a, b]. 
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 ( )( ) M I ( )B x R x x= − − ,   for a x b≤ ≤  (B.1) 
Taking the second derivative of the right hand side of (B.1) with respect to x, we have 
( )( )22 M I ( )d R x xdx − −  =  
2
2 ( )
d R x
dx
− . 
Since R(x) is a convex function over a budget range [a, b], thus
2
2 ( ) 0
d R x
dx
≥  over the 
range [a, b]. 
Therefore,  
2
2 ( ) 0
d B x
dx
≤ ,   for a x b≤ ≤ . 
Since the second derivative of the benefit B(x) is less than or equal to zero, the benefit 
( )B x  is a concave function. Therefore, there always exists a value of x which gives a maximum 
value of B(x).  The optimal budget value optimalx is the value of x which gives the first derivative 
of the benefit function equal to zero as in (B.2) or (B.3). 
 ( )( )M I ( ) 0d R x x
dx
− − =  (B.2) 
 1( )
M
d R x
dx
= −  (B.3) 
If there is no value of x in the range of [a, b] that satisfies (B.2) or (B.3), the optimal 
budget value still exists and equals to the budget value at the edge of the budget range, i.e., either 
at  or optimal optimalx a x b= = . 
The example below illustrates that the optimal budget value obtained from the analytical 
approach in (B.3) is equal to the optimal budget value from the experiment. Figure B.1 shows the 
minimum-risk curves for link protection and path protection on Network 3. Assuming that the 
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risk reduction of 40 Mbps is equal to one monetary unit (i.e., M = 1/40), from (B.3) the optimal 
budget value from the analytical approach is the budget value at which a slope of the risk curve 
is equal to -40. In Figure B.1, the straight lines with a slope -40 are also shown, which can 
identify the point at which the slope of each risk curve equals to -40. As shown in Figure B.1, the 
optimal budget value from an analytical approach is 27.5 units, and 52.5 units in the link 
protection case and the path protection case respectively. These optimal budget values are equal 
to the optimal budget values obtained from the experiment which maximize the benefit as shown 
in Figure B.2 (a) and (b) for the link protection and path protection cases, respectively. 
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Figure B.1 Minimum-risk curves (Risk vs Budget) for link protection and path protection on Network 3 and optimal 
budget values obtained from analytical approach 
27.5 52.5 
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Figure B.2 Benefit plots for (a) link protection, and (b) path protection on Network 3 showing the optimal budget 
value of 27.5 units, and 52.5 units, respectively. 
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